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AN ORDER IS NOT ABANDONDED PURSUANT TO 22 NYCRR 202.48 UNLESS THE ORDER DIRECTS THAT IT BE SETTLED OR SUBMITTED FOR SIGNATURE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined dismissal of a motion to enter a default judgment as abandoned pursuant to 22 NYCTT 202.48(b) was improper because the underlying order did not direct that it be settled or submitted for signature:

The Supreme Court incorrectly, sua sponte, dismissed the action as abandoned pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.48(b) because … its determination of the plaintiff’s 2014 motion did not expressly direct that the proposed judgment or order be settled or submitted for signature (see 22 NYCRR 202.48[a]; Funk v Barry, 89 NY2d 364, 367). HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Moley, 2016 NY Slip Op 08844, 2nd Dept 12-28-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (AN ORDER IS NOT ABANDONDED PURSUANT TO 22 NYCRR 202.48 UNLESS THE ORDER DIRECTS THAT IT BE SETTLED OR SUBMITTED FOR SIGNATURE)/ABANDONMENT (CIVIL PROCEDURE, ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS, AN ORDER IS NOT ABANDONDED PURSUANT TO 22 NYCRR 202.48 UNLESS THE ORDER DIRECTS THAT IT BE SETTLED OR SUBMITTED FOR SIGNATURE)/ORDERS (ABANDONMENT, (AN ORDER IS NOT ABANDONDED PURSUANT TO 22 NYCRR 202.48 UNLESS THE ORDER DIRECTS THAT IT BE SETTLED OR SUBMITTED FOR SIGNATURE)

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GENERAL PRAYER FOR RELIEF WILL NOT JUSTIFY RELIEF DRAMATICALLY DIFFERENT FROM THAT REQUESTED IN THE MOTION, REPLY PAPERS CANNOT BE USED TO ADVANCE NEW ARGUMENTS.

In the context of a foreclosure proceeding, the Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, explained that a general prayer for relief cannot justify relief dramatically different from that requested in the motion, and reply papers cannot be used to raise new arguments:

The court may grant relief that is warranted pursuant to a general prayer for relief contained in a notice of motion if the relief granted is not too dramatically unlike the relief sought, the proof offered supports it, and there is no prejudice to any party … . Here, [defendant’s] application to vacate the final judgment of foreclosure and sale, as well as the related relief awarded, sua sponte, by the Supreme Court, was “dramatically unlike” the relief sought in Ivette’s motion, which only sought to stay the impending foreclosure sale based on her pending contempt motion in the matrimonial action.

The function of reply papers is to address arguments made in opposition to the position taken by the movant and not to permit the movant to introduce new arguments in support of, or new grounds or evidence for, the motion … . Here, [defendant’s] reply papers included new arguments in support of the motion, new grounds and evidence for the motion, and expressly requested relief that was dramatically unlike the relief sought in her original motion. Accordingly, those contentions, and the grounds and evidence in support of them, were not properly before the Supreme Court. Similarly, the court erred in, sua sponte, awarding related relief not requested by the parties … . USAA Fed. Sav. Bank v Calvin, 2016 NY Slip Op 08223, 2nd Dept 12-7-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (GENERAL PRAYER FOR RELIEF WILL NOT JUSTIFY RELIEF DRAMATICALLY DIFFERENT FROM THAT REQUESTED IN THE MOTION, REPLY PAPERS CANNOT BE USED TO ADVANCE NEW ARGUMENTS)/MOTION PAPERS (CIVIL, GENERAL PRAYER FOR RELIEF WILL NOT JUSTIFY RELIEF DRAMATICALLY DIFFERENT FROM THAT REQUESTED IN THE MOTION, REPLY PAPERS CANNOT BE USED TO ADVANCE NEW ARGUMENTS)/REPLY PAPERS (CIVIL, REPLY PAPERS CANNOT BE USED TO ADVANCE NEW ARGUMENTS)

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FAMILY COURT JUDGE SHOULD HAVE RECUSED HERSELF AFTER DEATH THREAT BY FATHER.

The Fourth Department determined the Family Court judge should have recused herself from a dispositional hearing in a permanent neglect proceeding. Father had made a death threat against the judge following the finding of permanent neglect:

It is well settled that, “[a]bsent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a . . . Judge is the sole arbiter of recusal” … , and the decision whether to recuse is committed to his or her discretion … . Under these circumstances, and particularly in view of the order of protection, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in refusing to recuse itself … . Matter of Trinity E. (Robert E.), 2016 NY Slip Op 07804, 4th Dept 11-18-16

FAMILY LAW (FAMILY COURT JUDGE SHOULD HAVE RECUSED HERSELF AFTER DEATH THREAT BY FATHER)/JUDGES (FAMILY COURT JUDGE SHOULD HAVE RECUSED HERSELF AFTER DEATH THREAT BY FATHER)/RECUSAL (FAMILY COURT JUDGE SHOULD HAVE RECUSED HERSELF AFTER DEATH THREAT BY FATHER)

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FAILURE TO FILE PROOF OF SERVICE IS A CORRECTABLE DEFECT, PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED ON THAT GROUND.

The Second Department determined failure to file proof of service of a petition and notice of petition should not have resulted in the denial of the petition. The motion court raised the ground for denial itself. Rather than denying the petition, the motion court should have alerted the parties to the defect and allowed it to be cured:

“The failure to file proof of service is a procedural irregularity, not a jurisdictional defect, that may be cured by motion or sua sponte by the court in its discretion pursuant to CPLR 2004” … . Here, there is no dispute that the respondents were served with the notice of petition and petition, as they moved to dismiss on the ground that the petition failed to state a cause of action. At no time did they argue that the proceeding should be dismissed for failure to file proof of service. As such, the parties did not have an opportunity to address the purported failure to file proof of service, the ground upon which the Supreme Court relied in denying the petition and dismissing the proceeding, even though such defect is readily curable (see CPLR 2001, 2004). “The lack of notice and opportunity to be heard implicates the fundamental issue of fairness that is the cornerstone of due process” … . Therefore, the Supreme Court should have alerted the parties to the purported defect and afforded the appellant an opportunity to correct it, rather than denying the petition and dismissing the proceeding… . Matter of Meighan v Ponte, 2016 NY Slip Op 07653, 2nd Dept 11-16-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (FAILURE TO FILE PROOF OF SERVICE IS A CORRECTABLE DEFECT, PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED ON THAT GROUND)/SERVICE, PROOF OF (FAILURE TO FILE PROOF OF SERVICE IS A CORRECTABLE DEFECT, PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED ON THAT GROUND)

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FATHER DID NOT ABUSE THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE PROHIBITED FUTURE PETITIONS.

The Fourth Department determined father, who was incarcerated in Michigan, was afforded due process in the proceedings in which his petition for visitation was denied. However, the court noted that Family Court did not have the power, under the circumstances, to prohibit any further petitions by father:

… [W]e agree with the father that the court erred in sua sponte imposing conditions restricting him from filing new petitions. It is well settled that “[p]ublic policy mandates free access to the courts” … , but ” a party may forfeit that right if she or he abuses the judicial process by engaging in meritless litigation motivated by spite or ill will’ ” … . Here, however, there is no basis in the record from which to conclude that the father had engaged in meritless, frivolous, or vexatious litigation, or that he had otherwise abused the judicial process … . Matter of Otrosinka v Hageman, 2016 NY Slip Op 07553, 4th Dept 11-10-16

FAMILY LAW (FATHER DID NOT ABUSE THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE PROHIBITED FUTURE PETITIONS)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FATHER DID NOT ABUSE THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE PROHIBITED FUTURE PETITIONS)

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SORA RISK LEVEL ASSESSMENT REVERSED, DEFENDANT WAS NOT GIVEN A MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO COURT’S ASSESSMENT FOR VIOLENCE.

The Third Department, reversing County Court’s risk level assessment, determined defendant was not given a meaningful opportunity to respond to the assessment of points:

A defendant has both a statutory and constitutional right to notice of points sought to be assigned to him or her so as to be afforded a meaningful opportunity to respond to that assessment … . Not only did County Court fail to give defendant notice of its intention to sua sponte assess points for the category of use of violence, it affirmatively misled defendant by its assurance that it had already “made a decision . . . regarding a point score,” which included no assignment of points for that risk factor. Accordingly, defendant was denied due process … . Considering the fact that defendant was never aware of the potential of the assignment of such points until a point in time where he no longer had an opportunity to object — his only remaining opportunity to be heard being explicitly limited to arguing for a downward departure — he need not have taken any further action to preserve the issue for our review … . People v Griest, 2016 NY Slip Op 06907, 33rd Dept 10-20-16

CRIMINAL LAW (SORA RISK LEVEL ASSESSMENT REVERSED, DEFENDANT WAS NOT GIVEN A MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO COURT’S ASSESSMENT FOR VIOLENCE)/SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) (SORA RISK LEVEL ASSESSMENT REVERSED, DEFENDANT WAS NOT GIVEN A MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO COURT’S ASSESSMENT FOR VIOLENCE)/APPEALS (SORA RISK LEVEL ASSESSMENT REVERSED, DEFENDANT WAS NOT GIVEN A MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO COURT’S ASSESSMENT FOR VIOLENCE, NO FURTHER ACTION NECESSARY TO PRESERVE ISSUE FOR APPEAL)

JUDGE’S EGREGIOUS BEHAVIOR WARRANTED REMOVAL FROM OFFICE.

The Court of Appeals determined the petitioner, a Town and Village Justice, should be removed from office for what might be termed “bullying” while on and off the bench:

The misconduct giving rise to that concession “qualifies as ‘truly egregious'” … . The record reflects that, among other things, petitioner used a sanction — a tool meant to “shield” from frivolous conduct — as a “sword” to punish a legal services organization for a perceived slight in an inexcusable and patently improper way (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [a] [authorizing the imposition of sanctions, but precluding town and village courts from applying such penalties]). The record is also replete with instances in which petitioner used his office and standing as a platform from which to bully and to intimidate. To that end, it is undisputed that petitioner engaged in ethnic smearing and name-calling and repeatedly displayed poor temperament — perhaps most significantly, by engaging in a physical altercation with a student worker.

Those actions are representative of an even more serious problem. Petitioner — in what allegedly was a grossly misguided attempt to motivate — repeatedly threatened to hold various officials and employees of the Village of Spring Valley in contempt without cause or process. …

Significantly, too, petitioner’s hectoring extended beyond the courthouse. In what ostensibly was an attempt to undermine a former co-Judge and an apparent political adversary, petitioner willfully injected himself into the political process involving the election of an office other than his own. Matter of Simon, 2016 NY Slip Op 06855, CtApp 10-20-16

 

JUDGES (JUDGE’S EGREGIOUS BEHAVIOR WARRANTED REMOVAL FROM OFFICE)

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DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT ENTITLED TO FULL NAMES OF ALL PERSONS WHOSE INITIALS APPEAR ON A DNA LAB REPORT; WRIT OF PROHIBITION ISSUED RE: JUDGE WHO ORDERED DISCLOSURE.

The Second Department determined the People were entitled to a writ of prohibition re: a County Court Judge’s order that they produce the names of all lab personnel whose initials appeared on lab report concerning DNA test results. The People had notified defense counsel persons at the lab had cheated on an exam for certification for use of a DNA software program. The software program was not used in defendant’s case. The People provided defense counsel with the names of the two persons implicated in the cheating whose initials appeared on the lab report. Defense counsel requested the names of all the persons whose initials were on the report. County Court granted that request:

…[T]he only relevant inquiry is whether or not [the judge’s] actions exceeded his authorized powers … . We conclude that Judge De Rosa exceeded his authority by directing the People to make available to the defendant the full names corresponding to the initials that appear on the subject laboratory reports … . Nothing contained in CPL 240.20 imposes an obligation on the People to respond to the defendant’s questions concerning notations that appear in discoverable materials, or to affirmatively create or compile material, or obtain it from sources beyond their control … . Matter of Hoovler v De Rosa, 2016 NY Slip Op 06830, 2nd Dept 10-19-16

 

JUDGES (WRIT OF PROHIBITION, DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT ENTITLED TO FULL NAMES OF ALL PERSONS WHOSE INITIALS APPEAR ON A DNA LAB REPORT; WRIT OF PROHIBITION ISSUED RE: JUDGE WHO ORDERED DISCLOSURE)/CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, WRIT OF PROHIBITION, DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT ENTITLED TO FULL NAMES OF ALL PERSONS WHOSE INITIALS APPEAR ON A DNA LAB REPORT; WRIT OF PROHIBITION ISSUED RE: JUDGE WHO ORDERED DISCLOSURE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, WRIT OF PROHIBITION, DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT ENTITLED TO FULL NAMES OF ALL PERSONS WHOSE INITIALS APPEAR ON A DNA LAB REPORT; WRIT OF PROHIBITION ISSUED RE: JUDGE WHO ORDERED DISCLOSURE)/PROHIBITION, WRIT OF (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT ENTITLED TO FULL NAMES OF ALL PERSONS WHOSE INITIALS APPEAR ON A DNA LAB REPORT; WRIT OF PROHIBITION ISSUED RE: JUDGE WHO ORDERED DISCLOSURE

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SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE ORDERED A NEW TRIAL UNLESS THE PARTIES STIPULATE TO REDUCED DAMAGES AWARDS; SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE TO POWER TO SUA SPONTE REDUCE THE DAMAGES AMOUNTS.

The Second Department, although agreeing with Supreme Court that aspects the damages award in this medical malpractice case were excessive, determined Supreme Court did not have the power to simply reduce the damages amounts. Rather, Supreme Court should have granted the motion to set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial unless the parties stipulate to the reduced damages:

… [I]t was procedurally improper for the Supreme Court to enter a judgment reducing the awards for future medical care, future medications, future physical and occupational therapy from age 21, future speech therapy from age 21, future medical equipment, future medical supplies, future loss of earning capacity, past pain and suffering, and future pain and suffering without granting a new trial on those issues unless the plaintiffs stipulated to reduce the verdict … . Reilly v St. Charles Hosp. & Rehabilitation Ctr., 2016 NY Slip Op 06485, 2nd Dept 10-5-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE ORDERED A NEW TRIAL UNLESS THE PARTIES STIPULATE TO REDUCED DAMAGES AWARDS; SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE TO POWER TO SUA SPONTE REDUCE THE DAMAGES AMOUNTS)/NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE ORDERED A NEW TRIAL UNLESS THE PARTIES STIPULATE TO REDUCED DAMAGES AWARDS; SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE TO POWER TO SUA SPONTE REDUCE THE DAMAGES AMOUNTS)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE ORDERED A NEW TRIAL UNLESS THE PARTIES STIPULATE TO REDUCED DAMAGES AWARDS; SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE TO POWER TO SUA SPONTE REDUCE THE DAMAGES AMOUNTS)/DAMAGES (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE ORDERED A NEW TRIAL UNLESS THE PARTIES STIPULATE TO REDUCED DAMAGES AWARDS; SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE TO POWER TO SUA SPONTE REDUCE THE DAMAGES AMOUNTS)/VERDICT, MOTION TO SET ASIDE (SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE ORDERED A NEW TRIAL UNLESS THE PARTIES STIPULATE TO REDUCED DAMAGES AWARDS; SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE TO POWER TO SUA SPONTE REDUCE THE DAMAGES AMOUNTS)

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FALSE INFORMATION IN ATTORNEY AFFIDAVIT JUSTIFIED DENIAL OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE BUT NOT DISMISSAL.

The Second Department determined false information in the attorney affidavit submitted by the plaintiff bank warranted denial of the motion for a judgment of foreclosure, but did not warrant dismissal of the complaint with prejudice and cancellation of the notice of pendency:

The Administrative Order requires the attorney to attest that the papers “contain no false statements of fact or law” (Administrative Order 548/10). A plaintiff’s failure to file the mandatory attorney affirmation in compliance with the Administrative Order warrants denial of a motion for a judgment of foreclosure and sale … . Here, since the subject affirmation contained an apparently false statement of fact, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the motion for a judgment of foreclosure and sale without prejudice to renew (see CPLR 2001).

However, the Supreme Court erred in, sua sponte, directing the dismissal of the complaint with prejudice and in directing the cancellation of the notice of pendency. “A court’s power to dismiss a complaint, sua sponte, is to be used sparingly and only when extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant dismissal” … . Here, there were no extraordinary circumstances … . Downey Sav. & Loan Assn., F.A. v Trujillo, 2016 NY Slip Op 06058, 2nd Dept  9-21-16

 

FORECLOSURE (FALSE INFORMATION IN ATTORNEY AFFIDAVIT JUSTIFIED DENIAL OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE BUT NOT DISMISSAL)/ATTORNEYS (FALSE INFORMATION IN ATTORNEY AFFIDAVIT JUSTIFIED DENIAL OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE BUT NOT DISMISSAL)

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