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EXCESSIVE INTERFERENCE BY THE JUDGE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL.

The Second Department determined excessive interference by the judge deprived defendant of a fair trial:

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“Trial judges have wide discretion in directing the presentation of evidence but must exercise that discretion appropriately and without prejudice to the parties” … . While “neither the nature of our adversary system nor the constitutional requirement of a fair trial preclude a trial court from assuming an active role in the truth-seeking process,” the court’s discretion in this area is not unfettered … . “The overarching principle restraining the court’s discretion is that it is the function of the judge to protect the record at trial, not to make it. Although the law will allow a certain degree of judicial intervention in the presentation of evidence, the line is crossed when the judge takes on either the function or appearance of an advocate at trial” … . Thus, while there is no absolute bar to a trial court asking a particular number of questions of the witnesses in order to advance the goals of truth and clarity, a court may not “assume the advocacy role traditionally reserved for counsel, and in order to avoid this, the court’s discretion to intervene must be exercised sparingly” … .

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Here, notwithstanding numerous objections by defense counsel, the Supreme Court exercised little or no restraint in questioning the witnesses at length and improperly “assume[d] the advocacy role traditionally reserved for counsel” (id.). We acknowledge that this trial was lengthy because it involved three codefendants and multiple complainants. However, contrary to the People’s contention, the court’s questioning of the witnesses far exceeded what was necessary to “clarify[ ] confusing testimony” or facilitate “the orderly and expeditious progress of the trial” … . The court engaged in protracted and often unnecessary questioning on both direct and cross-examination, and at times acted as an advocate for the People … . People v Robinson, 2017 NY Slip Op 04473, 2nd Dept 6-7-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (JUDGES, EXCESSIVE INTERFERENCE BY THE JUDGE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL)/JUDGES (CRIMINAL LAW, EXCESSIVE INTERFERENCE BY THE JUDGE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL)

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