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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON A CAUSE OF ACTION (ACCOUNT STATED) NOT RAISED IN THE MOTION PAPERS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the award of attorney’s fees and 18% interest in this breach of contract action was error. Summary judgment cannot be granted by the court, sua sponte, on a ground (account stated) not raised in the motion papers:

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… [T]he court erred in awarding attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest at the rate of 18% based on an unpleaded account stated theory. The record establishes that plaintiff neither pleaded an account stated theory nor moved for summary judgment on that ground … . It is well settled that, generally, a party may not obtain summary judgment on an unpleaded cause of action… , but there is an exception to that general rule where the proof supports such a cause of action and the opposing party has not been misled to its prejudice … . Here, we conclude that defendant was substantially prejudiced by the court’s sua sponte reliance on the unpleaded account stated theory … . Indeed, we note that plaintiff’s moving and reply papers did not even mention that theory, nor did they mention attorney’s fees or interest at the rate of 18% per annum … .

We conclude that the court further erred in searching the record pursuant to CPLR 3212 (b) and granting summary judgment on an account stated theory to plaintiff, the moving party. Although a court has the authority to search the record and grant summary judgment to a nonmoving party (see id.), that authority is applicable “only with respect to a [claim] or issue that is the subject of the motions before the court”… . Here, plaintiff was the moving party and an account stated theory was not the subject of the motion before the court. Diamond Roofing Co., Inc. v PCL Props., LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 06745, Fourth Dept 9-29-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON A CAUSE OF ACTION (ACCOUNT STATED) NOT RAISED IN THE MOTION PAPERS (FOURTH DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON A CAUSE OF ACTION (ACCOUNT STATED) NOT RAISED IN THE MOTION PAPERS (FOURTH DEPT))/SUMMARY JUDGMENT  (SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON A CAUSE OF ACTION (ACCOUNT STATED) NOT RAISED IN THE MOTION PAPERS (FOURTH DEPT))/JUDGES  (SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON A CAUSE OF ACTION (ACCOUNT STATED) NOT RAISED IN THE MOTION PAPERS (FOURTH DEPT))

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