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JUDGE PROHIBITED FROM ADDING PROBATION TO DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE OUTSIDE OF DEFENDANT’S PRESENCE, ONCE DEFENDANT WAS RELEASED FROM JAIL ANY ATTEMPT TO INCREASE HIS SENTENCE PRECLUDED BY DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE.

The Fourth Department, in an original Article 78 proceeding, determined the judge was prohibited from imposing on defendant a sentence of probation. Defendant was sentenced to 30 days in jail. Outside the defendant’s presence the sentencing judge signed an order imposing a five-year probationary period and defendant agreed to the order by signing it in jail:

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While a court possesses the inherent authority to correct a mistake or error in a criminal defendant’s sentence … , the process by which a court corrects such an error is by resentencing the defendant … , which must be done in the defendant’s presence (see CPL 380.40 [1]). We thus conclude that the Judge erred in imposing an additional component to the sentence outside of petitioner’s presence …

We further conclude that petitioner cannot now be resentenced. It is well settled that, “where a defendant is released from custody and returns to the community after serving the period of incarceration that was ordered by the sentencing court, and the time to appeal the sentence has expired or the appeal has been finally determined,’ a legitimate expectation of the original sentence’s finality arises and double jeopardy precludes the modification of that sentence to include a period of” probation … . Here, ,,, petitioner has completed serving the period of incarceration and has been released from custody. Petitioner did not file a notice of appeal, and the time within which to do so has expired … . Although petitioner, as of this writing, could still move for an extension of time to take an appeal … , he cannot be forced to do so. We thus conclude that petitioner’s sentence is “beyond the court’s authority,” and an additional component to that sentence cannot be imposed … . Matter of Brandon v Doran, 2017 NY Slip Op 03371, 4th Dept 4-28-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (JUDGE PROHIBITED FROM ADDING PROBATION TO DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE OUTSIDE OF DEFENDANT’S PRESENCE, ONCE DEFENDANT WAS RELEASED FROM JAIL ANY ATTEMPT TO INCREASE HIS SENTENCE PRECLUDED BY DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ARTICLE 78, PROHIBITION, CRIMINAL LAW, JUDGE PROHIBITED FROM ADDING PROBATION TO DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE OUTSIDE OF DEFENDANT’S PRESENCE, ONCE DEFENDANT WAS RELEASED FROM JAIL ANY ATTEMPT TO INCREASE HIS SENTENCE PRECLUDED BY DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE)/JUDGES (ARTICLE 78, PROHIBITION, CRIMINAL LAW, JUDGE PROHIBITED FROM ADDING PROBATION TO DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE OUTSIDE OF DEFENDANT’S PRESENCE, ONCE DEFENDANT WAS RELEASED FROM JAIL ANY ATTEMPT TO INCREASE HIS SENTENCE PRECLUDED BY DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE)/DOUBLE JEOPARDY (JUDGE PROHIBITED FROM ADDING PROBATION TO DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE OUTSIDE OF DEFENDANT’S PRESENCE, ONCE DEFENDANT WAS RELEASED FROM JAIL ANY ATTEMPT TO INCREASE HIS SENTENCE PRECLUDED BY DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE)/SENTENCING (JUDGE PROHIBITED FROM ADDING PROBATION TO DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE OUTSIDE OF DEFENDANT’S PRESENCE, ONCE DEFENDANT WAS RELEASED FROM JAIL ANY ATTEMPT TO INCREASE HIS SENTENCE PRECLUDED BY DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE)

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