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SUPREME COURT IMPROPERLY, SUA SPONTE, ORDERED A FRYE HEARING AFTER WHICH THE COMPLAINT AGAINST A DOCTOR IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED, SUPREME COURT IMPROPERLY USED A FRYE HEARING TO AVOID THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court’s sua sponte ordering of a Frye hearing in this medical malpractice action was an impermissible avoidance of the law of the case doctrine. Another justice, in the same action, had denied the summary judgment motion brought by defendant doctor (Vartolomei). The Second Department held that Supreme Court’s ordering a Frye hearing and thereafter dismissing the complaint against Vartolomei was improper, as the hearing was used to rehear and grant the previously denied summary judgment motion:

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The general purpose of a Frye hearing is to determine whether an expert’s opinion is ” based on principles that are sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance as reliable'” … . Here, however, the overall nature of the questions posed at the hearing directed, sua sponte, by the Supreme Court, as well as statements by the court, establish that the true purpose of the hearing was not to determine whether Dr. Epstein’s opinions were based on principles that are sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance as reliable. Rather, the hearing purported to revisit the determination made in the order … denying Vartolomei’s motion for summary judgment insofar as asserted against her. In doing so, the court violated the doctrine of law of the case by completely disregarding the prior order, issued by a Justice of coordinate jurisdiction, that had concluded that triable issues of fact existed as to whether Vartolomei departed from accepted medical standards of care and whether such departures were a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the decedent … .

Moreover, this Court has held that “[a] court’s power to dismiss a complaint, sua sponte, is to be used sparingly and only when extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant dismissal” … . Here, there were no extraordinary circumstances warranting the sua sponte dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted against Vartolomei. Aguilar v Feygin, 2017 NY Slip Op 04811, 2nd Dept 6-14-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (LAW OF THE CASE, SUPREME COURT IMPROPERLY, SUA SPONTE, ORDERED A FRYE HEARING AFTER WHICH THE COMPLAINT AGAINST A DOCTOR IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED, SUPREME COURT IMPROPERLY USED A FRYE HEARING TO AVOID THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE)/NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, CIVIL PROCEDURE, LAW OF THE CASE, SUPREME COURT IMPROPERLY, SUA SPONTE, ORDERED A FRYE HEARING AFTER WHICH THE COMPLAINT AGAINST A DOCTOR IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED, SUPREME COURT IMPROPERLY USED A FRYE HEARING TO AVOID THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, FRYE HEARING, SUPREME COURT IMPROPERLY, SUA SPONTE, ORDERED A FRYE HEARING AFTER WHICH THE COMPLAINT AGAINST A DOCTOR IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED, SUPREME COURT IMPROPERLY USED A FRYE HEARING TO AVOID THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE)/EVIDENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, FRYE HEARING,  SUPREME COURT IMPROPERLY, SUA SPONTE, ORDERED A FRYE HEARING AFTER WHICH THE COMPLAINT AGAINST A DOCTOR IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED, SUPREME COURT IMPROPERLY USED A FRYE HEARING TO AVOID THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE)/LAW OF THE CASE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, FRYE HEARING, SUPREME COURT IMPROPERLY, SUA SPONTE, ORDERED A FRYE HEARING AFTER WHICH THE COMPLAINT AGAINST A DOCTOR IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED, SUPREME COURT IMPROPERLY USED A FRYE HEARING TO AVOID THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE)/FRYE HEARING (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, SUPREME COURT IMPROPERLY, SUA SPONTE, ORDERED A FRYE HEARING AFTER WHICH THE COMPLAINT AGAINST A DOCTOR IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED, SUPREME COURT IMPROPERLY USED A FRYE HEARING TO AVOID THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE)/SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, SUPREME COURT IMPROPERLY, SUA SPONTE, ORDERED A FRYE HEARING AFTER WHICH THE COMPLAINT AGAINST A DOCTOR IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED, SUPREME COURT IMPROPERLY USED A FRYE HEARING TO AVOID THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE)

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