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Criminal Law, Evidence, Judges

DEFENDANT PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS THE VICTIM OF ABUSE BY HIS GIRLFRIEND AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE TO WARRANT A HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS SENTENCE AND FOR RESENTENCING PURSUANT TO THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS JUSTICE ACT (DVSJA) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to vacate his sentence and for resentencing pursuant to the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) should not have been denied without a hearing. The court explained what a defendant must demonstrate to warrant a hearing:

The Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) “permits courts to sentence defendants to an alternative, less severe sentence if the defendant was a victim of domestic violence and convicted of certain eligible offenses” (… see Penal Law § 60.12). The DVSJA sets forth a three-prong test for entitlement to resentencing: “(a) at the time of the instant offense, the defendant was a victim of domestic violence subjected to substantial physical, sexual or psychological abuse inflicted by a member of the same family or household as the defendant . . . ; (b) such abuse was a significant contributing factor to the defendant’s criminal behavior; [and] (c) having regard for the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character[,] and condition of the defendant, . . . a sentence of imprisonment pursuant to [Penal Law §§ 70.00, 70.02, 70.06, 70.71(2), or (3)] would be unduly harsh” … .

A defendant’s motion for resentencing under the DVSJA “must include at least two pieces of evidence corroborating the . . . claim,” and “[a]t least one piece of evidence must be either a court record, pre-sentence report, social services record, hospital record, sworn statement from a witness to the domestic violence, law enforcement record, domestic incident report, or order of protection” (CPL 440.47[2][c] …).

Here, the defendant’s evidence in support of his motion included affidavits of his cousin and friend, as well as hospital records. Collectively, this evidence corroborated the defendant’s allegations that he was a victim of domestic violence subjected to substantial abuse inflicted by his girlfriend R.W. at the time that he committed the subject offense … . People v M.W., 2026 NY Slip Op 05815, Second Dept 10-7-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an explanation of the evidence a defendant must present to warrant a hearing on a motion vacate a sentence and for resentencing pursuant to the DVSJA.​

 

October 7, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-07 10:57:302026-10-18 11:29:02DEFENDANT PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS THE VICTIM OF ABUSE BY HIS GIRLFRIEND AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE TO WARRANT A HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS SENTENCE AND FOR RESENTENCING PURSUANT TO THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS JUSTICE ACT (DVSJA) (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence, Judges

THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH THE “DEFENSE OF A GOOD CLAIM OF RIGHT” IN THIS PETIT LARCENY CASE; DEFENDANT HAD REMOVED A MEMORIAL TO A MURDER VICTIM WHICH HAD BEEN SET UP ON THE SIDEWALK IN FRONT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTHER’S HOUSE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s petit larceny conviction and ordering a new trial, over a dissent, determined the jury should have been charged with the “defense of good claim of right.” The defendant was tried for criminally negligent homicide and petit larceny. A mistrial was declared on the criminally negligent homicide charge and she was convicted of petit larceny. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to criminally negligent homicide and then appealed the petit larceny conviction. The petit larceny charge alleged defendant dismantled and took away parts of a memorial for a murder victim which had been set up on the sidewalk in front of defendant’s mother’s house by the murder victim’s mother. It was the murder victim’s mother who was killed when she was struck by a vehicle driven by the defendant (the subject of the criminally negligent homicide conviction):

… Supreme Court improperly denied the defendant’s request to charge the jury with the defense of a good faith claim of right. “In determining whether to instruct a jury on a claimed defense, the court must view the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the defendant” … . “The charge must be given if there is evidence reasonably supportive of the defense, even if there is other evidence which, if credited, would negate it” … . “Where evidence exists upon which the jury could reasonably find that a particular defense applies, questions as to the credibility of the defendant’s testimony or inconsistences in the evidence presented do not disentitle the defendant to an instruction on the defense; those questions of fact are to be resolved by the jury” … . “If the evidence sufficiently supports a defense, a failure by the court to charge the jury constitutes reversible error” … .

… [W]e find that there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s good faith claim of right defense. * * * … [A]t trial, the People read the defendant’s grand jury testimony demonstrating that she had previously removed memorial items, including, inter alia, balloons and flowers without incident. Furthermore, at trial, a witness testified that he and the defendant, among others, had previously removed memorial items and no one ever asked where said items were and no one was ever arrested for removing same. This evidence reasonably supports the defendant’s claim of right defense. While there may have been evidence that contradicts the defendant’s claim of right defense, those are questions of fact the jury should have resolved … . People v Drago, 2026 NY Slip Op 05807, Second Dept 10-7-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a rare discussion of the “defense of a good claim of right” in the context of a petit larceny charge.

 

October 7, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-07 10:51:492026-10-17 11:45:40THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH THE “DEFENSE OF A GOOD CLAIM OF RIGHT” IN THIS PETIT LARCENY CASE; DEFENDANT HAD REMOVED A MEMORIAL TO A MURDER VICTIM WHICH HAD BEEN SET UP ON THE SIDEWALK IN FRONT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTHER’S HOUSE (SECOND DEPT). ​
Appeals, Criminal Law, Evidence

DEFENDANT’S WAIVER OF APPEAL WAS INVALID; DEFENDANT WAS SUBJECTED TO CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION WHICH WAS NOT PRECEDED BY THE MIRANDA WARNINGS; DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined (1) defendant’s waiver of appeal was invalid, and (2) defendant’s statements made in response to questioning not preceded by the Miranda warnings should have been suppressed:

… [D]efendant was a suspect in the burglary of the victim’s home after defendant’s fingerprint was found on a bedroom window. Investigators learned that defendant was scheduled to meet his parole officer. After defendant walked into his parole officer’s office, three police investigators entered the office to question him. At no point during the questioning of defendant did the officers give defendant his Miranda warnings or inform defendant that he was free to leave. Furthermore, the investigator who testified at the suppression hearing could not answer definitively whether defendant would have violated parole if he had refused to talk with the investigators and left the office. Defendant met with his parole officer only after the investigators concluded their interview. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would have thought that they were not free to leave during questioning … . Moreover, the questions by the investigators were accusatory in nature, rather than merely investigatory, and were designed to elicit an incriminating response … . We conclude that defendant was in custody and was subjected to interrogation. People v Clegg, 2026 NY Slip Op 05663, Fourth Dept 10-2-26

Practice Point: Here defendant was questioned by investigators when he showed up for a meeting with his parole officer. The investigators did not tell defendant he was free to leave and did not give him the Miranda warnings. The questioning was accusatory and designed to incriminate. Therefore defendant’s motion to suppress his statements to the investigators should have been granted.

 

October 2, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-02 11:23:012026-10-05 11:38:58DEFENDANT’S WAIVER OF APPEAL WAS INVALID; DEFENDANT WAS SUBJECTED TO CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION WHICH WAS NOT PRECEDED BY THE MIRANDA WARNINGS; DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FOURTH DEPT).
Evidence, Family Law

MOTHER WAS ENTITLED TO VACATION OF THE NEGLECT FINDING, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court in this neglect proceeding, determined mother was entitled to modification of the order of fact-finding and disposition granting a suspended judgment and vacating the finding of neglect. The neglect finding stemmed from mother’s failure to take medication to treat her mental illness:

Family Court Act § 1061 provides that for good cause shown, a court may set aside, modify, or vacate any order issued in the course of a child protective proceeding … . As with an initial order, the modified order must reflect a resolution consistent with the best interests of the child after consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances, and must be supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record … . “Courts have identified four factors to consider when determining whether to vacate a finding of neglect: ‘(1) respondent’s prior child protective history; (2) the seriousness of the offense; (3) respondent’s remorse and acknowledgment of the abusive/neglectful nature of his or her act; and (4) respondent’s amenability to correction, including compliance with court-ordered services and treatment'” … .

Here, the mother had no prior child protective history; the record demonstrates the mother’s compliance with services, medication, and therapy; and the mother’s therapist reported that the mother “shows good insight about the need for treatment.” Further, a suspended judgment leading to vacatur of the neglect finding was in the child’s best interests because the mother would have access to employment opportunities in childcare … . Matter of Naila P. (Althea P.), 2026 NY Slip Op 05540, Second Dept 9-30-26

Practice Point: Here mother’s neglect finding was vacated based upon her compliance with mental health services, medication and therapy. The neglect finding stemmed from her failure to take medication to treat her mental illness.

 

September 30, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-30 17:56:502026-10-04 18:15:43MOTHER WAS ENTITLED TO VACATION OF THE NEGLECT FINDING, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).
Evidence, Negligence

DEFENDANT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE WAS PUT ON NOTICE TO PRESERVE SURVEILLANCE VIDEO AS OF AUGUST 19; DEFENDANT’S EMPLOYEE AVERRED THAT THE VIDEO COULD HAVE BEEN AUTOMATICALLY DESTROYED BEFORE OR AFTER AUGUST 19; THEREFORE THE SPOLIATION ISSUE MUST BE DECIDED BY THE TRIER OF FACT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether defendant (Jet Blue) destroyed video evidence of plaintiff’s slip and fall. Therefore, whether there was spoliation of evidence is to be decided by the trier of fact:

… [T]he plaintiff demonstrated that Jet Blue was on notice as of August 19, 2021, that it had an obligation to preserve the video surveillance footage … . Moreover, the affidavit of Jet Blue’s employee raised an issue of fact as to whether the video surveillance footage was destroyed before or after Jet Blue’s obligation to preserve it arose on August 19, 2021. Under these circumstances, a triable issue of fact exists as to whether spoliation of evidence occurred, which issue should be determined by the trier of fact … . The appropriate sanction for any such spoliation of evidence would be an adverse inference charge against Jet Blue, as the destruction of any video surveillance footage of the incident did not deprive the plaintiff of the opportunity to prove her case … . Fernandez v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2026 NY Slip Op 05518, Second Dept 9-30-26

Practice Point: Sometimes spoliation of evidence is a jury question.​

 

September 30, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-30 15:09:552026-10-05 10:28:20DEFENDANT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE WAS PUT ON NOTICE TO PRESERVE SURVEILLANCE VIDEO AS OF AUGUST 19; DEFENDANT’S EMPLOYEE AVERRED THAT THE VIDEO COULD HAVE BEEN AUTOMATICALLY DESTROYED BEFORE OR AFTER AUGUST 19; THEREFORE THE SPOLIATION ISSUE MUST BE DECIDED BY THE TRIER OF FACT (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Foreclosure

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY DEFENDANT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO REBUT THE PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF PROPER SERVICE PRESENTED IN THE PROCESS SERVER’S AFFIDAVIT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s affidavit was not sufficient to rebut the prima facie demonstration of proper service in the process server’s affidavit:

… [T]he affidavit of service constituted prima facie evidence of valid service pursuant to CPLR 308(1) … . The process server alleged therein that on July 24, 2010, at 8:50 a.m., at the premises, he served the summons and complaint and RPAPL 1303 notice on the defendant by delivery to the defendant personally.

… [T]he defendant failed to rebut the presumption of proper service established by the affidavit of service. In her affidavit submitted in support of the motion, the defendant generally denied receipt of service but failed to specifically address the alleged service at the premises on July 24, 2010 … , or aver that she did not meet the description included in the affidavit of service … . The defendant further provided a letter from the New York City Police Department, Human Resources Division. Although the defendant averred that she was at work at the time she allegedly was served, the evidence submitted failed to establish that she was not at the premises at the time of service … . Rather, the letter merely established that she was employed as a “Police Comm Tech” from July 20, 1987, to January 26, 2018, and that she worked 35 hours per week. Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v Bryant, 2026 NY Slip Op 05570, Second Dept 9-30-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the nature of the evidence necessary to rebut the prima facie proof of proper service presented in a process server’s affidavit. Here, defendant failed to rebut the presumption of proper service.​

 

September 30, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-30 10:39:472026-10-05 10:56:25THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY DEFENDANT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO REBUT THE PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF PROPER SERVICE PRESENTED IN THE PROCESS SERVER’S AFFIDAVIT (SECOND DEPT).
Evidence, Negligence

THE CONDITION WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL WAS “OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND NOT INHERENTLY DANGEROUS” AS A MATTER OF LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the condition which caused plaintiff’s slip and fall was “open and obvious and not inherently dangerous:”

While the owner or possessor of real property may have a duty to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition … , “there is no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition which, as a matter of law, is not inherently dangerous” … . “A condition is open and obvious if it is readily observable by those employing the reasonable use of their senses, given the conditions at the time of the accident” … .

Here, the evidence submitted by the defendants established, among other things, that the lighting condition was good at the time of the accident, that the colors of the wooden pallet and the white containers were in contrast to the surrounding floor, that the plaintiff observed the containers of cleaning supplies as she approached the area, and that there was sufficient space to navigate the hallway without incident. Thus, the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that the condition was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous … . Scamardella v A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 05565, Second Dept 9-30-26

Practice Point: Consult this “slip and fall” decision for another example of a condition deemed “open and obvious and not inherently dangerous” as a matter of law.

 

September 30, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-30 10:28:452026-10-05 10:39:37THE CONDITION WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL WAS “OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND NOT INHERENTLY DANGEROUS” AS A MATTER OF LAW (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence

HERE THE DEFENDANT’S AFFIDAVIT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REJECTED BECAUSE IT WAS MADE BY A PARTY; THE AFFIDAVIT WAS BASED ON FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE AND WAS COMPETENT TO RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the affidavit which raised a question of fact should not have been rejected because it was made by a party, here the defendant:

… [Defendant’s] affidavit was competent to raise issues of fact as to the parties’ 2007 loan agreement sufficient to preclude summary judgment on [plaintiff’s] breach of contract claim. As we have recognized, “[t]hat an affidavit is submitted by a party or other interested person does not detract from its sufficiency as competent evidence” … . Such is the case here. Indeed, [defendant’s] affidavit provided firsthand knowledge of the transaction with [plaintiff]. .Tahari v Narkis, 2026 NY Slip Op 05505, First Dept 9-29-26

Practice Point: Here an affidavit by a party (defendant) was based on firsthand knowledge and was deemed competent to raise a question of fact.

 

September 29, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-29 10:33:002026-10-03 10:48:57HERE THE DEFENDANT’S AFFIDAVIT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REJECTED BECAUSE IT WAS MADE BY A PARTY; THE AFFIDAVIT WAS BASED ON FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE AND WAS COMPETENT TO RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence

HERE THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY AN ATTORNEY AFFIRMATION WAS REJECTED BECAUSE IT DID NOT STATE THAT IT WAS MADE “UNDER THE PENALTIES OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWS OF NEW YORK, WHICH MAY INCLUDE A FINE OR IMPRISONMENT” (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the evidence submitted by attorney affirmation was not in admissible form:

… [P]laintiff failed to proffer evidence in admissible form, as all of its evidence was submitted by way of an attorney affirmation that failed to substantially conform to the language of CPLR 2106, which requires any affirmation to explicitly state that it is made “under the penalties of perjury under the laws of New York, which may include a fine or imprisonment” … . Interasian Digital Tech. Holdings Ltd. v In Jin Moon Park, 2026 NY Slip Op 05478, First Dept 9-29-26

Practice Point: Evidence submitted by attorney affirmation will be rejected if the affirmation does not include the language mandated by CPLR 2106.

 

September 29, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-29 10:10:532026-10-03 10:32:47HERE THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY AN ATTORNEY AFFIRMATION WAS REJECTED BECAUSE IT DID NOT STATE THAT IT WAS MADE “UNDER THE PENALTIES OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWS OF NEW YORK, WHICH MAY INCLUDE A FINE OR IMPRISONMENT” (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence

DEFENDANT REBUTTED THE PROCESS SERVER’S AFFIDAVIT; A TRAVERSE HEARING IS NECESSARY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant rebutted the process server’s affidavit and a traverse hearing should have been held:

Defendant’s affidavit was sufficient to rebut plaintiff’s prima facie evidence of service. While defendant did not dispute that the service address listed was her home address, she stated that she was not personally served, that she was not the woman described in the affidavit, and provided a detailed, nonconclusory account of how she was in a different state at the time of service, providing childcare to her granddaughter … . In addition, the discrepancies identified in the descriptions of the woman served, who was white and had brown and blonde hair, and defendant, who is African American, were not “minor” … . US Bank Trust N.A. v Smith, 2026 NY Slip Op 05463, First Dept 9-29-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the nature of evidence deemed sufficient to rebut a process server’s affidavit and necessitate a traverse hearing.

 

September 29, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-29 09:46:232026-10-03 10:10:42DEFENDANT REBUTTED THE PROCESS SERVER’S AFFIDAVIT; A TRAVERSE HEARING IS NECESSARY (FIRST DEPT).
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