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PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO FORECLOSE; THE NOTE WAS NOT PROPERLY ENDORSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff in this foreclosure action did not establish standing to foreclose. Although the plaintiff proved it had possession of the note at the time the proceeding was brought, it did not demonstrate the note was properly endorsed:

Although the plaintiff established, prima facie, that it had possession of the original “wet ink” note prior to commencing the instant action …, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the note was properly endorsed. “Where there is no allonge or note that is either endorsed in blank or specially endorsed to the plaintiff, mere physical possession of a note at the commencement of a[n] . . . action is insufficient to confer standing or to make a plaintiff the lawful holder of a negotiable instrument for the purposes of enforcing the note” … . Here, the instant note bore no endorsements and had no allonges attached. Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v PJK Holdings, LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 05787, Second Dept 11-20-24

Practice Point: If standing to foreclose is contested, a plaintiff must show (1) it was in possession of the note at the time the proceeding was brought and (2) the note was properly endorsed in blank or specifically to the plaintiff.

 

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DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE SIDEWALK DEFECT WAS TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants in this slip and fall case did not make out a prima facie case that the sidewalk defect was trivial as a matter of law. Therefore defendants’ summary judgment motion should not have been granted:

… [T]he evidence submitted by the defendants, including, inter alia, a transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition testimony, as well as photographs of the allegedly defective sidewalk condition, was insufficient to establish, prima facie, that the height differential was physically insignificant and that the characteristics of the defect or the surrounding circumstances did not increase the risks the alleged defect posed … . The evidence submitted did not include objective measurements of the dimensions of the defect, specifically the height of the allegedly misleveled sidewalk. The evidence further failed to sufficiently quantify or estimate the dimensions of the defect. The plaintiff identified the photographs as fairly and accurately representing the allegedly defective sidewalk condition as it existed on the date of the accident. While the photographs demonstrated the irregular nature of the sidewalk … , it is impossible to ascertain or to reasonably infer the extent of the defect from the photographs submitted … .

Therefore, the defendants failed to make a prima facie showing of their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint on the ground that the defect was trivial and not actionable. Abreu v Pursuit Realty Group, LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 05781, Second Dept 11-20-24

Practice Point: Here the photos of the sidewalk defect were not supplemented with objective measurements. The proof did not establish the defect was trivial as a matter of law.

 

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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE WAS NOT A PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER, HE HAD BEEN QUALIFIED AS AN EXPERT IN 120 CASES; THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE SUMMARILY DISQUALIFIED HIM (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the trial judge should not have disqualified plaintiff’s expert in this elevator accident case. Although the expert was not a professional engineer, he had been qualified as an expert in over 120 state and federal cases:

Supreme Court erred in summarily disqualifying the opinion of Patrick A. Carrajat as an expert. Although Carrajat was not a professional engineer, he nonetheless had the requisite knowledge and experience to render an opinion on the cause of the accident, as he averred that he had been qualified as an elevator expert and testified as an expert witness 120 times in state and federal courts throughout the country … . Furthermore, challenges regarding an expert witness’ qualifications affect the weight to be accorded the expert’s views, not their admissibility … .

Plaintiff’s expert’s affidavit creates issues of fact as to both the nature of the incident, and the cause of the incident. While defendants’ experts opined that the elevator could not have malfunctioned as plaintiff described, and that the elevator descended to the lobby at regular speed, Carrajat disputed this and posited ways in which the elevator could have malfunctioned that were consistent with plaintiff’s account of the accident. Given the conflicting expert affidavits, the building defendants have not established their entitlement to summary judgment … . Escolastico v Rigs Mgt. Co., LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 05769, First Dept 11-19-24

Practice Point: Here in this elevator-accident case plaintiff’s expert was not a professional engineer but had been qualified as an expert in over 120 cases. It was reversible error to summarily disqualify him.

 

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THE POLICE HAD TO “MANIPULATE” THE CHECKS TO DETERMINE THEY WERE FORGED; THEREFORE THE “PLAIN VIEW” EXCEPTION TO THE SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENT WAS NOT APPLICABLE; INDICTMENT DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, suppressing evidence seized under the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement, held the police had to “manipulate” the checks which were in plain view to determine they were forged. Because the nature of the checks was not apparent until they were “manipulated,” the “plain view” exception was not applicable:

… [W]e conclude that the People did not meet their burden of establishing the third element of the plain view exception—i.e., that the incriminating nature of the seized items was immediately apparent. In making such a determination, we must consider whether “the facts available to the [police] officer would warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief . . . that [the] items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime” … . This is a probable cause standard—i.e., there need not be “certainty or near certainty” about the incriminating nature of the seized items … . That element is not satisfied, however, “where the object [to be seized] must be moved or manipulated before its illegality can be determined” … . Indeed, “[s]uch a search or seizure may not be upheld without proof that the [police] officer who moved or manipulated the object had probable cause to believe that the object was evidence or contraband at the time that it was moved or manipulated” … . Still, “[a] truly cursory inspection—one that involves merely looking at what is already exposed to view, without disturbing it—is not a search” … . People v Howard, 2024 NY Slip Op 05733, Fourth Dept 11-15-24

Practice Point: Here the fact the checks were forged was not apparent until the police “manipulated” them. Therefore the “plain view” exception to the search-warrant requirement was not applicable and the checks should have been suppressed.

 

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MOTHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DEEMED COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM PRESENTING EVIDENCE OF HER MENTAL HEALTH IN THIS TERMINATION-OF-PARENTAL-RIGHTS ACTION; THE PRIOR MENTAL-HEALTH-BASED RULING WAS BASED ON THREE-TO-EIGHT-YEAR-OLD EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Family Court, determined mother should not have been prevented from presenting evidence of her mental health in this termination-of-parental-rights proceeding under the collateral estoppel doctrine. Although mother had previously been adjudicated unable to provide proper and adequate care of the children in 2018, there was no evidence of mother’s current mental health:

Neither the relied-upon 2018 order of disposition nor its supporting decision … contains a finding of fact or conclusion of law that the mother’s mental illness or intellectual disability permanently impaired the mother’s ability to provide adequate care for a child … . Instead, the prior judicial determination that the mother was “presently and for the foreseeable future” unable to provide adequate care was premised upon evaluations of the mother conducted in 2012 and 2017. Further, that determination was issued a year prior to the birth of the subject child in the present proceeding and, although the subject child was ordered into petitioner’s care almost immediately following her birth, the instant petition was nonetheless not filed for yet another two years. Thus, the 2018 judicial determination, premised on three- to eight-year-old evidence, is insufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence, as a matter of law, that the mother was, at the time of this proceeding, “presently and for the foreseeable future unable, by reason of mental illness or intellectual disability, to provide proper and adequate care for [the subject] child” (Social Services Law § 384-b [4] [c] …). Matter of Juliet W. (Amy W.), 2024 NY Slip Op 05690, Fourth Dept 11-15-24

Practice Point: Here there was a prior ruling based on three-to-eight-year-old evidence that mother’s mental health prevented her from adequately caring for her children. The collateral estoppel doctrine should not have been applied to prevent her from presenting evidence of her current mental health.

 

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DEFENDANT’S BIPOLAR DIAGNOSIS AND A STATEMENT INDICATING HIS FAILURE TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OFFENSE DID NOT JUSTIFY AN UPWARD DEPARTURE FROM SORA RISK-LEVEL TWO TO THREE; TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the People did not demonstrate that an upward departure from SORA risk-level two to three was warranted:

… [W]e conclude that the People failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendant is more likely to reoffend based on his bipolar diagnosis. The only evidence offered by the People at the SORA hearing was the report prepared by defendant’s expert, who opined that “impaired judgment is a common disability in Bipolar Disorder, as is impulsiveness.” The expert further opined that defendant’s “judgment was impaired by his disorder” when he committed the crimes, and that he “acted impulsively because of his then undiagnosed (and inadequately treated) illness.” The fact that defendant’s bipolar condition may have impaired his judgment and decreased his ability to control impulsive sexual behavior when he committed the qualifying offenses does not mean, ipso facto, that he is at a greater risk of reoffending in the future as a result of his bipolar condition. Defendant’s mental illness was undiagnosed and untreated when he committed the qualifying offenses, and there is no evidence in the record indicating a reluctance or inability on defendant’s part to follow treatment recommendations and take prescribed medications now that he has been properly diagnosed.

We further conclude that an upward departure was not warranted based on defendant’s post-offense statement to one of the victims. Although the statement in question may show, as the People asserted, that defendant failed to accept responsibility for his crimes, an offender’s failure to accept responsibility is taken into account under risk factor 12 on the risk assessment instrument. Thus, an upward departure cannot be granted based on defendant’s statement … . People v Cohen, 2024 NY Slip Op 05658, Fourth Dept 11-15-24

Practice Point: Here defendant’s bipolar diagnosis and a statement to the victim indicating his failure to take responsibility for the offense did not justify an upward department from SORA risk-level two to three. The evidence did not demonstrate the bipolar disorder increased the risk of reoffending and the statement was already taken into account under risk factor 12.

 

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THE NEW YORK STATUTE DESIGNATING DEFENDANT A SEXUALLY VIOLENT OFFENDER WOULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED IF THE CALIFORNIA OFFENSE UPON WHICH THE DESIGNATION IS BASED WAS NON-VIOLENT; MATTER REMITTED FOR A RULING WHETHER THE CALIFORNIA OFFENSE WAS VIOLENT OR NON-VIOLENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, remitting the matter to County Court, over a five-justice concurrence, determined County Court must rule on whether defendant’s California conviction involved a violent or a non-violent sexual offense. If the facts of the case indicate the California offense was non-violent, the New York statute which requires designation of the defendant as a sexually violent offender would be unconstitutional as applied:

Defendant appeals from an order insofar as it designated him a sexually violent offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act ([SORA] Correction Law § 168 et seq.). Due to the designation, which is based on a felony conviction in California requiring defendant to register as a sex offender in that state, defendant is subject to lifetime registration as a sex offender in New York even though County Court determined that he is only a level one risk. The designation was made pursuant to Correction Law § 168-a (3) (b) insofar as it defines a sexually violent offense as including a “conviction of a felony in any other jurisdiction for which the offender is required to register as a sex offender in the jurisdiction in which the conviction occurred.” Although defendant concedes that he qualifies as a sexually violent offender under the foreign registration clause of § 168-a (3) (b), he contends that the provision is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution (US Const, 14th Amend, § 1), inasmuch as his out-of-state felony conviction was for a nonviolent offense. Defendant further contends that the foreign registration clause violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Federal Constitution … . * * *

If the felony of conviction, by virtue of its statutory elements … , involved sexually violent conduct, then the foreign registration clause of Correction Law § 168-a (3) (b) is not unconstitutional as applied to defendant inasmuch as he committed a violent sex offense even if it does not include all of the essential elements of one of the sexually violent offenses in New York enumerated in Correction Law § 168-a (3) (a). If, however, defendant was convicted of an out-of-state felony that is nonviolent in nature, we would conclude that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to defendant … . People v Grzegorzewski, 2024 NY Slip Op 05657, Fourth Dept 11-15-24

Practice Point: The statute which requires defendant be designated a sexually violent offender based upon an out-of-state conviction is unconstitutional as applied if the out-of-state offense was non-violent.

 

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PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL ON TRACKED-IN-RAIN DURING AN ONGOING STORM; DEFENDANT HAD PLACED MATS NEAR THE DOOR AND ELSEWHERE; DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant (Open Kitchen) in this tracked-in-rain slip and fall case was entitled to summary judgment. Open Kitchen demonstrated plaintiff slipped and fell during an ongoing rain storm and it had placed mats near the door and elsewhere:

… [T]here is no evidence that Open Kitchen either created the wet condition in the entryway or had notice of a hazard that could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care … . Open Kitchen satisfied its duty by employing reasonable remedial measures to address the ongoing rainstorm by laying mats in front of the entrance doors and elsewhere throughout the premises … . There was no active notice in the form of prior complaints received … . Nor did the undisputed fact that it was raining at the time of plaintiff’s accident, causing water to be tracked into the premises, constitute constructive notice of a dangerous situation requiring Open Kitchen to cover the entire floor with mats or continuously mop the floor … . Moreover, plaintiff testified that that he only noticed water on the floor after his fall, and thus it cannot be inferred that Open Kitchen had constructive notice of “a hazard sufficiently visible as to permit discovery and remedy” … . Betancourt v ARC NYC123 William, LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 05628, Third Dept 11-14-24

Practice Point: Here a slip and fall on tracked-in-rain during an ongoing storm was not actionable. Defendant had placed mats near the door and elsewhere and was deemed not have had constructive notice of a dangerous condition.​

 

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DEFENDANT SCHOOL DISTRICT DID NOT MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE DEMONSTRATING IT LACKED CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE TEACHER’S ALLEGED PROPENSITY TO SEXUALLY ABUSE CHILDREN; THEREFORE ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant school district was not entitled to summary judgment in this case alleging sexual abuse by a teacher in 2013 – 2014. A question of fact had been raised about whether the school district knew or should have known of the teacher’s alleged propensity to abuse children:

“Although an employer cannot be held vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee who is acting solely for personal motives unrelated to the furtherance of the employer’s business, the employer may still be held liable under theories of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision of the employee” … . “‘[A] necessary element of such causes of action is that the employer knew or should have known of the employee’s propensity for the conduct which caused the injury'” … .

“A school ‘has a duty to exercise the same degree of care toward its students as would a reasonably prudent parent, and will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision'” … . “‘The standard for determining whether the school has breached its duty is to compare the school’s supervision and protection to that of a parent of ordinary prudence placed in the same situation and armed with the same information'” … . “‘The adequacy of a school’s supervision of its students is generally a question left to the trier of fact to resolve, as is the question of whether inadequate supervision was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury'” … . “Where the complaint alleges negligent supervision due to injuries related to an individual’s intentional acts, the plaintiff generally must demonstrate that the school knew or should have known of the individual’s propensity to engage in such conduct, such that the individual’s acts could be anticipated or were foreseeable” … . “‘Actual or constructive notice to the school of prior similar conduct generally is required'” … .

Here, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that they lacked constructive notice of the teacher’s alleged abusive propensities and conduct … . In particular, the defendants submitted a transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition testimony, in which the plaintiff testified that the principal and other teachers were aware of the teacher’s inappropriate behavior, which occurred multiple times throughout the school year in a classroom on the defendants’ premises during school hours … . J.J. v Mineola Sch. Dist., 2024 NY Slip Op 05580, Second Dept 11-13-24

Practice Point: Here the plaintiff’s testimony that the principal and other teachers were aware of the teacher’s inappropriate behavior which occurred multiple times in a classroom was enough to prevent the school from making out a prima facie case that it did not have constructive notice of the teacher’s alleged propensity.

 

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THE FAILURE TO GRANT PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST THAT THE JURY BE GIVEN AN INTERROGATORY ON THE THEORY THE SURGEON IMPROPERLY PERFORMED A PROCEDURE WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR ( SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, ordering a new trial on one of the theories of negligence, determined plaintiff’s request that the jury be given an interrogatory should have been granted:

… [T]he Supreme Court erred in denying the plaintiff’s request that the jury be given an interrogatory asking whether [defendant] Lazzaro departed from good and accepted standards of medical practice by “the improper performance of a surgical procedure,” and therefore a new trial is required on this theory of negligence. “‘Jury interrogatories must be based on claims supported by the evidence'” … . “‘The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to submit interrogatories to the jury'” … . “However, where there is sufficient evidence to support a plaintiff’s cause of action pursuant to a particular theory of negligence, it is error to deny a request by the plaintiff to submit an interrogatory to the jury regarding that theory” … .

Here, the plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence at trial to support her theory that Lazzaro departed from good and accepted standards of medical practice by the manner in which he performed the surgery … . Lawrence v New York Methodist Hosp., 2024 NY Slip Op 05571, Second Dept 11-13-24

Practice Point: In this medical malpractice case, there was sufficient proof a defendant improperly performed a surgical procedure to warrant granting plaintiff’s request to give the jury an interrogatory on the issue. The denial of the request was deemed reversible error.

 

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