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Criminal Law, Evidence

A POLICE OFFICER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO GIVE HIS OPINION ABOUT WHAT WAS DEPICTED IN SURVEILLANCE VIDEOS, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the judgment of conviction and ordering a new trial, determined a police officer should not have been allowed to offer an opinion about what was depicted in surveillance videos:

Supreme Court should have precluded the testimony of a police detective regarding his opinion as to what was depicted on various surveillance videos. “It is, of course, the role of the jury to determine the facts of the case tried before it” … . “Generally, lay witnesses must testify only to the facts and not to their opinions and conclusions drawn from the facts, as it is the jury’s province to draw the appropriate inferences arising from the facts” … . Here, considerable portions of the detective’s testimony improperly usurped the jury’s function by interpreting the evidence and was improperly admitted into evidence as relevant to the detective’s investigation … . Rather than aiding the jury in understanding the investigation, the detective improperly narrated the video, and the detective’s interpretation of the video improperly “instruct[ed] the jury on the existence of the facts needed to satisfy the elements of the charged offense” … . The error cannot be deemed harmless since the evidence of the defendant’s guilt, without reference to the error, was not overwhelming, and it cannot be said that there is no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error … . People v Vincent, 2026 NY Slip Op 06149, Second Dept 10-21-26

Practice Point: Here, allowing a police officer to give his opinion about what was depicted in surveillance videos usurped the jury’s function.

 

October 21, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-21 12:45:312026-10-30 12:59:58A POLICE OFFICER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO GIVE HIS OPINION ABOUT WHAT WAS DEPICTED IN SURVEILLANCE VIDEOS, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence

IN THIS STREET STOP, THE POLICE WERE JUSTIFIED IN FRISKING THE DEFENDANT BUT WERE NOT JUSTIFIED IN REACHING INSIDE A POCKET TO RETRIEVE THE ROBBERY VICTIM’S DRIVER’S LICENSE; BECAUSE THE DRIVER’S LICENSE CORROBORATED OTHER EVIDENCE, MAKING CONVICTION MORE LIKELY, A NEW TRIAL WAS ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing several convictions and ordering a new trial on the relevant counts, determined the police were justified in frisking the defendant not in removing the robbery victim’s driver’s license from defendant’s pocket. The driver’s license corroborated other evidence making the robbery and possession of stolen property convictions more likely:

… Supreme Court properly determined that since the defendant fit the description heard over the radio and he was in close spatial and temporal proximity to the scene of the robbery, the police officers reasonably suspected that the defendant was the perpetrator of the robbery. Furthermore, the police officers were justified in performing a protective frisk since they had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed and dangerous since he had a box cutter in his hand, and the police officers had concerns for safety, entitling them to conduct a protective frisk … . However, here, there was no justification for searching the defendant’s pants pocket, reaching into it, and removing the driver license … , as there was no evidence presented at the suppression hearing that, during his frisk of the defendant, Officer Mancuso felt anything in the defendant’s pocket that seemed to be a weapon or that could have posed a further danger to the police officers at the scene. In the course of conducting a protective pat-down based upon reasonable suspicion, “[o]nce an officer has concluded that no weapon is present, the search is over and there is no authority for further intrusion” … . Thus, there was no lawful basis for removing the driver license from the defendant’s pocket … . Accordingly, the People failed to satisfy their burden of going forward to establish the legality of police conduct in the first instance, and thus, the driver license should have been suppressed. People v Sanchez, 2026 NY Slip Op 06146, Second Dept 10-21-26

Practice Point: Here the police were justified in frisking the defendant for weapons. But, because the frisk did not indicate the presence of a weapon, the police were not justified in reaching inside defendant’s pocket and seizing the robbery victim’s driver’s license.

 

October 21, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-21 12:21:062026-10-30 12:45:23IN THIS STREET STOP, THE POLICE WERE JUSTIFIED IN FRISKING THE DEFENDANT BUT WERE NOT JUSTIFIED IN REACHING INSIDE A POCKET TO RETRIEVE THE ROBBERY VICTIM’S DRIVER’S LICENSE; BECAUSE THE DRIVER’S LICENSE CORROBORATED OTHER EVIDENCE, MAKING CONVICTION MORE LIKELY, A NEW TRIAL WAS ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence

THE PROOF OF PHYSICAL INJURY WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE STRANGULATION AND ASSAULT CONVICTIONS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department reversed strangulation and assault convictions because the proof of physical injury was insufficient:

The injuries to the victim’s neck, described as “redness,” “small black and blue marks,” and “little scratches” are insufficient to establish physical injury … . * * *

The object was described by the victim as “something that was like metal,” which caused tiny red marks on the victim’s stomach. This evidence was insufficient to prove that the object was a dangerous instrument … capable of causing serious physical injury … . People v Guzman, 2026 NY Slip Op 05972, Second Dept 10-14-26

Practice Point: Strangulation and assault require proof of physical injury. The minor injuries proven in this case did not support the convictions.

 

October 14, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-14 22:06:402026-10-23 22:19:02THE PROOF OF PHYSICAL INJURY WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE STRANGULATION AND ASSAULT CONVICTIONS (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Medical Malpractice, Negligence

NEW GROUNDS OR EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO DISMISS RAISED IN REPLY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, noted that new arguments or evidence presented in the reply papers should not have been considered:

… [P]laintiffs failed to establish that the defendant’s affirmative defense alleging the expiration of the statute of limitations was without merit as a matter of law. The plaintiffs’ moving papers did not support their conclusory allegations that the defendant’s treatment of the injured plaintiff beginning on May 11, 2021, and continuing through July 15, 2022, made their action timely based on the continuous treatment doctrine … . The plaintiffs’ attempt to remedy this deficiency by submitting portions of a purported medical chart through their counsel’s reply affirmation was improper. The function of reply papers is to address arguments made in opposition to the position taken by the movant and not to permit the movant to introduce new grounds or evidence in support of the motion … . Malone v Spaliviero, 2026 NY Slip Op 05948, Second Dept 10-14-26

Practice Point: Here new evidence submitted in reply papers should not have been considered by the court.

 

October 14, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-14 16:58:322026-10-23 17:09:52NEW GROUNDS OR EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO DISMISS RAISED IN REPLY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED (SECOND DEPT).
Evidence, Labor Law-Construction Law

WHETHER PLAINTIFF FELL FROM THE SIXTH STEP OF AN UNSECURED A-FRAME LADDER OR THE SECOND STEP WAS IRRELEVANT; BOTH ARE COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor law 240(1) cause of action in this ladder-fall case. Whether plaintiff fell from the sixth step of the A-frame ladder or the second step was irrelevant:

Plaintiff “established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim by submitting proof, including an expert affidavit, that he fell from an unsecured [eight]-foot A-frame ladder that suddenly moved” as he was removing plywood sheets from the ceiling above him … . Plaintiff’s testimony that he fell from the ladder after it was struck by a falling piece of plywood is uncontroverted. It is irrelevant whether plaintiff was on the sixth step of the ladder when the plywood fell, as he testified, or on the second step of the ladder, as his coworker averred, because a fall from a height of two feet can constitute the type of elevation-related risk that is covered by the protections of Labor Law § 240(1) … .

Defendants’ argument that plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his accident is unavailing. Even if plaintiff was negligent, it is “conceptually impossible” for a plaintiff’s negligence to be the sole proximate cause where it is shown that defendants’ violation of Labor Law § 240(1) was also a proximate cause of the accident … . In any event, plaintiff was not solely liable for the accident, because he followed his employer’s instruction in performing the work … . De Souza v 4720 Third Ave LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 05905, First Dept 10-13-26

Practice Point: A fall from the second step of an unsecured A-frame ladder is covered under Labor Law 240(1) (two feet in height).

 

October 13, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-13 09:03:172026-10-21 09:31:07WHETHER PLAINTIFF FELL FROM THE SIXTH STEP OF AN UNSECURED A-FRAME LADDER OR THE SECOND STEP WAS IRRELEVANT; BOTH ARE COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1) (FIRST DEPT).
Attorneys, Criminal Law, Evidence

PRESENTING A VIDEOTAPED INTERVIEW OF THE 17-YEAR-OLD VICTIM TO THE GRAND JURY IN THE ABSENCE OF A COURT ORDER VIOLATED THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW AND IMPAIRED THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS; INDICTMENT DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, dismissing the indictment without prejudice, determined presenting a videotaped interview of the 17-year-old victim without a court order violated the Criminal Procedure Law and impaired the integrity of the proceedings:

Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of attempted rape in the first degree … . Defendant contends that County Court erred in denying that part of his omnibus motion seeking to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the grand jury proceeding failed “to conform to the requirements of [CPL] article [190] to such degree that the integrity thereof [was] impaired and prejudice to the defendant” resulted (CPL 210.35 [5]). We agree. The People correctly concede on appeal that the prosecutor improperly presented to the grand jury a videotaped interview of the approximately 17-year-old victim conducted by a social services caseworker in lieu of her live testimony without adhering to any of the requirements of CPL 190.32, including the obligation to seek a court order authorizing the videotaping of an examination of the victim as a “special witness” … . We agree with the parties that, under these circumstances, this error rendered the proceeding so irregular “that the integrity thereof [was] impaired and prejudice to . . . defendant may [have] result[ed]” (CPL 210.35 [5]; see CPL 210.20 [1] [c] …). People v Thompson, 2026 NY Slip Op 05874, Fourth Dept 10-9-26

Practice Point: Presenting a videotaped interview of a crime victim to a grand jury without a court order may impair the integrity of the proceedings requiring dismissal of the indictment.

 

October 9, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-09 22:06:582026-10-19 22:30:21PRESENTING A VIDEOTAPED INTERVIEW OF THE 17-YEAR-OLD VICTIM TO THE GRAND JURY IN THE ABSENCE OF A COURT ORDER VIOLATED THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW AND IMPAIRED THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS; INDICTMENT DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE (FOURTH DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence, Judges

NOTHING IN THE RECORD SUPPORTED THE PROSECUTOR’S REASON FOR STRIKING A JUROR, I.E., THAT THE JUROR “SPOKE BROKEN ENGLISH;” DEFENDANT’S BATSON CHALLENGE TO THE STRIKING OF THE JUROR SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the judgment of conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the defendant’s “Batson” challenge to the striking of a juror (juror No. 95] should have been granted. The record indicates the prosecutor’s reason for striking the juror, i.e., the juror’s “broken English,” was pretextual:

Evaluating the record … becomes problematic in instances where, like here, the nature of the race-neutral explanation given by a prosecutor pertains to a trait — i.e., speech and the ability to communicate — which is not easily captured by the record. Indeed, traits such as accent, dialect, tone, cadence, fluency or manner of speech are not typically represented on a transcript, but nonetheless remain part of the overall calculus as to whether an individual is perceived by others as being able to communicate effectively. This is why it is essential for trial courts, which are in a “unique position to verify . . . [what] is not clearly established in the appellate record” … , to create meaningful records for a reviewing court to uphold its determinations … .

Consequently, we are constrained to agree with defendant that County Court erred in denying his Batson challenge at step three. …[T]he record reflects that neither County Court nor defense counsel indicated any trouble understanding juror No. 95. Rather, County Court and defense counsel expressly disagreed with that characterization during voir dire … . Thus, there is nothing in the record to otherwise suggest that juror No. 95 had difficulty understanding or answering the limited questions posed by County Court, and the trial prosecutor did not ask any questions of this juror. In view of the sparseness of the record at trial and on remittal, as well as the comments and conduct of the trial prosecutor, a determination at step three that juror No. 95 did have difficulty communicating would, at best, be speculative … . Accordingly, since County Court’s determination was unsupported by the voir dire transcript, not based on its recalled observations or the assessment of the prosecutor’s credibility, and is otherwise without a basis in the record, we must reverse and remit the matter for a new trial … . People v Duplessis, 2026 NY Slip Op 05830, Third Dept 10-8-26

​Practice Point: The Third Department stressed the importance of creating a record during a Batson challenge to striking a juror, “particularly where innate traits such as language are at issue.” Here the prosecutor’s “race-neutral” reason for striking a juror, i.e., that the juror spoke “broken English,” had no support in the record. The appellate court, therefore, was “constrained” to find the reason “pretextual.”

 

October 8, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-08 19:09:542026-10-21 20:23:30NOTHING IN THE RECORD SUPPORTED THE PROSECUTOR’S REASON FOR STRIKING A JUROR, I.E., THAT THE JUROR “SPOKE BROKEN ENGLISH;” DEFENDANT’S BATSON CHALLENGE TO THE STRIKING OF THE JUROR SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).
Evidence, Trusts and Estates

THE WORDING OF THE WILL RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE INTENT OF THE TESTATOR BECAUSE SEVERAL CHILDREN WERE MISIDENTIFIED AND ONE WAS OMITTED; THE PETITION FOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE WILL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, determined the wording of the will raised questions about the testator’s intent. Therefore the petition for construction of the will pursuant to SCPA (Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act) section 1420 should not have been denied without a hearing:

“The cardinal rule of construction of a will is to carry out the intent of the testator” … . “All rules of interpretation are subordinated to the requirement that the actual purpose of the testat[or] is sought and effectuated as far as is consonant with principles of law and public policy” … . “Intent is not to be gleaned by focusing upon any one particular word, sentence, or provision; rather, it must be ascertained from a perusal of the entire will by a reader mindful of the particular facts and circumstances under which the provisions of the instrument were framed” … . “The heirs of a testator are favored by the policy of the law and cannot be disinherited upon mere conjecture, and when the testator intends to disinherit them he must indicate that intention clearly” … .

Here, the Surrogate’s Court should not have, in effect, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding without a hearing … . The allegations in the verified petition, inter alia, that several of the decedent’s children were misidentified in Article THIRD and that Article THIRD contained the word “children” but omitted the name of one of the decedent’s children … , were sufficient to indicate that the testator’s intent was not clear and unambiguous.

Accordingly, the Surrogate’s Court should have held a hearing to give the petitioner the opportunity to submit proof to establish the decedent’s intent … . Matter of Covington, 2026 NY Slip Op 05785, Second Dept 10-7-26

Practice Point: Here the wording of the will raised questions about the testator’s intent. The petition for construction of the will should not have been denied without a hearing at which petitioner could present evidence of the decedent’s intent.

 

October 7, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-07 17:01:552026-10-15 18:11:12THE WORDING OF THE WILL RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE INTENT OF THE TESTATOR BECAUSE SEVERAL CHILDREN WERE MISIDENTIFIED AND ONE WAS OMITTED; THE PETITION FOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE WILL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).
Evidence, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

DEFENDANT REAR DRIVER PROVIDED A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION FOR THE REAR-END COLLISION PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant in this rear-end collision case raised a question of fact precluding summary judgment. Defendant alleged plaintiff abruptly changed lanes without signaling and came to a sudden stop in front of defendant’s vehicle:

… [A] rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, requiring that operator to come forward with evidence of a nonnegligent explanation for the collision to rebut the inference of negligence” … . “A nonnegligent explanation may include that a vehicle made a sudden lane change in front of a defendant’s vehicle, forcing the defendant to stop suddenly” … .

Here, the plaintiff established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by submitting an affidavit wherein she averred that the rear of her stopped vehicle was struck by the front of the defendants’ vehicle … . However, in opposition, the defendants raised triable issues of fact as to the existence of a nonnegligent explanation for striking the rear of the plaintiff’s vehicle. According to the defendant driver’s affidavit, the accident occurred when the plaintiff’s vehicle abruptly changed lanes, without signaling, and immediately came to a sudden stop in front of the defendants’ vehicle … . Johnson v Payne, 2026 NY Slip Op 05775, Second Dept 10-7-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an example of a “nonnegligent” explanation for a rear-end collision which precluded summary judgment.​

 

October 7, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-07 11:30:362026-10-12 11:53:00DEFENDANT REAR DRIVER PROVIDED A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION FOR THE REAR-END COLLISION PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT). ​
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Immunity, Municipal Law, Negligence

A PRECLUSION ORDER DOES NOT HAVE THE SAME EFFECT AS STRIKING THE ANSWER; THE DEFENDANT CAN STILL PRESENT LEGAL ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING A MOTION TO DISMISS; HERE THE DEFENDANT CITY AMBULANCE SERVICE WAS PERFORMING A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION WHEN DECEDENT WAS INJURED AND WAS ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY IN THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the city was entitled to dismissal of the negligence action because the ambulance service was performing a governmental function and no special duty was owed by the city to the decedent. Here the city had failed to meet its discovery obligations and Supreme Court precluded the city from offering evidence. However the city was entitled to make legal arguments in an attorney affirmation to support its motion to dismiss the complaint:

… [A]n order precluding the submission of evidence, unlike the striking of an answer, does not relieve the plaintiff of his or her obligation to establish a prima facie case in the first instance … . The purpose of a preclusion order is to make the demanding party whole … . To further preclude the defendants from asserting defenses which require only general denials, despite the existence of a genuine factual dispute, deprives the defendants of their day in court and gives the plaintiff more relief than is warranted by the defendants’ failure to comply with their disclosure obligations … . Thus, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the order … precluding the defendants “from offering any evidence . . . and/or affidavits in support of or in opposition to any dispositive motion,” did not preclude the defendants from submitting legal arguments in an attorney affirmation or from referring to the parties’ pleadings.

When a municipality provides ambulance service by emergency medical technicians in response to a 911 call for assistance, it performs a governmental function and cannot be held liable unless it owed a special duty to the injured party … . As relevant here, a municipality will be held to have voluntarily assumed a duty or special relationship with the plaintiff where there is (1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking … . It is the plaintiff’s obligation to prove that the government defendant owed a special duty of care to the injured party because the duty is an essential element of the negligence claim itself … . Davis v City of New York, 2026 NY Slip Op 05766, Second Dept 10-7-26

Practice Point: Here the city defendant failed to meet its discovery obligations and the court issued an order precluding the city from presenting evidence. However the city was not precluded from making legal arguments in support of its successful motion to dismiss.

Practice Point: The city was entitled to immunity because the city ambulance service was performing a governmental function and there was no special relationship between the city and the decedent.

 

October 7, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-07 11:26:572026-10-14 10:22:50A PRECLUSION ORDER DOES NOT HAVE THE SAME EFFECT AS STRIKING THE ANSWER; THE DEFENDANT CAN STILL PRESENT LEGAL ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING A MOTION TO DISMISS; HERE THE DEFENDANT CITY AMBULANCE SERVICE WAS PERFORMING A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION WHEN DECEDENT WAS INJURED AND WAS ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY IN THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
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