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Evidence, Negligence

WHETHER A CONDITION IS “OPEN AND OBVIOUS” IS USUALLY A JURY QUESTION; IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, PLAINTIFF TRIPPED AND FELL OVER THE FORK PART OF A FORKLIFT PARKED IN AN AISLE OF A HOME DEPOT STORE; THE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, noted that whether a condition is “open and obvious” is usually a question of fact for the jury:

“A landowner has a duty to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition” … . “However, a landowner has no duty to protect or warn against conditions that are open and obvious and not inherently dangerous” … . “The determination of whether an asserted hazard is open and obvious cannot be divorced from the surrounding circumstances, and whether a condition is not inherently dangerous, or constitutes a reasonably safe environment, depends on the totality of the specific facts of each case” … .

Here, the defendants’ submissions failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether the forklift was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous … . “Some hazards, although discernable, may be hazardous because of their nature and location” … . In particular, the plaintiff’s deposition testimony raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the forklift’s location, in relation to the five quarter decking the plaintiff was loading into his cart when the accident occurred, constituted an inherently dangerous condition … . The plaintiff testified, inter alia, that he could not put his cart right next to the location in the aisle where he was retrieving the five quarter decking because the forklift was in the way. Simon v Plainview Ave. Assoc., 2026 NY Slip Op 05205, Second Dept 9-2-26

Practice Point: Here plaintiff tripped over the fork part of a forklift parked in an aisle of a Home Depot store. The complaint should not have been dismissed. Whether the condition was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous was a question of fact.

 

September 2, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-02 13:26:422026-09-11 14:10:11WHETHER A CONDITION IS “OPEN AND OBVIOUS” IS USUALLY A JURY QUESTION; IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, PLAINTIFF TRIPPED AND FELL OVER THE FORK PART OF A FORKLIFT PARKED IN AN AISLE OF A HOME DEPOT STORE; THE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
Evidence, Labor Law-Construction Law

PLAINTIFF STEPPED BACKWARD TO ALLOW OTHERS TO EXIT THE ELEVATOR; THE FLOOR OF THE ELEVATOR WAS SIX TO TWELVE INCHES ABOVE THE BUILDING FLOOR AND PLAINTIFF SEVERELY INJURED HIS KNEE; THE SIX TO TWELVE INCH GAP WAS NOT THE TYPE OF “ELEVATION RISK” COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the 6 to 12-inch gap between the floor of the elevator and the unfinished floor just outside the elevator door was not the type of “elevation risk” addressed by Labor Law 240(1). Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Labor Law 240(1) action should have been dismissed. However, Supreme Court properly denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the Labor Law 200 cause of action (unsafe condition):

Supreme Court should have granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment to the extent it sought dismissal of the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action. Not every fall results in the “extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240(1)” … . The statute protects workers only from those falls stemming from the “extraordinary elevation risks” created by “the relative elevation at which the [work] must be performed” and not from “the usual and ordinary dangers of a construction site” … .

It is true that “there is no bright-line minimum height differential that determines whether an elevation hazard exists” … . However, under the present circumstances, the 6-to-12 inch gap between the elevator doorway and the floor “was not a physically significant height elevation differential to trigger the protection of Labor Law § 240(1)” … . Also, neither the elevator nor the missing ramp was the “functional equivalent of a safety device enumerated in the statute” … . Instead, the record supports a conclusion that plaintiff’s injury arose from the type of “usual and ordinary” perils plaintiff could expect at his job site … . Ambrose v City Univ. Constr. Fund, 2026 NY Slip Op 05060, Second Dept 8-20-26

Practice Point: Here the six to twelve inch gap between the floor of the elevator and the building floor was not the type of “elevation risk” covered by Labor Law 240(1). Labor Law 200 (unsafe condition) may apply.​

 

August 20, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-08-20 15:21:132026-08-23 15:50:17PLAINTIFF STEPPED BACKWARD TO ALLOW OTHERS TO EXIT THE ELEVATOR; THE FLOOR OF THE ELEVATOR WAS SIX TO TWELVE INCHES ABOVE THE BUILDING FLOOR AND PLAINTIFF SEVERELY INJURED HIS KNEE; THE SIX TO TWELVE INCH GAP WAS NOT THE TYPE OF “ELEVATION RISK” COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1) (FIRST DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence

DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING AT MORE THAN TWICE THE POSTED SPEED LIMIT IN A RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOOD WHEN HE COLLIDED WITH ANOTHER CAR, KILLING THE DRIVER; USUALLY EXCESSIVE SPEED ALONE WILL NOT SUPPORT A CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE CHARGE; HERE, HOWEVER, THE EXCESSIVE SPEED IN COMBINATION WITH OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING THE CHARACTER OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD, WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CHARGE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court’s dismissal of the indictment, over a dissent, determined the evidence presented to the grand jury was legally sufficient for criminally negligent homicide. The defendant was driving at twice the speed limit in a residential neighborhood when he collided with another vehicle at an intersection, killing the driver. Generally driving in excess of the speed limit, alone, will not support a criminally negligent homicide charge. However, here, the excessive speed, in combination with other factors, was deemed sufficient:

[T]he culpable risk-creating conduct necessary to support a finding of recklessness or criminal negligence generally requires ‘some additional affirmative act’ aside from ‘driving faster than the posted speed limit'” … , which transforms speeding into dangerous speeding, by engaging in some other “risk-creating” behavior such as disregarding traffic signals … . However, there is no per se rule that speeding alone is insufficient … . There are circumstances where excessive speed “absent proof of any other contributing factors” is sufficient … . The extent of the violation of the posted speed limit and the surrounding circumstances must be considered … .

“[I]n order to sustain a conviction for criminally negligent homicide in a case in which the principal item of evidence consists of proof of the defendant’s use of excessive speed, [the law does not require that] the prosecution must always prove some other traffic law violation unrelated to the defendant’s rate of speed. While it may be accurate to say that an infraction of the posted speed limit does not ipso facto establish criminal negligence, it would not be accurate to say that a trier of fact may never conclude that in light of the time, the place, the weather conditions, and in light of any number of other factors which might be established at the trial, the defendant’s use of excessive speed was criminally negligent” … .

Here, … [t]he evidence, if accepted as true, demonstrated that the defendant disregarded road conditions, i.e., the fact that he was traveling in a residential neighborhood with a playground on the corner of the intersection, when he decided to drive his vehicle through the intersection at well above twice the posted speed limit … . The evidence further indicated that he was showing off to his friend how the vehicle “drives,” which, considering the fact that he accelerated the vehicle’s speed while allegedly doing so, indicated that he was showing off how the vehicle operated at a high speed. The evidence further indicated that he ignored a traffic control sign directing motorists to exercise additional caution … . People v Lee, 2026 NY Slip Op 05038, Second Dept 8-19-26

Practice Point: Here in the fatal-vehicle-accident case, defendant’s excessive speed, in combination with the nature of the neighborhood and other factors, supported the criminally negligent homicide charge.

 

August 19, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-08-19 13:32:502026-08-24 14:00:04DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING AT MORE THAN TWICE THE POSTED SPEED LIMIT IN A RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOOD WHEN HE COLLIDED WITH ANOTHER CAR, KILLING THE DRIVER; USUALLY EXCESSIVE SPEED ALONE WILL NOT SUPPORT A CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE CHARGE; HERE, HOWEVER, THE EXCESSIVE SPEED IN COMBINATION WITH OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING THE CHARACTER OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD, WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CHARGE (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Family Law, Judges

THE JUDGE DISMISSED FATHER’S NEW YORK CUSTODY PETITION BECAUSE MOTHER HAD PREVIOUSLY COMMENCED A CUSTODY PROCEEDING IN FLORIDA; BECAUSE THE JUDGE DID NOT FOLLOW THE PROCEDURE MANDATED BY THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT, THE MATTER WAS REMITTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversed Family Court and remitted the matter. The Family Court judge dismissed the father’s New York custody petition on the ground mother had previously commenced a custody proceeding in Florida where she and the child resided. The judge, however, did not follow the procedures mandated by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act which must precede a ruling that one of the two courts is the most appropriate forum:

Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (see Domestic Relations Law article 5-A), a New York court “may not exercise its jurisdiction” in a child custody proceeding “if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child has been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with [Domestic Relations Law article 5-A], unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because a court of this state is a more convenient forum” (Domestic Relations Law § 76-e[1] …). “If the court determines that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with [Domestic Relations Law article 5-A], the court of this state shall stay its proceeding and communicate with the court of the other state” (Domestic Relations Law § 76-e[2]; see Domestic Relations Law § 77-f …). “If the court of the state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with [Domestic Relations Law article 5-A] does not determine that the court of this state is a more appropriate forum, the court of this state shall dismiss the proceeding” (Domestic Relations Law § 76-e[2] …).

A court, acting pursuant to these provisions, must make a record of its communications with a court of another state on substantive matters, must promptly inform the parties of the communication, and grant the parties access to the record (see Domestic Relations Law § 75-i[4] …). The court may, in its discretion, allow the parties to participate in the communication, but “[i]f the parties are not able to participate in the communication, they must be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made” (Domestic Relations Law § 75-i[2] …). Matter of Adames v Digangi, 2026 NY Slip Op 05022, Second Dept 8-19-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an explanation of the statutory procedure mandated when a judge must decide which of two forums is appropriate for a custody proceeding. Here mother commenced a custody proceeding in Florida and father subsequently commenced a custody proceeding in New York.

 

August 19, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-08-19 12:51:292026-08-28 12:05:04THE JUDGE DISMISSED FATHER’S NEW YORK CUSTODY PETITION BECAUSE MOTHER HAD PREVIOUSLY COMMENCED A CUSTODY PROCEEDING IN FLORIDA; BECAUSE THE JUDGE DID NOT FOLLOW THE PROCEDURE MANDATED BY THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT, THE MATTER WAS REMITTED (SECOND DEPT).
Evidence, Fraud, Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law

IN AN ACTION ALLEGING A FRAUDULENT SCHEME TO DEREGULATE APARTMENTS, TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE SUCH THAT THE FOUR-YEAR LOOK-BACK DOES NOT APPLY, PLAINTIFF NEED NOT DEMONSTRATE EACH ELEMENT OF COMMON-LAW FRAUD; SUFFICIENT INDICIA OF FRAUD OR A COLORABLE CLAIM OF A FRAUDULENT SCHEME ARE WHAT MUST BE DEMONSTRATED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court upon remittitur from the Court of Appeals, over a two-justice dissent, remitted the matter to Supreme Court for application of the recently clarified standard for the prima facie demonstration of fraud in an action alleging a fraudulent scheme to deregulate apartments. The issue is whether plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of fraud to overcome the four-year look-back provision in the former Rent Stabilization Law:

… [T]he Court [of Appeals] refined the common-law standard applied to allegations of a fraudulent scheme to deregulate apartments subject to rent stabilization on a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 … . More specifically, [the Court of Appeals] “made clear that, for the fraud exception [to the four-year lookback period in the former Rent Stabilization Law § 26-516 (a)] to apply, a plaintiff need not demonstrate each element of common-law fraud and instead must put forth sufficient indicia of fraud or a colorable claim of a fraudulent scheme” … .

Parallel to the Court of Appeals’ development of the common law applicable to fraudulent deregulation claims, the legislature addressed the fraudulent deregulation standard by statute … . Under the legislature’s statutory amendments, the relevant inquiry is whether the landlord ” ‘knowingly engaged in [a] fraudulent scheme [to deregulate] after a consideration of the totality of the circumstances’ ” … To date, the Court of Appeals has not had occasion to “address to what extent this legislation differs from [the] common-law rule, and, if there is any difference, the impact or applicability of that legislation” … . Aras v B-U Realty Corp., 2026 NY Slip Op 04983, First Dept 8-13-26

​Practice Point; Consult this decision for insight into what a plaintiff must allege or demonstrate to survive a motion to dismiss or to warrant summary judgment in an action alleging a fraudulent scheme to deregulate apartments and seeking the “fraud exception” to the statutory four-year look-back for damages.

 

August 13, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-08-13 14:00:362026-08-15 16:02:06IN AN ACTION ALLEGING A FRAUDULENT SCHEME TO DEREGULATE APARTMENTS, TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE SUCH THAT THE FOUR-YEAR LOOK-BACK DOES NOT APPLY, PLAINTIFF NEED NOT DEMONSTRATE EACH ELEMENT OF COMMON-LAW FRAUD; SUFFICIENT INDICIA OF FRAUD OR A COLORABLE CLAIM OF A FRAUDULENT SCHEME ARE WHAT MUST BE DEMONSTRATED (FIRST DEPT).
Evidence, Negligence

SELF-SERVING STATEMENTS OF AN INTERESTED PARTY (THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE) WHICH REFERRED TO MATTERS EXCLUSIVELY WITHIN THAT PARTY’S KNOWLEDGE CREATED AN ISSUE OF CREDIBILITY PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this slip and fall case, determined inconsistencies in plaintiff’s deposition testimony as well as the fact he was the only witness to the incident raised credibility issues which precluded summary judgment:

Here, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability. His deposition testimony, which included inconsistencies regarding the location of the alleged accident and was generally vague, in addition to a lack of other supporting evidence, placed his own credibility in issue and presented triable issues of fact regarding how the alleged accident occurred … . The plaintiff also testified at his deposition that he was the only witness to the alleged accident, which further raised credibility issues, since “[o]n a motion for summary judgment . . . , self-serving statements of an interested party which refer to matters exclusively within that party’s knowledge create an issue of credibility which should not be decided by the court but should be left for the trier of facts” … . Espinal v 1760-1770, LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 04926, Second Dept 8-12-26

Practice Point: On a summary judgment motion, statements by an interested party which refer to matters exclusively within that party’s knowledge can create a credibility issue which precludes summary judgment.

 

August 12, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-08-12 16:44:202026-08-15 17:06:57SELF-SERVING STATEMENTS OF AN INTERESTED PARTY (THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE) WHICH REFERRED TO MATTERS EXCLUSIVELY WITHIN THAT PARTY’S KNOWLEDGE CREATED AN ISSUE OF CREDIBILITY PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).
Evidence, Medical Malpractice, Negligence

THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE DR. VELASQUEZ WAS NEGLIGENT; HIS SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION IN THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE OPINION IS FACT-SPECIFIC AND DETAILED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mendez, determined this medical malpractice action against one of the defendants, Dr. Velasquez, should have been dismissed. The opinion is fact-specific and goes through the evidence in granular detail. Roth v Velasquez, 2026 NY Slip Op 04915, First Dept 8-6-26

 

August 6, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-08-06 11:51:552026-08-09 12:03:47THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE DR. VELASQUEZ WAS NEGLIGENT; HIS SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION IN THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE OPINION IS FACT-SPECIFIC AND DETAILED (FIRST DEPT). ​
Evidence, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEFENDANT DRIVER’S STRIKING A 12-YEAR-OLD PEDESTRIAN WAS THE PEDESTRIAN’S SUDDENLY RUNNING ONTO THE HIGHWAY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined this traffic-accident action stemming from defendant’s striking a 12-year-old pedestrian (J.W.) should have been dismissed. J.W. suddenly ran into defendant driver’s (Li’s) highway lane:

Li testified that he was driving south in the right lane of the Hutchinson River Parkway in the Bronx at about 45 miles per hour when he first saw J.W. standing 100 feet in front of him in a grassy area on the side of the highway to his right. Li testified that when the vehicle approached, J.W. made a “running gesture” and began to run towards the vehicle when it was approximately two car lengths away. Li did not brake or honk his horn, but did take his foot off the gas pedal and was in the process of moving into the left lane to move away from J.W. when J.W. entered the highway, at which point the front right side of the van struck him. Police conducted sobriety tests at the scene and allowed Li to drive the van from the scene. He did not receive a ticket, violation, or citation as a result of the collision. It is undisputed that pedestrians are prohibited from occupying the location where J.W. was traversing (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1229-a).

Defendants established prima facie that J.W.’s act of running into the highway unlawfully was the sole proximate cause of the collision … . Li’s testimony shows that he was confronted with a sudden and unforeseen situation in which he was forced to make a split second decision and could not “weigh alternative courses of action” such that “he cannot reasonably be held to the same conduct as one who has had full opportunity to reflect” … . “While it is often a jury question whether a person’s reaction to an emergency was reasonable, summary resolution is possible when the individual presents sufficient evidence to support the reasonableness of his or her actions and there is no opposing evidentiary showing sufficient to raise a legitimate question of fact on the issue” … . Danielle W. v Li, 2026 NY Slip Op 04821, First Dept 7-30-26

 

July 30, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-07-30 12:21:012026-08-07 10:05:13THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEFENDANT DRIVER’S STRIKING A 12-YEAR-OLD PEDESTRIAN WAS THE PEDESTRIAN’S SUDDENLY RUNNING ONTO THE HIGHWAY (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Foreclosure

THE REFEREE’S REPORT REFERRED TO UNPRODUCED DOCUMENTS RENDERING IT INADMISSBILE HEARSAY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the referee’s report in this foreclosure action should not have been confirmed. The documents upon which the report was based were not produced, rendering the report inadmissible hearsay:

… [T]he plaintiff’s motion which were to confirm the referee’s report and for a judgment of foreclosure and sale should have been denied. “The report of a referee should be confirmed whenever the findings are substantially supported by the record, and the referee has clearly defined the issues and resolved matters of credibility” … . However, computations based upon a review of unidentified and unproduced business records constitute inadmissible hearsay and lack probative value … .

Here, the referee’s report indicates, among other things, that “[t]he information contained herein was obtained from the books and records of plaintiff pertaining to the defendants’ loan and payment history.” However, the record does not reflect that those books and records were annexed to an affidavit of an another officer of the plaintiff’s former loan servicer. As the defendants contended in opposition to the plaintiff’s motion, inter alia, to confirm the referee’s report and in support of their cross-motion, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 4403 to reject the referee’s report, and as they contend on appeal, the referee’s computations as to the amounts due to the plaintiff for advances of taxes and insurance were based on unidentified and unproduced business records, and therefore, the referee’s assertions in those regards constituted inadmissible hearsay and lacked probative value … . Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Prestia, 2026 NY Slip Op 04735, Second Dept 7-29-26

 

July 29, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-07-29 11:58:452026-08-05 12:10:38THE REFEREE’S REPORT REFERRED TO UNPRODUCED DOCUMENTS RENDERING IT INADMISSBILE HEARSAY (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Court of Claims, Evidence

TO STATE A MERITORIOUS CLAIM AGAINST THE STATE IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS, CLAIMANT NEED NOT MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE; IT IS ENOUGH THAT THE CLAIM HAS THE APPEARANCE OF MERIT; HERE CLAIMANT’S APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO FILE A LATE CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined claimant’s application for permission to file a late claim should have been granted. The Court of Claims found that claimant did not demonstrate a meritorious claim. The Fourth Department explained that a claimant need not make out a prima facie case at this stage. If the claim is not patently groundless, frivolous or legally defective it should be deemed meritorious:

… [W]hile being treated in the inpatient psychiatric unit at Upstate, she was restrained by security officers and nurses because she was engaging in self-harm or had refused medication and injection. According to claimant, security officers escorted her to a seclusion room and forcefully pinned her down, with several security officers lying on top of her while her left arm was underneath her body. Claimant’s medical records confirmed that four security officers and two nurses were involved in the restraining incident. Claimant allegedly screamed out in pain, and a nurse told the security officers to get off of her. Consistent with claimant’s allegations, the medical records establish that, as a result of the incident, claimant suffered a dislocated left elbow, which first required a closed reduction under sedation and placement of a cast and later required surgery under general anesthesia to correct the recurrent instability in her elbow and a complete tear of the ligament complex.

… [T]he evidence presented by claimant in support of the application demonstrates that the security officers and nurses may have caused her injuries, as she alleges, by negligently applying excessive force while attempting to restrain her … . Further, contrary to the State’s assertion, to the extent that Upstate’s account of the incident in the medical records suggests that claimant somehow dislocated her own elbow, that notation created at most a factual issue with respect to causation … . Consequently, on this record, it cannot be said that “the claim raised is patently groundless, frivolous or legally defective” … . … [C]aimant’s submissions on the application are sufficient, at this stage in the proceedings, to demonstrate that there appears to be merit to her claim within the meaning of Court of Claims Act § 10 (6) … . Viola v SUNY Upstate Univ. Hosp., 2026 NY Slip Op 04604, Fourth Dept 7-24-26

Practice Point: In seeking permission to make a late claim in the Court of Claims, claimant need not make out a prima facie case. It is enough that the claim has the appearance of merit, i.e., that it is not patently groundless, frivolous or legally defective.

 

July 24, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-07-24 16:35:422026-07-30 11:25:43TO STATE A MERITORIOUS CLAIM AGAINST THE STATE IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS, CLAIMANT NEED NOT MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE; IT IS ENOUGH THAT THE CLAIM HAS THE APPEARANCE OF MERIT; HERE CLAIMANT’S APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO FILE A LATE CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT). ​
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