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You are here: Home1 / Attorneys2 / HERE THE TRIAL TESTIMONY ABOUT THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT’S...
Attorneys, Criminal Law, Evidence

HERE THE TRIAL TESTIMONY ABOUT THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT’S VOICE WAS MUCH LESS DEFINITIVE AND UNEQUIVOCAL THAN THE TESTIMONY AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING, RAISING A QUESTION WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DEFENDANT’S ARREST; DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE TO REOPEN THE SUPPRESSION HEARING; MATTER REMITTED FOR A REOPENED HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, remitting the matter for a reopened suppression hearing, determined defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move to reopen the hearing based upon discrepancies between the testimony at the suppression hearing and at trial. The trial testimony was less definitive and unequivocal, raising a question about whether there was probable cause for defendant’s arrest:

The defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to reopen the pretrial suppression hearing on the basis that an individual had testified, during the trial, that he had told the police that the voice of the alleged kidnapper, who the individual had heard speaking on the telephone, was “possibly” that of the defendant, and the individual also admitted to testifying before the grand jury that he identified the voice after being shown a photograph of the defendant. Whereas, the police testimony at the pretrial suppression hearing regarding the same individual’s identification of the defendant’s voice, which formed the basis for the defendant’s arrest, was more definitive and unequivocal, and did not involve the viewing of a photograph. We agree.

Courts have the discretion to reopen a suppression hearing based upon new facts, which could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence before the determination of the suppression motion, pertinent to the suppression issue … . These new facts need not establish a constitutional violation on their face, but must be facts that would either materially affect, or have affected, the earlier determination … . Here, where the reliability of a witness’s identification of the defendant’s voice as that of one of the perpetrators of the crime, which primarily formed the basis for the defendant’s arrest, was called into question in light of that witness’s trial testimony, an issue of fact was raised regarding whether there was probable cause for the defendant’s arrest … . Although motions to reopen suppression hearings are generally denied where the new facts proffered go only to the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s arrest, here, the defendant could not be presumed to know the basis of the communications or conduct between police, leading to his arrest … . The failure of trial counsel to move to reopen the suppression hearing on this ground was therefore both objectively unreasonable as well as prejudicial to the defendant … . Contrary to the People’s contention, this is not a case in which trial counsel’s error can be explained as part of any strategic design … . People v Clark, 2026 NY Slip Op 02414, Second Dept 4-22-26

Practice Point: Here trial testimony about the identification of defendant’s voice was not as definitive or unequivocal as the testimony at the suppression hearing raising a question whether there was probable cause for defendant’s arrest. Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move to reopen the hearing. The matter was remitted for a reopened hearing.​

 

April 22, 2026
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-04-22 18:36:582026-04-24 18:58:36HERE THE TRIAL TESTIMONY ABOUT THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT’S VOICE WAS MUCH LESS DEFINITIVE AND UNEQUIVOCAL THAN THE TESTIMONY AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING, RAISING A QUESTION WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DEFENDANT’S ARREST; DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE TO REOPEN THE SUPPRESSION HEARING; MATTER REMITTED FOR A REOPENED HEARING (SECOND DEPT).
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