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PLAINTIFF DID NOT PROVE THE RPAPL 1304 NOTICE OF FORECLOSURE WAS PROPERTY MAILED TO DEFENDANT; THE MAILING WAS DONE BY A THIRD PARTY AND NO FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF THE THIRD-PARTY’S MAILING PROCEDURE WAS PRESENTED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff in this foreclosure action did not demonstrated the RPAPL 1304 notice of foreclosure was properly mailed to defendant. The mailing was done by a third-party and no first-hand evidence of that party’s mailing procedure was presented:

… [T]he affiant did not attest that she was familiar with the standard office mailing procedures of Covius Services, LLC, the third-party vendor that sent the RPAPL 1303 and 1304 notices on behalf of plaintiff. The affidavit therefore did not establish proof of a standard office mailing procedure designed to ensure that items were properly addressed and mailed … . The affidavit also did not address the nature of plaintiff’s relationship with Covius, nor did it address whether Covius’s records were incorporated into plaintiff’s own records or routinely relied upon in plaintiff’s business … . Thus, under the circumstances presented, the tracking numbers on the copies of the 90-day notices did not by themselves suffice to establish proper mailing under RPAPL 1304 … . Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Merino, 2026 NY Slip Op 02616, First Dept 4-28-26

Practice Point: If the mailing of the RPAPL 1304 notice of foreclosure is done by a third-party, first-hand knowledge of that party’s mailing procedure must be presented.​

 

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