You are here: / Attorneys
,

PETITIONER PREVAILED IN THE FOIL PROCEEDING AND WAS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES; HOWEVER, PETITIONER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO LEGAL COSTS INCURRED IN PROSECUTING THE PETITIONER’S CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES, SO-CALLED “FEES ON FEES” (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that, although the petitioner in this FOIL action prevailed and was entitled to attorney’s fees, the petitioner was not entitled to the fees incurred in seeking to recover the attorney’s fees, so-called “fees on fees:”

… [W]e find that the award of attorneys’ fees included amounts for legal fees and costs incurred by the petitioner in prosecuting its claim for an award of attorneys’ fees, or so called “fees on fees.” In New York, an attorney’s fee is “‘merely an incident of litigation and is not recoverable absent a specific contractual provision or statutory authority'” … . An award of fees on fees—fees for services performed to recover a fee award—also must be based upon a specific contractual provision or statute … . Here, “[g]iven the absence of unmistakably clear intent regarding the recovery of fees on fees [in Public Officers Law § 89(4)(c)], a right to recover those fees should not be implied” … .

As the petitioner is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new hearing on the issue of the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees arising solely from the prosecution of this proceeding, without the inclusion of legal fees and costs incurred in prosecuting the petitioner’s claim for an award of attorneys’ fees … . Matter of Aron Law, PLLC v New York City Fire Dept., 2025 NY Slip Op 03806, Second Dept 6-25-25

Practice Point: The prevailing party in a FOIL proceeding is entitled to attorney’s fees. However the petitioner is not entitled to “fees on fees,” i.e., legal costs incurred in prosecuting the claim for attorney’s fees.

 

, , , ,

A POLICE OFFICER DESCRIBED STATEMENTS MADE BY THE VICTIMS BUT THE VICTIMS DID NOT TESTIFY; ALTHOUGH DEFENSE COUNSEL MENTIONED THE LACK OF CROSS-EXAMINATION IN A SUFFICIENCY-OF-EVIDENCE ARGUMENT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY RAISED; THEREFORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL; THERE WAS AN EXTENSIVE THREE-JUDGE DISSENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming defendant’s conviction, over a three-judge dissent, determined the constitutional “confrontation” issue first raised on appeal had not been preserved. A police officer testified about the identities and physical descriptions of the assailants provided by one of the victims while she was being treated in an ambulance. The victims were expected to testify but never did:

Defendant’s motion at the close of the People’s case did not invoke the Confrontation Clause and the colloquy that took place between defense counsel and the court makes clear that the motion to dismiss was neither intended nor understood to raise a constitutional issue.  Moreover, counsel did not invoke or rely on any caselaw dealing with constitutional protections. Instead, counsel made evidentiary arguments regarding the persuasive quality of the prosecution’s proof and, when asked by the court, confirmed that the motion was limited to the sufficiency of the evidence. Further, the timing of defendant’s motion at the close of the People’s case—which defense counsel specifically referred to as “a trial order of dismissal” …—suggests that defendant’s aim was not to challenge testimony of the victim’s statements as violative of his right to confrontation, but simply as failing to meet the evidentiary bar for a prima facie case … . Additionally, counsel repeatedly told the court that his motion was “focus[ed]” on the third-degree robbery charge, demonstrating that the argument was a legal insufficiency one, rather than a Confrontation Clause challenge, which would necessarily apply to all charges with equal force. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the mere reference to a lack of cross-examination was insufficient to alert the court that defendant was making a constitutional argument … . People v Bacon, 2025 NY Slip Op 03692, CtApp 6-18-25

Practice Point: Here the violation of defendant’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was a viable issue because statements made by two witness were described by a police officer but the witnesses did not testify. Although defense counsel mentioned the inability to cross-examine the witnesses in a “sufficiency-of-evidence” argument before the trial court, the constitutional confrontation argument was not specifically raised. The majority, over an extensive three-judge dissent, determined the constitutional issue was not preserved for appeal.

 

,

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR’S REPEATED CLAIMS, DURING SUMMATION, THAT EVERYTHING THE JURY HEARD FROM DEFENDANT WERE “LIES;” MANSLAUGHTER CONVICTION REVERSED AND NEW TRIAL ORDERED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing defendant’s manslaughter conviction and ordering a new trial, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, with two concurrences, determined defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s claims during summation that defendant had repeatedly lied. Defendant had been abused by the victim and had asserted the justification defense. She testified she stabbed the victim once in fear for her life when the victim lunged at her, after he had raped her:

During summation, the prosecutor sought to undermine the defendant’s justification defense by suggesting that the defendant was not credible. In furtherance of that strategy, the prosecutor told the jury, “You never heard testimony that [the defendant] was in fear for her life. You never heard testimony that she was in fear of serious injury. Nothing.” As the People concede, this statement was false. The defendant had, in fact, testified that immediately before the stabbing she was “scared for my life,” and when subsequently asked whether she had testified that she was “afraid for your life,” the defendant responded “Yes, I was.”

Additionally, the prosecutor claimed in summation that the defendant had lied on the stand, using the word “lie” or “lies” fourteen times in total. Among other comments, the prosecutor claimed that “the only thing we can get out of [the defendant] are lies”; that her testimony was “unsubstantiated wild lies”; and that her testimony was “[m]eant to distract you from . . . the endless lies she has told you throughout this entire process.” The prosecutor also posed rhetorical questions along similar lines to the jury: “How could you possibly believe one thing that comes out of her mouth after all the lies she told you?” and “What wouldn’t she lie about?” Following summations, the court excused the jury and expressed concern about “[t]he repeated use of the word lies, which I also was going to limit if not eliminate,” but noted that it did not do so as the word “had been used throughout the trial without objection and I didn’t think it was proper for me to do it at this point.”

Defense counsel did not object either to the prosecutor’s flat misstatement of the defendant’s testimony that she feared for her life or to the repeated use of the word “lies.”  People v T.P., 2025 NY Slip Op 03642, CtApp 6-17-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into when a prosecutor can go too far in summation.

 

, ,

A MISSING JURY-NOTE-RESPONSE TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT WARRANT REVERSAL UNLESS THE DEFENDANT SHOWS ENTITLEMENT TO A RECONSTRUCTION HEARING AND THE TRANSCRIPT CANNOT BE RECONSTRUCTED, NOT THE CASE HERE; WHEN A MOTION TO VACATE A CONVICTION ON INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE GROUNDS TURNS ON FACTS OUTSIDE THE RECORD, DENIAL WITHOUT A HEARING IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, remitting the matter for a hearing, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, determined (1) the absence of the transcript of a response to a jury note did not require reversal, and (2) defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction on ineffective-assistance grounds should not have been denied without a hearing:

Re: missing response-to-a-jury-note transcript:

… [A] missing transcript alone does not entitle a defendant to the extreme remedy of vacatur, but may entitle a defendant to a reconstruction hearing … . To be sure, if a defendant shows that they are entitled to a reconstruction hearing, and that the missing transcript at issue “cannot be reconstructed . . . , there must be a reversal” … . But defendant has not made that showing. Thus, the missing transcript does not warrant reversing defendant’s conviction.

Re: motion to vacate conviction, ineffective assistance:

Where a defendant moves to vacate their conviction under CPL 440.10, the court “must” decide “whether the motion is determinable without a hearing to resolve questions of fact” … . The court “may deny” the motion summarily under enumerated circumstances, including where purported facts essential to the motion are unsupported by “sworn allegations” that “substantiat[e] or tend[ ] to substantiate” those facts … , or where such a fact “is contradicted by a court record or other official document” and “there is no reasonable possibility that [the] allegation is true” … . We review a CPL article 440 motion’s summary denial for abuse of discretion … .

Defendant’s ineffective assistance claim cannot be decided without first resolving questions of fact. Defense counsel’s affirmation, together with the trial record, suggest that counsel may have lacked a strategic or other legitimate basis for one or more of his actions relating to eyewitness identification testimony at the heart of the People’s proof. Whether counsel in fact had such a basis for his conduct turns on factual information outside the present record that should be developed at an evidentiary hearing. People v Salas, 2025 NY Slip Op 03603, CtApp 6-12-25

Practice Point: A missing jury-note-response transcript does not require reversal unless the defendant shows entitlement to a reconstruction hearing and the transcript cannot be reconstructed.​

Practice Point: Where a motion to vacate the conviction on ineffective-assistance grounds turns on facts outside the record, here the strategic or other legitimate basis for counsel’s actions, it is an abuse of discretion to deny the motion without a hearing.

 

, ,

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT MOVING TO SUPPRESS CREDIT CARDS SEIZED DURING THE EXECUTION OF A SEARCH WARRANT WHICH WERE NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE WARRANT; THE INCRIMINATING NATURE OF THE CREDIT CARDS WAS NOT IMMEDIATELEY APPARENT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined defense counsel was ineffective in failing to move to suppress credit cards seized during the execution of a search warrant. The credit cards were not within the scope of the warrant and there was no showing the incriminating nature of the credit cards was immediately apparent to the officer who seized them:

… [I]n an affirmation in support of the defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion, trial counsel averred that he “failed to consider that the seized credit cards were not described in the search warrant” and that he “failed to research the applicable law on exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Trial counsel admitted that his subsequent failure to move to suppress the credit cards in particular was not the result of a strategic decision and that he would have so moved if he had researched the law concerning the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. Thus, by his own admission, trial counsel’s failure to move for suppression of the credit cards due to their warrantless seizure cannot be characterized as a legitimate strategic decision … .

Defense counsel’s “investigation of the law, the facts, and the issues that are relevant to the case” is “[e]ssential to any representation, and to the attorney’s consideration of the best course of action on behalf of the client” … . Since the defendant established that trial counsel “did not fully investigate the case and did not collect the type of information that a lawyer would need in order to determine the best course of action” …  he demonstrated that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel. Thus, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment of conviction on this basis and ordered a new trial. People v Goodluck, 2025 NY Slip Op 03343, Second Dept 6-4-25

Practice Point: Here defense counsel’s failure to investigate the law regarding the seizure of evidence outside the scope of a search warrant was deemed ineffective assistance requiring a new trial. Note that defense counsel, in support of defendant’s motion, submitted an affirmation admitting the failure to investigate and acknowledging that the omission was not a deliberate defense strategy.

 

, , ,

HERE DEFENDANT MADE A TIMELY REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF WHICH WAS DENIED WITHOUT ANY INQUIRY; DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a dissenting opinion (three judges), reversing defendant’s convictions and ordering a new trial, determined that the judge’s failure to conduct an inquiry before denying defendant’s request to represent himself violated his constitutional right to self-representation:

A defendant has a constitutional right to proceed pro se (see US Const Amend VI; NY Const, art I, § 6; see also CPL 170.10 [6], 180.10 [5], 210.15 [5] [codifying a defendant’s constitutional right to self-representation]). Defendant invoked that right when he informed Supreme Court that he “would like to represent [him]self” at his upcoming trial. People v McIntyre (36 NY2d 10 [1974]) and its progeny required that the court make a searching inquiry into defendant’s unequivocal and timely request to proceed pro se, to determine whether that request was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Contrary to that rule, the court immediately denied defendant’s request without inquiry, and it expressly refused to consider any further request until the day of trial. The court’s failure to inquire into defendant’s request violated his constitutional right to self-representation. Therefore, we reverse and grant defendant a new trial.

On June 4, 2018, the parties appeared for trial. * * * This colloquy followed:

THE DEFENDANT: I’m going to go cocounsel.
THE COURT: I can’t hear you.
THE DEFENDANT: Cocounsel. I’m going to go cocounsel.
THE COURT: Cocounsel?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: What is that?
THE DEFENDANT: Meaning I’m going to represent myself in this case.
THE COURT: You mean pro se.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I will be going pro se at trial. I will be representing myself acting as my own.
THE COURT: You made no application before me.
THE DEFENDANT: I never said I wanted a trial by jurors. I never told this individual that I wanted a trial by jurors.
THE COURT: You know, Mr. Lewis, I’m assuming now you’re trying to play games with this court. . . . I’ll continue with this trial. If you want to speak to [defense counsel] about certain issues, I’ll hear [defense counsel] tomorrow morning.”

The following morning, the court invited defendant to raise any issues before proceeding with jury selection. Defendant asserted again that he did not want defense counsel to represent him, alleging that counsel was ineffective, had a conflict of interest, and was not working on his behalf. The court only responded, “[o]kay. Nicely done,” and continued the proceeding. People v Lewis, 2025 NY Slip Op 03011, CtApp 5-20-25

Practice Point: A defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation. A judge must conduct a “searching inquiry” upon a timely request.​

 

, , ,

DEFENDANT IN THIS GRAND LARCENY CASE WAS DETAINED BY STORE SECURITY GUARDS; DEFENSE COUNSEL FIRST LEARNED THE IDENTITY OF ONE OF THE STORE’S SECURITY PERSONNEL ON THE EVE OF THE HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SECURITY GUARDS WERE LICENSED TO EXERCISE POLICE POWERS OR WERE AGENTS OF THE POLICE; THEREFORE DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REQUEST FOR AN ADJOURNMENT TO SUBPOENA THE STORE’S EMPLOYMENT POLICIES AND OTHER EMPLOYMENT INFORMATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court and ordering a new “state action” hearing, determined defense counsel’s request for an adjournment to subpoena information about the store security guards’ employment should have been granted. The issue is whether the store security guards who detained the defendant in this grand larceny case were licensed to exercise police powers or acted as agents of the police. Defense counsel learned the name of the store’s lead investigator at the time of defendant’s detention on the eve of the state action hearing. The First Department noted that defense counsel could not properly subpoena the employment information without knowing the identities of the people involved:

… [W]e find that the court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying defense counsel a short adjournment. In denying the requested adjournment, the court found that defendant “could have done that [subpoena … records] a long time ago, maybe even when this appeal was being perfected.” On this appeal, the People make a similar argument that the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the adjournment because defense counsel could have subpoenaed the materials during the pendency of this appeal. The problem with these arguments is that this Court had already recognized that, without information about the identity of the officers involved in defendant’s arrest, defense counsel was not in a position to meaningfully subpoena records … .

Contrary to the court’s suggestion, this is not the situation where defense counsel failed to exercise due diligence. In fact, as we held, without knowing the names of the store security guards involved in defendant’s detention, defendant was in no better position to subpoena the employer material than when he filed his initial motion. Thus, it was only upon learning the identity of one member of the security team that the defense could meaningfully begin to investigate whether the security guards were state actors. People v Sneed, 2025 NY Slip Op 03026, First Dept 5-20-25

Practice Point: If a defendant is detained by store security guards, the detention may implicate constitutional protections if the security guards are licensed to exercise police powers or are agents of the police. The defense, therefore, may be entitled to a so-called “state action” hearing. To subpoena the appropriate store employment records, defense counsel is entitled to the identities of the security guards involved in defendant’s detention.

 

, ,

BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT CONSENT TO THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING THE PEOPLE’S DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS, THE JUDGE WAS REQUIRED TO HOLD A HEARING; MATTER REMITTED; ON REMITTAL THE PEOPLE SHOULD PROVIDE WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE REQUEST TO DEFENSE COUNSEL AND, TO FACILITATE ANY REQUEST FOR AN EXPEDITED REVIEW, DEFENSE COUNSEL SHOULD BE PROVIDED WITH A COPY OF THE PROTECTIVE ORDER (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, vacating the protective order and remitting the matter, determined the County Court failed to hold the hearing which is required where defense counsel did not consent to the issuance of a protective order. The Third Department offered guidance on how the further proceedings should be conducted, i.e., defense counsel should be given advanced written notice of the request for a protective order (a motion by order to show cause), and, to facilitate an expedited review, defense counsel should be provided with a copy of the protective order:

Pursuant to CPL 245.70 (3), “[u]pon request for a protective order, unless the defendant voluntarily consents to the people’s request for a protective order, the court shall conduct an appropriate hearing within three business days to determine whether good cause has been shown.” Here, it is undisputed that defense counsel did not consent to the People’s proposed protective order for the disputed materials…. . …

… [I]t is true that, under certain circumstances and in an appropriate case, CPL 245.70 (1) permits a court to conduct ex parte proceedings and accept in camera submissions. … “[T]he better practice, in most cases, would be for the People to provide the defendant with advanced written notice, by way of motion brought on by order to show cause, that certain information had not been disclosed and a protective order was being sought under CPL 245.70” … . Proceeding in this manner would “allow defense counsel to see the portions of the People’s written application that contained legal argument or other matter that would not reveal the information sought to be covered by the protective order” … , and ensure that defense counsel has a meaningful opportunity to participate in the hearing to the fullest extent practicable. …

… [R]ecognizing that CPL 245.70 (6) provides an opportunity for expedited review of a protective order by a Justice of the Appellate Division, “within two business days of the adverse or partially adverse ruling,” the party seeking such expedited review should be provided a copy of the subject order. While the papers submitted in support of the People’s application for a protective order and the hearing transcript may be appropriately sealed to preserve the confidentiality of sensitive information … , the same does not hold true for the protective order itself. That said, in drafting a protective order, the court should be mindful not to discuss the protected materials or include confidential information that would obviate the basis for granting the protective order or sealing the documents and materials considered. People v Murphy, 2025 NY Slip Op 02975, Third Dept 5-15-25

Practice Point: Where defense counsel does not consent to a protective order, the statute requires the judge to conduct a hearing. Failure to hold the hearing requires vacation of the protective order.

Practice Point: The better practice is to notify defense counsel of the request for a protective order by a motion brought by an order to show cause.

Practice Point: Defense counsel who seeks an expedited review should be provided with a copy of the protective order.

 

, ,

THE CRITERIA FOR JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL WERE NOT MET HERE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, over a dissent, determined plaintiff was not precluded by judicial estoppel from seeking attorney’s fees deemed uncollectible in a bankruptcy proceeding:

Supreme Court incorrectly dismissed the complaint on the ground that judicial estoppel bars plaintiff from seeking attorneys’ fees that were deemed uncollectible in a bankruptcy proceeding. Judicial estoppel applies where it is shown that a debtor omitted or concealed the existence of an asset and later brought suit to collect on that asset … . Here, the court made no such findings, and in fact assumed that plaintiff had not misled the bankruptcy trustee. Nor does the record establish that plaintiff obtained a benefit in the bankruptcy proceeding by taking one position in that proceeding and then assuming a contrary position in this action “simply because [his] interest changed” … . We respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleague that the record establishes that plaintiff unequivocally adopted a conflicting legal position to obtain a bankruptcy discharge. Bohn v Tekulsky, 2025 NY Slip Op 02848, First Dept 5-8-25

Practice Point: In the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, the doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes a debtor from concealing the existence of an asset and subsequently bringing suit to collect on that asset. Although there was a dissent, the majority concluded plaintiff had not misled the bankruptcy court and therefore judicial estoppel did not apply.

 

, , ,

DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF NEW COUNSEL BASED UPON COUNSEL’S REMARK THAT DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA WAS UNWARRANTED; THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE CONDUCTED AN INQUIRY ABOUT DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL AND HIS REQUEST TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA; MATTER REMITTED FOR ASSIGNMENT OF NEW COUNSEL AND A SUFFICIENT INQUIRY BY THE JUDGE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a dissent, determined defendant’s appeal waiver was invalid, defendant demonstrated a conflict of interest on assigned counsel’s part, and the judge did not conduct a proper inquiry about defendant’s requests for new counsel and to withdraw his guilty plea. The Third Department vacated defendant’s sentence, not the conviction or plea, and remitted the matter for the assignment of new counsel and an inquiry about defendant’s request for substitute counsel and his request to withdraw his plea:

At sentencing, the Conflict Defender explained that she had “numerous phone conversations” with defendant about the grounds for his motion — namely, that assigned counsel’s communication of the People’s plea offer amounted to coercion; that defendant’s learning disability had prevented him from comprehending the consequences of his plea; and that the Conflict Defender was herself conflicted out of representing defendant. Based on her conversations with defendant, the Conflict Defender stated to County Court, “I don’t believe there is anything that warranted [defendant] withdrawing a plea, so I didn’t file a motion” … . “While apparently inadvertent, counsel’s remark . . . affirmatively undermined arguments her client wished the court to review, thereby depriving defendant of effective assistance of counsel” … , and the court should have relieved the Conflict Defender and assigned new counsel to represent defendant on the motion … .

We also agree with defendant that the allegations of assigned counsel’s ineffectiveness were sufficiently serious and factually specific to trigger County Court’s duty to consider his request for substitute counsel … . An indigent defendant’s right to court-appointed representation “does not encompass a right to appointment of successive lawyers at defendant’s option” … . “Rather, a defendant may be entitled to new counsel only upon showing good cause for a substitution, such as a conflict of interest or other irreconcilable conflict with counsel” … . * * *

In addition to alleging that assigned counsel coerced him into pleading guilty, defendant’s letters to County Court asserted that assigned counsel failed to visit him in jail or discuss his case with him; dodged his phone calls on specific dates; sent other attorneys to represent defendant who did not seem to be knowledgeable about the case; intended to oppose any motion defendant made to substitute counsel; and told defendant that his only other options for representation were to hire private counsel or represent himself. Further, defendant indicated that assigned counsel misadvised defendant about his sentencing exposure in a prior case, resulting in an appeal from that conviction on the ground of assigned counsel’s ineffectiveness. Defendant also alleged that assigned counsel was not relaying information or following his instructions in representing him in a separate, contemporaneous criminal action against him. Reading defendant’s allegations of ineffectiveness in the context of defendant’s purported history with assigned counsel, defendant’s complaints set out a plausible claim that the trust and communication between him and assigned counsel had broken down irretrievably … . Faced with these complaints, the court was required to “make at least a minimal inquiry, and discern meritorious complaints from disingenuous applications by inquiring as to the nature of the disagreement or its potential for resolution” … . People v Ubrich, 2025 NY Slip Op 02824, Third Dept 5-8-25

Practice Point: Here defense counsel’s remark that defendant’s request to withdraw his plea was unwarranted demonstrated a conflict of interest requiring the assignment of new counsel.

Practice Point: Here defendant raised serious issues about assigned counsel’s representation requiring the judge to consider his request for substitute counsel.

Practice Point: Here defendant raised serious issues in support of his request to withdraw his guilty plea which required an inquiry by the judge.

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy