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IN THIS DIVORCE PROCEEDING, THE ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILDREN DID NOT ASCERTAIN THE POSITION OF THE ELDEST CHILD (WHO IS AUTISTIC, NONVERBAL AND HAS A SEIZURE DISORDER) AND DID NOT HAVE A THOROUGH UNDERSTANDING OF THE CHILD’S CIRCUMSTANCES; THE MOTION TO APPOINT A NEW ATTORNEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; IN ADDITION, GIVEN THE CONFLICTING CONTENTIONS AND THE ELDEST CHILD’S SPECIAL NEEDS, THE MOTION FOR A NEUTRAL OR INDEPENDENT FORENSIC EXAMINATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this divorce proceeding, determined the defendant’s motion to appoint a new attorney for two of the children and for a neutral or independent forensic examination should have been granted:

The parties were married in 2010 and have three children. The eldest child is autistic, is nonverbal, and has a seizure disorder. * * *

Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 7.2, the attorney for the child must zealously advocate the child’s position … . “In ascertaining the child’s position, the attorney for the child must consult with and advise the child to the extent of and in a manner consistent with the child’s capacities, and have a thorough knowledge of the child’s circumstances” … . “If the child is capable of knowing, voluntary and considered judgment, the attorney for the child should be directed by the wishes of the child . . . . The attorney should explain fully the options available to the child, and may recommend to the child a course of action that in the attorney’s view would best promote the child’s interests” … . An attorney for the child may substitute his or her judgment only when he or she is “convinced either that the child lacks the capacity for knowing, voluntary and considered judgment, or that following the child’s wishes is likely to result in a substantial risk of imminent, serious harm to the child” … . In such circumstance, “the attorney for the child must inform the court of the child’s articulated wishes if the child wants the attorney to do so, notwithstanding the attorney’s position” … . “An [attorney for the child] should not have a particular position or decision in mind at the outset of the case before the gathering of evidence . . . . After an appropriate inquiry, it is entirely appropriate, indeed expected, that a[n attorney for the child] form an opinion about what action, if any, would be in a child’s best interest” … .

… [T]he defendant demonstrated that the attorney for the children failed to adequately ascertain the eldest child’s position to the extent of and in a manner consistent with the child’s capacities and failed to have a thorough knowledge of the child’s circumstances … .

… In any action for a divorce, the court may appoint an appropriate expert to give testimony with respect to custody or parental access (see 22 NYCRR 202.18). “In custody disputes, the value of forensic evaluations of the parents and children has long been recognized” … . “Although forensic evaluations are not always necessary, such evaluations may be appropriate where there exist sharp factual disputes that affect the final determination” … .

… Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion when it failed to direct a neutral forensic evaluation of the parties and the children, in light of, inter alia, the parties’ conflicting contentions and the eldest child’s special needs (see 22 NYCRR 202.18 …). Sandiaes v Sandiaes, 2025 NY Slip Op 03833, Second Dept 6-25-24

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an explanation of the role of the attorney for the child in divorce proceedings and an example of when the failure to direct an independent or neutral forensic examination in divorce proceedings is an abuse of discretion.

 

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