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THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE ISSUED A PROTECTIVE ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL TO INFORM DEFENDANTS’ FORMER EMPLOYEES THAT COUNSEL’S INTERESTS ARE ADVERSE TO THEIRS AND TO RECOMMEND THE FORMER EMPLOYEES RETAIN COUNSEL BEFORE ANY DISCUSSION WITH PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge in this action alleging sexual abuse of the plaintiffs in the steam rooms of defendants’ fitness clubs should not have issued a protective order concerning interviews of defendants’ former employees by plaintiffs’ counsel. The order precluded plaintiffs’ counsel from communicating with any former employees without advising them that their interests are, or are reasonably likely to become, adverse to counsel’s interests and recommending that the former employees retain counsel before continuing the discussion:

Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3103 for an order precluding the plaintiffs’ counsel from communicating with any former employees of Equinox without advising them that their interests are, or are reasonably likely to become, adverse to counsel’s clients’ interests and recommending that the former employees retain counsel before continuing the discussion. The defendants failed to make the requisite showing pursuant to CPLR 3103(a) to warrant the issuance of a protective order … . The defendants’ allegations of prejudice in the absence of a protective order were both conclusory and speculative … . G.B. v Equinox Holdings, Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 04452, Second Dept 7-30-25

Practice Point: Here a protective order restricting communications between plaintiffs’ counsel and defendants’ former employees was reversed because the need for the order was not adequately demonstrated by conclusory and speculative allegations.

 

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