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HERE THE VICTIMLESS CRIME DID NOT CONSTITUTE “EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE “RAISE THE AGE” LEGISLATION; THE PEOPLE’S MOTION TO PREVENT THE REMOVAL OF THE ADOLESCENT OFFENDER’S CASE FROM THE YOUTH PART OF SUPREME COURT TO FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a comprehensive opinion by Justice Chambers, determined the People’s motion to prevent the removal of this criminal action against a 16-year-old from the Youth Part of Supreme Court to Family Court should not have been granted. The opinion focuses on the meaning of “extraordinary circumstances” in the controlling “Raise the Age” legislation which would warrant overcoming the presumption supporting removal to Family Court for adolescent offenders. The opinion is far too detailed to fairly summarize here:

In effect, the Youth Part treated a single rearrest—absent a conviction—as dispositive of the defendant’s future potential. That reasoning, if broadly applied, would undermine the core purpose of the Raise the Age legislation. The mere fact that an adolescent engaged in rehabilitative services and was later arrested, without more, does not constitute “strong proof” … that he or she is beyond the reach of the Family Court system.

Although the Youth Part concluded that “no one factor on its own may have been enough,” it found that the defendant’s prior record and prior service engagement, “coupled” with the “nature of the pending charges,” amounted to extraordinary circumstances. But none of those factors, either individually or together, rise to the level of exceptionality contemplated by the Raise the Age legislation. A second arrest for a victimless act of adolescent bravado does not convert otherwise ordinary circumstances into extraordinary ones.

Therefore, the Youth Part should have denied the People’s motion pursuant to CPL 722.23(1) to prevent removal of this action to Family Court and transferred this action to the Family Court, Richmond County. People v Lloyd F., 2025 NY Slip Op 04583, Second Dept 8-6-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for an in-depth analysis of the criteria for keeping an adolescent offender’s prosecution in the Youth Part of Supreme Court as opposed to removing the case to Family Court for a juvenile-delinquency proceeding.

 

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