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LAW OFFICE FAILURE DEEMED AN ADEQUATE EXCUSE FOR A DEFAULT IN RESPONDING TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION; TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined that law office failure was an adequate excuse for plaintiffs’ default in responding to defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this traffic accident case:

… [P]laintiffs proffered a reasonable excuse of law office failure for the brief delay in serving their opposition papers to defendant’s motion (see CPLR 2005…). Although plaintiffs’ counsel admittedly failed to properly calendar the motion opposition date, counsel did attempt to seek defendant’s consent for an adjournment prior to the return date of the motion, which plaintiffs’ counsel apparently believed to be the due date for the opposition to defendant’s motion. Further, plaintiffs’ counsel submitted opposition papers on the return date, albeit after business hours, upon the mistaken belief that the motion was to be taken on submission. There is no evidence of a willful default and the negligible delay cannot be said to have prejudiced defendant … . April I.O. v Taylor, 2026 NY Slip Op 02741, Fourth Dept 5-1-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a rare instance of law office failure serving as an adequate excuse for a default in responding to a motion for summary judgment.

 

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