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AFTER PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL WITHDREW, THE JUDGE SET A DEADLINE FOR PLAINTIFF TO APPEAR WITH NEW COUNSEL; WHEN THE DEADLINE PASSED, THE JUDGE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COMPLAINT; THE JUDGE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY FOR THE “SUA SPONTE” DISMISSAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge did not have the authority to, sua sponte, dismiss the complaint when plaintiff missed the court’s deadline for finding new counsel:

… [C]ounsel … moved for leave to withdraw as the plaintiff’s counsel. … Supreme Court, inter alia, granted the motion and directed that should the plaintiff fail to retain counsel by February 1, 2023, the complaint would be dismissed. Thereafter, in an order dated February 8, 2023, the court, upon the conditional order, sua sponte, directed dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals.

“A court’s power to dismiss a complaint sua sponte is to be used sparingly, and only when extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant such a dismissal” … . Here, the Supreme Court was without authority, either pursuant to CPLR 3216 or 22 NYCRR 202.27 … , to direct dismissal of the complaint … . Under these circumstances, the court improperly, sua sponte, directed dismissal of the complaint .. . Dowd v Tischler, 2026 NY Slip Op 02968, Second Dept 5-13-26

Practice Point: Appellate courts don’t like “sua sponte” dismissals of complaints.

 

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RPAPL 1301, WHICH PROHIBITS SIMULTANEOUS ACTIONS AT LAW TO RECOVER ON A NOTE... UPON THE PRIOR APPEAL, THE SECOND DEPARTMENT MADE A FINDING THAT RESPONDENT...