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QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE DEFENDANT BUS DRIVER SAW WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN AND WHETHER THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE APPLIED TO THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE; THE BUS WAS BEHIND PLAINTIFF’S SCOOTER AND BOTH THE BUS AND THE SCOOTER APPARENTLY CHANGED LANES AT THE SAME TIME (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact whether defendant bus driver (Payne) failed to see what should have been seen and whether the emergence doctrine applied to this rear-end collision case. Plaintiff was on a motor scooter in front of the bus and both the bus and the scooter changed lanes at approximate the same time:

… [E]ven if Payne had the right of way, she testified at her deposition that she did not see the plaintiff on his motor scooter until “seconds” before the accident. Since the video recording taken from the bus seems to show that the bus was following the plaintiff’s motor scooter for approximately two blocks prior to the accident, Payne’s testimony raised a triable issue of fact as to whether Payne failed to see what was there to be seen through the proper use of her senses, and thus whether she exercised reasonable care to avoid the accident and whether her actions were a proximate cause of the accident … . …

… [T]he evidence failed to eliminate the existence of triable issues of fact as to whether Payne’s actions contributed to or caused the emergency, in light of, inter alia, her failure to observe the motor scooter earlier … . Fergile v Payne, 2022 NY Slip Op 01008, Second Dept 2-16-22

 

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