You are here: / / DEFENDANT’S COMPLAINTS TO THE UNITED STATES TENNIS ASSOCIATION (USTA)...
,

DEFENDANT’S COMPLAINTS TO THE UNITED STATES TENNIS ASSOCIATION (USTA) ABOUT PLAINTIFF’S BULLYING OF HER SON AT JUNIOR TOURNAMENTS WERE PROTECTED BY QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE; ANY STATEMENTS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN FALSE WERE NOT MOTIVATED BY MALICE; THE DEFAMATION ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Zayas, determined that the defamation action should have been dismissed. Defendant’s son was a tennis player who participated in United State Tennis Association (USTA) junior tournaments. Defendant communicated with the USTA alleging that plaintiff, another tennis player, was bullying defendant’s son. The only statements attributed to defendant alleged to have been defamatory were allegations plaintiff had been “kicked out” of tennis programs because of his behavior. The Second Department held that the complaints about bullying were privileged and the statements alleged to have been defamatory were not demonstrated to have been made with malice:

… [T]he defendant established … that her email to [the USTA] was protected by a qualified privilege. The defendant unquestionably had an interest, as a parent, in complying with [USTA’s] request that she put her concerns in writing and thus reporting, in a more formal way, serious allegations of bullying—none of which, it bears emphasizing, were alleged to be defamatory—that, in her view, put her son’s physical and emotional well-being at risk … .* * *

[Re: malice:]The extensive submissions … make clear that no factfinder could reasonably conclude that the defendant was not motivated, at least in substantial part, by legitimate concerns for her son’s emotional well-being and physical safety. Porges v Weitz, 2022 NY Slip Op 01823, Second Dept 3-16-22

Practice Point: Defendant’s complaints to the United State Tennis Association about plaintiff’s bullying her son at junior tournaments were protected by qualified privilege. Any statements alleged to have been false were not motivated by malice. Therefore the defamation action should have been dismissed.

 

You might also like
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO NOTICE THE PEOPLE WERE GOING TO PRESENT EVIDENCE SHE TYPED IN THE COMBINATION TO A SAFE IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FROM A DETECTIVE, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
WHERE THE ESSENCE OF A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION IS THE FAILURE TO PROPERLY DIAGNOSE PLAINTIFF’S CONDITION, THE CRITERIA FOR A “LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT” CAUSE OF ACTION ARE NOT MET (SECOOND DEPT
PLAINTIFF IN THIS MED-MAL WRONGFUL-DEATH ACTION DID NOT RESPOND TO THE NINETY-DAY DEMAND TO FILE A NOTE OF ISSUE, DID NOT PRESENT A REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR THE FAILURE TO RESPOND, AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A MERITORIOUS CAUSE OF ACTION; THE COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS WARRANTED DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE FORMER “EMERGENCY OR DISASTER TREATMENT PROTECTION ACT (EDTPA)” PROVIDED IMMUNITY TO HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS RE: COVID-19, HERE DEFENDANT NURSING HOME DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE THREE REQUIREMENTS FOR IMMUNITY WERE MET (SECOND DEPT).
THE FEDERAL FELONY DID NOT QUALIFY AS A NEW YORK PREDICATE FELONY, DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENTENCED AS A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER (SECOND DEPT).
OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT CREATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED.
AGREEMENT WHICH WAS PART OF A FOREIGN ISLAMIC DIVORCE DECREE PROPERLY ENFORCED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF COMITY.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT PRODUCED FOR SENTENCING; HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT SENTENCING... THE AFFIDAVIT FROM THE LOAN SERVICER PURPORTING TO DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANTS’...