The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Zayas, determined that the defamation action should have been dismissed. Defendant’s son was a tennis player who participated in United State Tennis Association (USTA) junior tournaments. Defendant communicated with the USTA alleging that plaintiff, another tennis player, was bullying defendant’s son. The only statements attributed to defendant alleged to have been defamatory were allegations plaintiff had been “kicked out” of tennis programs because of his behavior. The Second Department held that the complaints about bullying were privileged and the statements alleged to have been defamatory were not demonstrated to have been made with malice:
… [T]he defendant established … that her email to [the USTA] was protected by a qualified privilege. The defendant unquestionably had an interest, as a parent, in complying with [USTA’s] request that she put her concerns in writing and thus reporting, in a more formal way, serious allegations of bullying—none of which, it bears emphasizing, were alleged to be defamatory—that, in her view, put her son’s physical and emotional well-being at risk … .* * *
[Re: malice:]The extensive submissions … make clear that no factfinder could reasonably conclude that the defendant was not motivated, at least in substantial part, by legitimate concerns for her son’s emotional well-being and physical safety. Porges v Weitz, 2022 NY Slip Op 01823, Second Dept 3-16-22
Practice Point: Defendant’s complaints to the United State Tennis Association about plaintiff’s bullying her son at junior tournaments were protected by qualified privilege. Any statements alleged to have been false were not motivated by malice. Therefore the defamation action should have been dismissed.