You are here: / / SUPREME COURT HAD THE AUTHORITY UNDER CPLR 3001 TO ISSUE A DECLARATORY...
,

SUPREME COURT HAD THE AUTHORITY UNDER CPLR 3001 TO ISSUE A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ON THE PROPER RATE FOR POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST; ANOTHER COURT’S PRIOR DISCUSSION OF THE PROPER INTEREST RATE WAS MERELY ADVISORY (I.E., NOT ON THE MERITS) AND THEREFORE WAS NOT SUBJECT TO THE DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR LAW OF THE CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, over an extensive dissent, determined (1) Supreme Court had the power to issue a declaratory judgment in this hybrid proceeding seeking a declaratory judgment on the rate of post-judgment interest; and (2) Supreme Court correctly found that dicta in a prior ruling about the proper post-judgment interest rate (i.e., that the rate should be 9% per year under the CPLR, not 2% per month under the Insurance Law) was merely “advisory” and therefore was not controlling under the doctrines of collateral estoppel, res judicata, or law of the case. Supreme Court’s finding that the Insurance Law interest rate applied was affirmed. Using that rate the original 2001 judgment of $8,842.49 had apparently grown to $229,981.66 as of 2015:

CPLR 3001 uniquely vests the Supreme Court with authority to render declaratory judgments to the exclusion of other courts of the state. … [T]o the extent [respondent] wished to obtain a declaratory judgment governing the rate of interest on its judgment, … with appellate remedies correctly foreclosed, the Supreme Court was the only court where it could seek redress on that issue. * * *

… [T]he Appellate Term’s expression in its decision and order dated August 18, 2017, regarding the applicable rate of interest was not determined on the merits, but was instead merely advisory. * * *

… [Appellant] was unable to establish that there was a determination on the merits in any prior proceeding about the proper rate of interest applicable to the judgment, as to preclude the Supreme Court from considering the issue de novo … . Matter of B.Z. Chiropractic, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 2021 NY Slip Op 04484, Second Dept 7-21-21

 

You might also like
DNA Reports Did Not Violate Right to Confrontation; Reports Admissible as Business Records
Although the Mortgage Note Was Discharged In Bankruptcy, the Bank Holding the Mortgage Note Had Standing to Bring a Foreclosure Action (In Rem) Seeking the Proceeds of the Foreclosure Sale—The Bank Could Not, However, Seek a Deficiency Judgment (In Personam) Against the Borrower
Action Against Broker for Failure to Procure Correct Coverage Should Not Have Been Dismissed/Question of Injured Worker’s Employment Status Must First Be Determined by the Workers’ Compensation Board
A JUDGE SHOULD NOT, SUA SPONTE, ORDER THE DISMISSAL OF A COMPLAINT ABSENT “EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES,” NOT PRESENT HERE (SECOND DEPT).
CONTRACTUALLY SHORTENED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ENFORCED.
HERE THE RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL IN THE ORIGINAL DEED DIVIDING THE PROPERTY INTO EIGHT PARTS WAS A VALID DEFENSE TO THE PARTITION ACTION; HOWEVER, IF DEEMED TO RUN WITH THE LAND, THE RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL VIOLATED THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHEN AN UNPROTECTED TRENCH CAVED IN AND COLLAPSED; THE ABSENCE OF ANY SAFETY DEVICES, LIKE A SAFETY RAILING, VIOLATED LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) (SECOND DEPT).
PETITION FOR A LICENSE PURSUANT TO RPAPL 881 TO ENTER A CONDOMINIUM TO MAKE REPAIRS PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT’S AFFIDAVIT WAS CONCLUSORY AND DID NOT RAISE... STATUTORY AMENDMENTS REPEALING MANDATORY SURCHARGES AND CRIME VICTIM ASSISTANCE...