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PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ARREST IS A COMPLETE DEFENSE TO CAUSES OF ACTION FOR FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND BATTERY STEMMING FROM THE ARREST (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court noted that probable cause for arrest is a complete defendant to causes of action for false arrest, false imprisonment and battery association with the arrest:

The Supreme Court should have granted those branches of the municipal defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of action, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery insofar as asserted against them. The existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to causes of action alleging false arrest and false imprisonment … . The existence of probable cause is also a complete defense to a cause of action alleging assault and battery based solely on bodily contact during an allegedly unlawful arrest … . Farquharson v United Parcel Serv., 2022 NY Slip Op 01007, Second Dept 2-16-22

 

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