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PLAINTIFF, A SWIMMING OFFICIAL, SLIPPED ON WATER ON A POOL DECK AT AN INDOOR SWIMMING FACILITY; THE WATER ON THE POOL DECK CAME FROM AN OVERHEAD DEHUMIDIFICATION SYSTEM, NOT FROM SPLASHES FROM THE POOL; THE WATER WAS NOT NECESSARILY INCIDENTAL TO THE USE OF THE POOL AND THE ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY; THEREFORE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case was properly denied. Plaintiff, a swimming official, slipped on water on a pool deck at an indoor swimming facility. The water did not come from the pool, but rather was condensation from a dehumidification system:

… [T]he defendant cannot obtain summary judgment by relying on the cases in which courts have dismissed personal injury claims arising out of slipping on water around pools based on the reasoning that such water was necessarily incidental to the use of the area … . …

[Re: assumption of the risk:] … [P]articipants are not deemed to have assumed risks that are concealed or unreasonably increased over and above the usual dangers that are inherent in the sport” … .

Here, the hazardous condition of an indoor pool deck wet from condensation that had formed and dripped was not open and obvious and created a risk beyond that inherent in the sport of swimming in an indoor swimming facility … .. Further, “the doctrine of assumption of risk does not exculpate a landowner from liability for ordinary negligence in maintaining a premises” … . O’Brien v Asphalt Green, Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 02534, Second Dept 4-28-21

 

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