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ONCE SUPREME COURT FOUND DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE IT WAS REQUIRED TO VACATE THE CONVICTION; DEFENDANT MOVED TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION BECAUSE HE REJECTED A PLEA OFFER WITHOUT BEING INFORMED HE COULD BE SUBJECT TO LIFE IN PRISON AS A PERSISTENT FELONY OFFENDER AFTER TRIAL; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REINSTATED THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE AFTER FINDING DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined, once the motion court found defendant’s counsel ineffective for failing to inform defendant he risked being sentenced to life in prison as a persistent felony offender after trial, the motion court could not leave the convictions in place and reinstate the original sentence. Defendant had been offered a plea offer with a sentence of 4 1/2 to 9 years which he rejected and moved to vacate the guilty plea pursuant to CPL 440.10:

CPL 440.10(4) provides that “[i]f the court grants [a defendant’s motion pursuant to CPL 440], it must, except as provided in subdivision five or six of this section, vacate the judgment, and must dismiss the accusatory instrument, or order a new trial, or take such other action as is appropriate in the circumstances” (emphasis added). Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the plain language of CPL 440.10(4) requires that, upon a finding that a defendant’s CPL 440 motion is meritorious, a court must, in the first instance (absent the exceptions in subdivisions five or six of CPL 440.10 which are not relevant here), vacate the judgment … , and upon so doing, must then select one of three options: (1) “dismiss the accusatory instrument,” (2) “order a new trial,” or (3) “take such other action as is appropriate in the circumstances” (CPL 440.10[4]). Since the court found that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, it should have granted the defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion by vacating the judgment of conviction … . People v Brown, 2020 NY Slip Op 04849, Second Dept 9-2-20

 

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