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THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATED DEFENDANT DID NOT STOP FOR A RED LIGHT AND STRUCK PLAINTIFF’S CAR AS PLAINTIFF WAS PASSING THROUGH THE INTERSECTION; FAILING TO STOP FOR A RED LIGHT VIOLATES THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW AND CONSTITUTES NEGLIGENCE PER SE; PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the evidence that defendant Glennon ran a red light and struck plaintiff’s car as plaintiff was passing through the intersection warranted summary judgment in plaintiff’s favor. Running a red light is a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law which constitutes negligence per se:

“[A] violation of a standard of care imposed by the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se” … . Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111(d)(1), a driver when “facing a steady circular red signal, . . . shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, then shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or in the event there is no crosswalk, at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of the approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering the intersection.” …

[Steedman, a witness, testified the] first two vehicles passed through the intersection without incident, but then the plaintiff, who was driving the third vehicle, was struck by Glennon’s vehicle. Steedman … testified that he observed Glennon looking down into her lap at the time of the accident. Thus, the evidence submitted by the plaintiff demonstrated, prima facie, that Glennon entered the subject intersection against a red light, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111(d)(1) … . Callahan v Glennon, 2021 NY Slip Op 02509, Second Dept 4-28-21

 

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