You are here: / / THERE WAS NO PROPER FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE EXPERT’S TESTIMONY...
, ,

THERE WAS NO PROPER FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE EXPERT’S TESTIMONY IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, DEFENSE VERDICT FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUFFER A SERIOUS INJURY WAS NECESSARILY BASED ON THE DEFENSE EXPERT’S TESTIMONY, VERDICT WAS PROPERLY SET ASIDE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict in this traffic accident case was properly granted. Plaintiff had been granted summary judgment on liability and proceeded to trial on damages. Defendants’ expert, McGowan, purported to analyze the forces involved in the collision and opined that the impact could not have caused plaintiff’s injuries. The jury returned a verdict finding that plaintiff did not suffer a “serious injury:”

… [W]e agree with the Supreme Court’s determination to grant the plaintiff’s motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the jury verdict on the issue of damages… . “An expert’s opinion must be based on facts in the record or personally known to the witness'”… . Here, a proper foundation was lacking for the admission of McGowan’s opinion … . Among other things, McGowan failed to calculate the force exerted by all four vehicles, the crash test he utilized to determine the delta-v differed in several significant respects from the instant accident, and he reviewed simulations in which the weight of the dummies was not similar to that of the plaintiff. Imran v R. Barany Monuments, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 08921, Second Dept 12-26-18

You might also like
FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE REOPENED THE NEGLECT HEARING WHEN MOTHER ARRIVED AT COURT SHORTLY AFTER SUMMATIONS (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE CITY GAVE A PERMIT TO A BUS COMPANY TO USE A PARKING LOT, THE CITY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT RELINQUISHED ALL CONTROL OVER THE MAINTENANCE OF THE PARKING LOT SUCH THAT IT COULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE PARTY TWICE FILED FOR BANKRUPTCY WITHOUT LISTING THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION AS AN ASSET, THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING WAS SUBSEQUENTLY REOPENED AND THE ACTION WAS ADDED AS AN ASSET; AT THAT POINT THE BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE BECAME THE PLAINTIFF IN THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION AND THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL, BASED UPON THE PARTY’S INITIAL FAILURE TO LIST THE ACTION AS AN ASSET, DID NOT APPLY TO THE TRUSTEE (SECOND DEPT).
Whether Lost Evidence Was Relevant to Plaintiff’s Case Presented a Jury Question—Only If the Jury Determines the Evidence Was Relevant Can the Jury Consider the Adverse Inference Charge for Spoliation of Evidence
THE APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS FOR DECLARATORY-JUDGMENT CAUSES OF ACTION DEPEND ON THE NATURE OF THE UNDERLYING ALLEGATIONS; HERE THE ALLEGATIONS SOUNDED IN FRAUD, UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND VIOLATIONS OF THE REAL PROPERTY LAW; ALL WERE TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).
THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT, QUASI CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; PLAINTIFF SCHOOL BUS COMPANY WAS SEEKING PAYMENT FOR THE MONTHS THE SCHOOLS WERE CLOSED DUE TO COVID-19 (SECOND DEPT).
THE ABSENCE OF A PRICE FOR INTERNET SERVICE IN THE CONTRACT FOR THE PURCHASE OF SATELLITE TELEVISION SERVICE RENDERED THE CONTRACT AN UNENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT TO AGREE (SECOND DEPT).
WHEEL STOP WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND NOT INHERENTLY DANGEROUS.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE WAS SUPPORTED BY A SWORN DENIAL... MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE THE ADMINISTRATRIX OF PLAINTIFF’S ESTATE FOR THE...