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ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT ATTORNEY’S CONTINGENCY FEE IN THIS EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION MATTER WAS UNENFORCEABLE, THE ATTORNEY MAY BE ENTITLED TO PAYMENT UNDER A QUANTUM MERUIT THEORY.

The Second Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on liability in this action against plaintiff’s attorney alleging violation of ethics rules in setting a contingency fee in an equitable distribution matter. However the attorney may be entitled to payment under a quantum meruit theory:

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The plaintiff demonstrated, prima facie, through the submission of the parties’ retainer agreement, that the defendant charged her a contingency fee in violation of rule 1.5(d)(5)(i) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0). Because the defendant’s fee was to be “determined by reference to the amount of . . . equitable distribution” in the form of the money judgment and subsequent enforcement stipulation, the retainer agreement violated rule 1.5(d)(5)(i) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR § 1200.0). Contrary to the defendant’s argument, the enforcement of an equitable distribution award reduced to a money judgment is not exempt from rule 1.5(d)(5)(i) ,,, . The plaintiff also demonstrated prima facie that the defendant violated the rules set forth in 22 NYCRR 1400.3. In that respect, the retainer agreement did not specify how the defendant’s fee would be calculated if the plaintiff discharged the defendant “during the course of the representation” and did not specify how frequently itemized bills would be provided (22 NYCRR 1400.3). Additionally, the plaintiff did not receive itemized bills from the defendant … . In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Medina v Kraslow, 2017 NY Slip Op 02979, 2nd Dept 4-19-17

ATTORNEYS (ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT ATTORNEY’S CONTINGENCY FEE IN THIS EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION MATTER WAS UNENFORCEABLE, SHE MAY BE ENTITLED TO PAYMENT UNDER A QUANTUM MERUIT THEORY)/FAMILY LAW (ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT ATTORNEY’S CONTINGENCY FEE IN THIS EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION MATTER WAS UNENFORCEABLE, SHE MAY BE ENTITLED TO PAYMENT UNDER A QUANTUM MERUIT THEORY)/CONTINGENCY FEES (FAMILY LAW, ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT ATTORNEY’S CONTINGENCY FEE IN THIS EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION MATTER WAS UNENFORCEABLE, SHE MAY BE ENTITLED TO PAYMENT UNDER A QUANTUM MERUIT THEORY)

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