You are here: / / PREJUDGMENT INTEREST NEED NOT BE PAID INTO THE COURT PURSUANT TO CPLR 2601...

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST NEED NOT BE PAID INTO THE COURT PURSUANT TO CPLR 2601 WHEN SUCH A PAYMENT IS MADE TO STOP THE ACCRUAL OF INTEREST.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant need not pay prejudgment interest when it paid the policy limits into the court pursuant to CPLR 2601 to stop the accrual of interest on that amount:

In this action to recover damages for medical malpractice, after a jury trial, a judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs and against, among others, the defendant New York Methodist Hospital (hereinafter NYMH) in the total present value sum of $13,815,290. In an order dated September 24, 2014, the Supreme Court granted NYMH’s motion pursuant to CPLR 2601, inter alia, for leave to pay the limits of its insurance policy, $7,500,000, into court in order to stop the accrual of interest on that amount. * * *

… CPLR 2601 does not mandate that any specific amount of money be paid into court or require that interest on the amount to be paid into court from the date of the verdict to the date of deposit be paid at or around the time of deposit. Therefore, NYMH was not required to pay into court an additional $619,520.55, which represented the accrued interest from the date of the verdict to the date of deposit. Accordingly, the order must be reversed. Sence v Atoynatan, 2016 NY Slip Op 05804, 2nd Dept 8-17-16

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (PREJUDGMENT INTEREST NEED NOT BE PAID INTO THE COURT PURSUANT TO CPLR 2601 WHEN SUCH A PAYMENT IS MADE TO STOP THE ACCRUAL OF INTEREST)/PREJUDGMENT INTEREST (PREJUDGMENT INTEREST NEED NOT BE PAID INTO THE COURT PURSUANT TO CPLR 2601 WHEN SUCH A PAYMENT IS MADE TO STOP THE ACCRUAL OF INTEREST)/INTEREST (PREJUDGMENT INTEREST NEED NOT BE PAID INTO THE COURT PURSUANT TO CPLR 2601 WHEN SUCH A PAYMENT IS MADE TO STOP THE ACCRUAL OF INTEREST)

You might also like
THE JUDGE DID NOT ENSURE THAT DEFENDANT’S WAIVER OF A JURY TRIAL WAS KNOWING, INTELLIGENT AND VOLUNTARY (SECOND DEPT).
KNEE INJURY CAUSED BY CARRYING A HEAVY STEEL BEAM DOWN STAIRS IS NOT A COVERED ACCIDENT UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) (SECOND DEPT).
DISTRIBUTING A LETTER WHICH DEALT WITH RELIGIOUS (NATION OF ISLAM) INFORMATION DID NOT VIOLATE ANY PRISON GUIDELINES OR POLICIES, MISBEHAVIOR DETERMINATION ANNULLED (SECOND DEPT).
Question of Fact Whether Deed Procured by Fraud and Whether Mortgagee Had Notice of the Potential Fraud
AFTER MAKING A FINAL AWARD, THE RABBINICAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY BY MAKING A SECOND AWARD BASED ON NEW EVIDENCE.
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE ENCROACHMENT OF A FIRE ESCAPE HOVERING OVER A PORTION OF DEFENDANT’S PROPERTY WAS HOSTILE AND CONTINUOUS FOR THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO SUE UNDER AN INSTALLMENT CONTRACT ALLEGEDLY ASSIGNED TO HIM; THE DOCUMENTS UPON WHICH PLAINTIFF RELIED DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE (SECOND DEPT).
Type II Actions (Here Replacement of a Wooden Boardwalk With Synthetic Materials) Presumptively Do Not Have a Significant Impact on the Environment and Do Not Require an Environmental Impact Statement

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

EVEN IF ANIMAL SHELTER FAILED TO INFORM PLAINTIFF OF THE DOG’S VICIOUS... JUDGE’S FAILURE TO ADDRESS JURY NOTES BEFORE THE VERDICT NOT REVIEWED...