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THE BASES FOR THE UPWARD DEPARTURE WERE ALREADY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY THE SORA RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES; UPWARD DEPARTURE REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing County Court’s upward departure from the SORA guidelines, determined the bases for the departure had been taken into account by the guidelines:

County Court lacked the discretion to upwardly depart from the presumptive risk assessment level because the People failed, as a matter of law, to identify an aggravating factor that was not adequately taken into account by the Guidelines. In seeking an upward departure from the presumptive risk assessment level established at the hearing, the People relied upon the defendant’s prior conviction of public lewdness and indications in the record suggesting that he had not accepted responsibility for his sexual misconduct. The defendant’s prior conviction of public lewdness constituted a misdemeanor sex crime, which is already accounted for under risk factor 9 of the Guidelines … . Similarly, an offender’s lack of acceptance of responsibility is accounted for under risk factor 12 … . ​People v Mott, 2021 NY Slip Op 03621, Second Dept 6-9-21

 

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