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CPLR 7003(1), WHICH REQUIRES A JUDGE TO FORFEIT $1000 FOR AN IMPROPER DENIAL OF HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS A VIOLATION OF THE COMPENSATION CLAUSE OF THE NYS CONSTITUTION AND AS A VIOLATION OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, in a comprehensive full-fledged opinion by Justice Golia, in a matter of first impression, determined CPLR 7003(1), which requires a judge to forfeit $1000 when a petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief is improperly denied, is unconstitutional. The statute violates the Compensation Clause of the NYS Constitution and the separation of powers doctrine:

… [W]hile CPLR 7003(c) is not a direct diminution of judicial compensation, the language of that provision explicitly “targets judges for disadvantageous treatment,” as it provides that a $1,000 forfeiture be paid personally by a judge who does not issue a writ of habeas corpus where one should have been issued … . CPLR 7003(c) is, thus, an indirect diminution of the salary of judges within the meaning of the Compensation Clause of the New York State Constitution. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly determined that “[b]y its nature, CPLR 7003(c) singles out judges for financially adverse treatment because of their exercise of their judicial functions and does so in a manner that discriminates based on how they decide an application for a writ. To impose a forfeiture on a judge based on which way they decide an application undermines the core objective of the [C]ompensation [C]lause of protecting judicial independence.” * * *

By imposing a penalty on a judge who refuses a petitioner’s request for habeas corpus [*14]relief where such relief should have been issued, the Legislature, through CPLR 7003(c), is interfering with judicial functions by incentivizing one specific outcome, namely, issuance of the writ, because a judge only faces a penalty if he or she refuses to issue a writ. Such influence is impermissible, as “‘the mere existence of the power to interfere with or to influence the exercise of judicial functions contravenes the fundamental principles of separation of powers embodied in our State constitution and cannot be sustained'” … . Poltorak v Clarke, 2025 NY Slip Op 04496, Second Dept 7-30-25

Practice Point: CPLR 7003(1) requires a judge to forfeit $1000 for an improper denial of habeas corpus relief. The statute violates the Compensation Clause of the NYS Constitution and the separation of powers doctrine.

 

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