You are here: / / DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS CONSTITUTE REAL PROPERTY WHICH CAN BE SOLD PURSUANT...

DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS CONSTITUTE REAL PROPERTY WHICH CAN BE SOLD PURSUANT TO RPAPL 1602 2ND DEPT.

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Connolly, in a matter of first impression, determined that development rights constituted real property within the meaning of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) 1602, but that the sale of the development rights in this case would not be “expedient” and therefore would violate RPAPL 1602. Here three of four siblings wanted to sell the development rights to the family farm in order to preserve it as a farm. One of the siblings, the defendant, objected to the idea. Overruling Supreme Court, the Second Department held that development rights constitute real property which can be sold pursuant to RPAPL 1602. But, because there was no purchaser for the development rights, the plaintiffs had not demonstrated the sale was “expedient” within the meaning of the statute:

… [D]evelopment rights, as that term was understood by the parties to this action, are clearly “real property, or a part thereof” (RPAPL 1602). Indeed, the Court of Appeals has held that development rights constitute interests within the metaphorical “bundle of rights” that comprise fee interests in real property (see Seawall Assocs. v City of New York, 74 NY2d 92, 109 …). In Seawall, the Court of Appeals observed that “[t]here can be no question that the development rights which have been totally abrogated by the local law are, standing alone, valuable components of the bundle of rights’ making up their fee interests,” …  Applying the bundle-of-rights metaphor to the case at bar, by seeking court approval to convey away the right to build as many homes as are allowed by zoning and planning regulations, the plaintiffs are seeking to convey those portions of the bundle of rights comprising the maximum development capacity of the property. Moreover, in drafting RPAPL 1602, the Legislature gave courts the authority to compel the mortgage, lease, or sale of “real property, or a part thereof” … , without placing any limitations on which “parts” of the bundle of rights comprising real property are subject to the statute. “Ordinarily, where the Legislature in enacting a statute utilized general terms, and did not, either expressly or by implication, limit their operation, the court will not impose any limitation” … . Hahn v Hagar, 2017 NY Slip Op 05710, 2nd Dept 7-19-17

REAL PROPERTY (DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS CONSTITUTE REAL PROPERTY WHICH CAN BE SOLD PURSUANT TO RPAPL 1602 2ND DEPT)/DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS (REAL PROPERTY, DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS CONSTITUTE REAL PROPERTY WHICH CAN BE SOLD PURSUANT TO RPAPL 1602 2ND DEPT)

You might also like
PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE RELEASE WAS PROCURED BY FRAUD, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).
Buyout Upon Dissolution Can Be Ordered by Judge 
SEVEN-YEAR DELAY BETWEEN ARREST AND INDICTMENT DID NOT VIOLATE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.
Procedure for Sentencing a Second Felony Offender Not Followed
THE PROPERTY OWNER AND GENERAL CONTRACTOR FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION REQUIRING EMPLOYERS TO ENSURE THE FLOOR AT THE WORK SITE IS NOT SLIPPERY DID NOT APPLY TO THE FLOOR OF A TRUCK OWNED AND OPERATED BY A THIRD PARTY WHICH DELIVERED MATERIALS TO THE WORK SITE; HERE PLAINTIFF ALLEGED HE SLIPPED AND FELL ON OIL ON THE FLOOR OF THE TRUCK AS HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO UNLOAD IT (SECOND DEPT).
FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REVIEWED THE SUPPORT MAGISTRATE’S NONFINAL ORDER AND GRANTED FATHER’S OBJECTIONS, FATHER’S ARGUMENT THAT HE WOULD NEED TO PAY ATTORNEY’S FEES AND SPEND TIME AWAY FROM WORK TO LITIGATE THE MATTER DID NOT RISE TO THE LEVEL OF IRREPARABLE HARM NEEDED TO JUSTIFY A REVIEW OF A NONFINAL ORDER (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SMALL TABLE OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF TRIPPED AND FELL WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). ​
Res Ipsa Loquitur Is Rarely a Basis for Summary Judgment/Questions of Fact About Defendant’s Control of the Instrumentality Causing Injury Precluded Summary Judgment.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT DRIVER WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT IN THIS... ENTIRELY HEARSAY EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY’S ABUSE...