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Court Should Not Have Dismissed for “Neglect to Proceed”—Criteria Explained

Noting that CPLR 3216 is extremely forgiving and never requires dismissal based on “neglect to proceed,” the Second Department determined Supreme Court, under the facts, should not have dismissed the action.  A dual showing of a justifiable excuse for the delay and a meritorious cause of action is not strictly necessary to avoid dismissal:

While generally, the Supreme Court is prohibited from dismissing an action based on neglect to proceed whenever the plaintiff has shown a justifiable excuse for the delay in the prosecution of the action and a potentially meritorious cause of action (see CPLR 3216[e]…) , such a dual showing is not strictly necessary to avoid dismissal of the action … .

Under the circumstances of this case, including the minimal 4-day delay in filing the note of issue, the fact that the defendants demanded additional discovery subsequent to the court’s certification order containing the 90-day demand, the absence of any claim of prejudice, and the lack of evidence of a pattern of persistent neglect and delay in prosecuting the action or of any intent to abandon the action, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in declining to excuse the plaintiffs’ failure to meet the deadline for filing the note of issue … . Rossi v Scheinbach, 2015 NY Slip Op 04110, 2nd Dept 5-13-15

 

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