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THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE ALLONGE, A SEPARATE PAPER, WAS FIRMLY ATTACHED TO THE NOTE, AS REQUIRED BY THE UCC; THEREFORE THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT HAD STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank did not demonstrate standing to bring the foreclosure action:

… [T]he plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that it had standing to commence the action based on its annexation of the note to the summons and complaint, since the plaintiff did not demonstrate that the purported allonge, which was on a piece of paper completely separate from the note, was “so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof,” as required by UCC 3-202(2) … . Hudson City Sav. Bank v Ellia, 2022 NY Slip Op 06235, Second Dept 11-9-22

Practice Point: When a defendant contests the bank’s standing to bring a foreclosure action, the bank must prove the allonge (a separate paper) was “firmly attached” to the note as required by UCC 3-202(2).

 

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NO CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT A TORT CAUSE OF ACTION IN NEW YORK.

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THE BANK INCLUDED OTHER NOTICES WITH THE NOTICE OF DEFAULT, A VIOLATION OF THE... REPEATED FAILURES TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY ORDERS WITH NO EXCUSE WARRANTED STRIKING...