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Petition to Commence Action Against the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC) Should Not Have Been Denied In the Absence of a Hearing

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should not have summarily determined a petition to bring an action against the Motor Vehicle Accident Insurance Corporation (MVAIC) and ordered a hearing.  Plaintiff alleged he was injured (while riding a scooter) by a driver who left the scene:

Here, while the petitioner sufficiently pleaded the prima facie elements necessary to commence an action against the MVAIC (see Insurance Law §§ 5217, 5218), the MVAIC raised questions of fact precluding summary determination of the petition. Based on the record before us, the issues of (1) whether the petitioner is an uninsured resident of New York, and, therefore, a “qualified person” pursuant to article 52 of the Insurance Law (see Insurance Law § 5202[b]), (2) whether the accident was reported to the police within 24 hours (see Insurance Law § 5218[b]; 5208[a][2][A]), and (3) whether the petitioner served a notice of claim upon the MVAIC within 90 days of the accident (see Insurance Law § 5208[a][2][A]), could not have been resolved without an evidentiary hearing … . Thus, the Supreme Court should not have summarily determined the petition (see CPLR 409, 410).  Matter of Hernandez v Motor Veh Acc Indem Corp, 2014 NY Slip Op 06203, 2nd Dept 9-17-14

 

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