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Motion for Default Judgment Should Have Been Denied; Motion to Compel Acceptance of Late Answer Should Have Been Granted

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should not have granted plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment and denied defendant’s motion to compel the acceptance of a late answer:

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant Lockwood Associates, LLC (hereinafter Lockwood), and in denying Lockwood’s cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3012(d) to compel the plaintiffs to accept service of its answer. Considering the lack of any prejudice to the plaintiffs as a result of Lockwood’s relatively short delay in answering, the existence of a potentially meritorious defense, and the public policy favoring the resolution of cases on the merits, Lockwood’s delay in answering should have been excused….  Grammas v Lockwood Assoc LLC, 2013 NY Slip Op 04776, 2nd Dept 6-26-13

 

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