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DOCTOR WHO OPERATED A PILL MILL FOR PERSONS ADDICTED TO OPIOIDS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF MANSLAUGHTER FOR OVERDOSE DEATHS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defendant, a doctor accused of operation a “pill mill” for persons addicted to opioids and Xanax, was properly convicted of manslaughter in the overdose deaths of two persons to whom he has supplied drugs:

Defendant argues that the manslaughter convictions should be reversed because, as a matter of law, the sale of a controlled substance can never support a homicide charge in the absence of express legislative authorization. He bases this position on a [2nd] Department decision, People v Pinckney (38 AD2d 217 [2nd Dept 1972] … ). * * *

… Nothing in Pinckney suggests that one who provides a controlled substance, whether it be heroin by a street dealer, or opioids by a medical doctor, can never be indicted on a manslaughter charge. Indeed, in People v Cruciani (36 NY2d 304 [1975]), the [Ct.] of Appeals affirmed the second degree manslaughter conviction of the defendant, who injected the victim with heroin, because he knew she was already in a highly intoxicated state. The Cruciani Court distinguished Pinckney, because in the latter case there was not “any proof, as here, of awareness of the ongoing effect of drugs in the victim’s body at the time any self-inflicted injection might have been made, or, beyond the general knowledge of the injuriousness of drug-taking, of a real threat to life. The remoteness of that fatal injection from the fact of sale diffused intent and scienter by possibly unknown or intervening events beyond Pinckney’s control” … .

At bottom, all that was needed for the manslaughter charge to be sustained was for the People to satisfy its elements. That is, that defendant was “aware of and consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that [death] [would] occur . . . The risk [being] of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitute[d] a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation” … .

The question then becomes whether the People presented sufficient evidence to establish that defendant consciously disregarded the risk that Haeg and Rappold would die as a result of his prescribing practices. … People v Stan XuHui Li, 2017 NY Slip Op 08438, First Dept 11-30-17

CRIMINAL LAW (MANSLAUGHTER, PILL MILL, DOCTOR WHO OPERATED A PILL MILL FOR PERSONS ADDICTED TO OPIOIDS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF MANSLAUGHTER FOR OVERDOSE DEATHS (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (OPIOIDS, PILL MILL, DOCTOR WHO OPERATED A PILL MILL FOR PERSONS ADDICTED TO OPIOIDS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF MANSLAUGHTER FOR OVERDOSE DEATHS (FIRST DEPT))/OPIOIDS (CRIMINAL LAW, MANSLAUGHTER, PILL MILL, DOCTOR WHO OPERATED A PILL MILL FOR PERSONS ADDICTED TO OPIOIDS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF MANSLAUGHTER FOR OVERDOSE DEATHS (FIRST DEPT))/PILL MILL (CRIMINAL LAW, MANSLAUGHTER, PILL MILL, DOCTOR WHO OPERATED A PILL MILL FOR PERSONS ADDICTED TO OPIOIDS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF MANSLAUGHTER FOR OVERDOSE DEATHS (FIRST DEPT))

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