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THE PARTIES IN THIS DIVORCE PROCEEDING ENTERED A LITIGATION FUNDING AGREEMENT IN WHICH DEFENDANT ADVANCED FUNDS TO PLAINTIFF IN RETURN FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF PROCEEDS FROM THE DIVORCE CLAIM; DESPITE THE INCLUSION OF THE TERM “THIS IS NOT A LOAN” IN THE AGREEMENT, THE FIRST DEPARTMENT HELD THE AGREEMENT WAS IN FACT AN INVALID LOAN AT A USURIOUS 18.96% ANNUAL INTEREST RATE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Michael, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the parties’ divorce-litigation funding agreement was a usurious loan, not an investment, and was therefore void and unenforceable:

The parties entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement, dated May 23, 2018 (the PSA), wherein defendant agreed to advance approximately$200,000 to plaintiff to fund the legal costs of plaintiff’s pending divorce action. In return, plaintiff agreed to assign to defendant his right to receive any proceeds from the divorce claim up to the amount owed to defendant under the PSA. The “Proceeds” consisted of “the total recovery from the Claim” and the “Claim” was defined as plaintiff’s right, title, and interest in and to any amount granted to plaintiff in connection with his pending divorce action, any appeal or settlement with respect thereto, and any related action. * * *

The PSA clarified that “THIS IS NOT A LOAN” and was expressly contingent on plaintiff’s “successful” recovery on the Claim. It proclaimed that “[i]f there is no recovery on the Claim, nothing will be owed to [defendant].” Yet, several provisions of the PSA together with the Sweetheart Guaranty … , entitled defendant to recoup the money it advanced plus interest even if “there is no recovery on the Claim,” such as in the event of plaintiff’s death or reconciliation with his wife. * * *

Considering the totality of the circumstances … , we find that the parties’ PSA was in fact a loan. The only remaining question is whether the loan was usurious. A loan is usurious if the interest exceeds the maximum legal rate of 16% (see General Obligations Law § 5-501[1], [2]; Banking Law § 14-a[1]). It is undisputed that under the PSA, interest accrued at 18.96% annually, which exceeds the legal limit. Denemark v New Ch. Capital, Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 04553, First Dept 7-23-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into when an agreement constitutes a “loan” subject to the usury law rather than an “investment.”

 

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DEFENDANT’S MURDER CONVICTION HINGED ON THE CREDIBILITY OF A POLICE OFFICER’S CLAIM DEFENDANT CONFESSED TO INTENTIONAL MURDER; ALL OTHER STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO DEFENDANT WERE CONSISTENT WITH AN ACCIDENTAL SHOOTING; WITHHOLDING TWO FEDERAL COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE OFFICER AND THE OFFICER’S “CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD” (CCRB) RECORDS FROM THE DEFENSE WAS A REVERSIBLE BRADY VIOLATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, affirming the vacation of defendant’s conviction stemming from the People’s Brady violation, in a detailed opinion by Justice Kapnick, determined the murder conviction hinged on the credibility of a police officer’s (Rodriguez’) claim defendant confessed to intentional murder. All of the other statements attributed to defendant were consistent with an accidental shooting. The opinion is far too complex to fairly summarize here and is well worth studying:

Defendant argued that the People possessed but did not disclose (i) two federal complaints brought by pro se plaintiff Dale Robertson against Detective Rodriguez, (ii) a complaint brought by plaintiff Enger Miguel Javier against Detective Rodriguez in Bronx Supreme Court, and (iii) a three-page CCRB [Civilian Complaint Review Board] Officer History. Defendant argued that the People’s failure to disclose these materials undermined the fairness of his trial and may have impacted the verdict.

The verified complaint for Javier v City of New York, filed approximately one year [the instant shooting], alleged that Detective Rodriguez and his partner interrogated the plaintiff, Javier, over two days without Miranda warnings and deprived him of access to a lawyer … . It further alleged that the detectives forced a witness to falsely accuse Javier of the crime, even though Javier repeatedly told the detectives that he was innocent and identified the actual perpetrator. Ultimately, the Bronx DA dismissed the charges against Javier.

In Robertson, the plaintiff alleged that Detective Rodriguez coerced him into confessing that he had accidentally murdered the victim while he was being transported to Central Booking …. Robertson claimed that Detective Rodriguez and another officer transported him in the back of an unmarked police vehicle with the front seat pushed all the way back, crushing Robertson’s legs. Detective Rodriguez, who was seated next to him, allegedly pressed him against the window to coerce the confession.

The People conceded that they possessed but did not disclose a CCRB Officer History containing summary information regarding 40 allegations made against Detective Rodriguez, including the dates, categories of allegations, and disposition of each incident. The 40 allegations of misconduct reflect 16 discrete CCRB incidents where Detective Rodriguez allegedly used physical force, caused property damage and threatened arrest. People v White, 2026 NY Slip Op 04475, First Dept 7-16-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for an in-depth analysis of when civilian complaints against a police officer must be disclosed by the People as Brady material.

 

VERTICALLY-STACKED SHEETS OF METAL ON A DOLLY FELL ON PLAINTIFF WHEN HE MOVED IT; THE HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL WAS NOT DE MINIMUS AND PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) FALLING-OBJECT CASE; THE FACT THAT THE DOLLY BELONGED TO ANOTHER CONTRACTOR WAS NOT DISPOSTIVE, PLAINTIFF WAS DIRECTED TO MOVE THE DOLLY AS PART OF HIS EMPLOYMENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff should have been awarded summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff moved a dolly belonging to another contractor. The dolly tipped over and the vertically-stacked sheets of metal that were on the dolly struck him. The elevation differential between the dolly and floor was not de minimus and, although the dolly belonged to another contractor, plaintiff was directed to move it:

Based on plaintiff’s testimony as well as the testimony of OTL Enterprises’ principal that an unsecured load of material on a dolly was unsafe because the material could fall, plaintiff established that the metal sheets required securing … , the material that fell here was elevated on a dolly such that the elevation differential was not de minimus but rather was sufficient for the load of metal sheets to generate a significant amount of force and was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.

Plaintiff’s conduct of moving another subcontractor’s loaded dolly that was in the way of his work after an unnamed site supervisor allegedly directed him to do so was in the scope of plaintiff’s employment and was not the act of a volunteer falling outside the ambit of Labor Law § 240(1) … . Plaintiff’s conduct in moving the dolly was at most comparative negligence, which is not a defense to a Labor Law § 240(1) claim … . Aponte v 298 E. Vil. Owner LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 04138, First Dept 6-30-26

Practice Point: The difference in height between the platform of a dolly and the floor was not de minimus. Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action after being struck by metal plates which fell from the dolly.

 

A RARE SITUATION WHERE SUSPENSION OF THE NONCUSTODIAL PARENT’S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WAS WARRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gesmer, over an extensive dissent, affirmed Supreme Court’s denial of mother’s motion for pendente lite child support in the amount of $25,000/month and $10,000/month travel allowance. It was determined mother deliberately and actively alienated the child from the father:

Based on clear and convincing evidence presented at the 35-day custody trial, the court determined that the mother had deliberately and actively alienated the child from the father in “one of the most clear-cut and disturbing examples of parental alienation that this court has observed through thousands of custody cases over many years.” Accordingly, the court reasonably determined that this is one of the unfortunate and rare situations where suspension of the noncustodial parent’s child support obligation was warranted. Specifically, the court decided the pendente lite motion by directing the father to pay 90% of the child’s unreimbursed medical and mental health expenses and otherwise suspended the father’s child support obligation until the child’s visitation with the father was “meaningfully resumed” or “there is otherwise good cause to resume the support” … . * * *

As the motion court found, the child’s reasonable and appropriate needs are being met … . It is undisputed that the mother and child continue to reside in a 1,500 square foot luxury apartment with views of Central Park and that the father continues to pay all of the child’s expenses for private school, extracurricular activities and tutoring, in addition to 90% of her unreimbursed medical and mental health expenses. Rosenfeld v Rosenfeld, 2026 NY Slip Op 04048, First Dept 6-25-26

 

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PLAINTIFF’S STATEMENT THE LADDER MOVED SIDE TO SIDE CAUSING HIM TO FALL AND PLAINTIFF’S STATEMENT HE LOST HIS BALANCE ARE NOT INCONSISTENT; PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Suprem[e Court, determined plaintiff in this ladder-fall case was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff testified the ladder moved side to side. A medica report indicated plaintiff said he lost his balance. The two statements were not inconsistent:

Plaintiff, who fell from an eight-foot A-frame ladder while installing sheetrock, established his prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action through his testimony that the ladder moved from side to side and caused him to fall … .

… [Even] if plaintiff’s hearsay statement contained in his post-accident medical report and post-accident investigation report that he lost his balance may be considered, it is not inconsistent with his testimony that the ladder moved and caused him to fall … . Gomez v Brookfield Props. One WFC Co., LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 03921, First Dept 6-23-26

Practice Point: The statement that a ladder-fall resulted from movement of the ladder from side to sided and the statement that the ladder-fall resulted from plaintiff’s losing his balance are not inconsistent and do not create a question of fact.

 

PLAINTIFF SUED THE DEVELOPER OF PROPERTY ADJACENT TO PLAINTIFF’S BUILDING ALLEGING EXCAVATION WORK CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S BUILDING TO SETTLE AND LEAN; THE CITY ISSUED A STOP-WORK ORDER STEMMING FROM PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT; DEFENDANT-DEVELOPER THEN COUNTERCLAIMED ALLEGING PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT IN NOT MAINTAINING PLAINTIFF’S BUILDING SUCH THAT THE EXCAVATION WORK WOULD NOT DAMAGE IT, RESULTING IN THE STOP-WORK ORDER AND CAUSING THE DEVELOPER PURELY ECONOMIC LOSS OF AT LEAST $16 MILLION; SUPREME COURT LET THE COUNTERCLAIM STAND BUT THE FIRST DEPARTMENT DISMISSED IT; PLAINTIFF DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO THE DEVELOPER AND THE DEVELOPER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO PURELY ECONOMIC DAMAGES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Moulton, determined the defendant-developer’s counterclaim alleging plaintiff was negligent should have been dismissed. Plaintiff sued the developer alleging excavation and construction on the developer’s property, which is adjacent to plaintiff’s building, caused plaintiff’s building to settle and lean. Defendant-developer counterclaimed alleging plaintiff was negligent in not maintaining plaintiff’s building such that the excavation would would not damage it. The counterclaim alleged economic harm ($16 million) stemming from a stop-work order triggered by the plaintiff’s complaint:

The negligence counterclaim asserts that plaintiff “had a duty to construct and maintain the 1992 Building in compliance with the [Building] Code” and “a duty to maintain the 1992 Building in a reasonable and safe condition.” It contends that, as evidenced by three structural engineering reports, the building was “not constructed in compliance with the Code,” “remains in violation of the Code” and “was constructed and remains in an unsafe condition.” … The counterclaim further asserts that, on December 13, 2023, as a result of these conditions, “the DOB issued a partial Stop Work Order for the Project Site, forcing [the developer] to stop construction on its own property because of structural instability of the 1992 Building that was caused by the 1992 Building’s non-compliance with the Code and [plaintiff’s] failure to maintain the 1992 Building in a reasonable condition.” According to the developer, it was “harmed by the delay in construction . . . due to this stoppage” in an amount not less than $16 million. The developer does not allege that plaintiff’s negligent design, construction, and maintenance of its building caused any bodily injury or property damage.

This appeal raises two novel issues: 1) whether Supreme Court correctly held that plaintiff owes the developer a common-law duty as an adjacent landowner to protect the developer’s excavation/foundation work from construction delays arising out of the stop work order and, 2) assuming the existence of a duty based on plaintiff’s status as an adjacent landowner, whether the court correctly held that the developer could recover purely economic damages.

We now answer both questions in the negative and reverse. 1992 Third Realty LLC v Third Ave NY Realty LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 03871, First Dept 6-18-26

Practice Point: The owner of a building which is damaged by excavation work on an adjacent building by a developer, does not owe a duty to the developer to maintain his building such that the excavation work would not damage it.

 

IF THE FACTS FIT THE STATUTORY CRITERIA OF THE “HEIRS ACT” (RPAPL 993(2)), THE ACT MUST BE APPLIED TO A PARTITION ACTION RE: PROPERTY HELD BY TENANTS-IN-COMMON (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, remitting the matter, determined Supreme Court should have applied the Heirs Act to this partition action re: property held as tenants-in-common. The First Department noted that if the facts fit the requirements of RPAPL 993(2) (the Heirs Act), the Act must be applied:

The Heirs Act does not apply in all cases where real property is owned by tenants-in-common. Rather, “heirs property” is defined as real property that is held in tenancy in common and satisfies all of the following requirements: there is no agreement in a record binding all of the co-tenants which governs the partition of the property (RPAPL 993[2][e][i]); any of the co-tenants acquired title from a relative (RPAPL 993[2][e][i]); the property is used for residential or agricultural purposes (RPAPL 993[2][e][iii]); and any of the following applies: (a) 20% or more of the interests are held by co-tenants who are relatives; (b) 20% or more of the interests are held by an individual who acquired title from a relative, whether living or deceased; (c) 20% or more of the co-tenants are relatives of each other; or (d) any co-tenant who acquired title from a relative resides in the property (RPAPL 993[2][e][iv][A]-[D]).

Construing unambiguous language to give effect to its plain meaning, as we must …, we find that the Heirs Act is applicable in this action because all of the conditions noted in RPAPL 993(2)(e) were satisfied. There was no agreement in the record governing the partition of the property; both parties acquired their interest from their mother; the property was used as a residence; and all of the conditions set forth in RPAPL 9939(2)(e)(iv) were present. Thus, the statute unambiguously applies to the parties here and expressly takes precedence over the traditional partition proceedings under RPAPL 901(1) (RPAPL 993[3][c]). Accordingly, the matter should be remitted to Supreme Court to comply with the requirements of the Heirs Act. Williams v Williams, 2026 NY Slip Op 03902, First Dept 6-18-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for the circumstances under which the “Heirs Act” must be applied to a partition action re: property held by tenants-in-common.​

 

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EVIDENCE THAT THE A-FRAME LADDER FROM WHICH PLAINTIFF FELL WAS UNSECURED AND SHIFTED FOR NO APPARENT REASON WARRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION; EVIDENCE THAT THE LADDER WAS RESTING ON GARBAGE BAGS SPOKE TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, WHICH IS NOT A DEFENSE (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff should have been awarded summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action in this A-frame ladder-fall case. The evidence that the ladder was unsecured and shifted for no apparent reason was sufficient to support summary judgment. The allegation that the ladder was resting on garbage bags spoke only to comparative negligence which is not a defense to a Labor Law 240(1) violation:

Supreme Court should have granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability on his Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff established his entitlement to summary judgment through his testimony that while he was standing on the ladder, it shifted and fell for no apparent reason … . Plaintiff also established that he was provided with a safety device — namely, the ladder itself — but that the device proved to be inadequate … .

The testimony stating that the feet of the ladder were resting on garbage bags is insufficient to warrant denial of plaintiff’s motion, as there is no dispute that the ladder was unsecured … and at most, such evidence constitutes comparative negligence which is not a defense to a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). Rudzikewycz v 164 W. 79th St. Corp., 2026 NY Slip Op 03897, First Dept 6-18-26

Practice Point: If a ladder isn’t “secured” and it moves and plaintiff falls, plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on a Labor Law 240(1) cause of action, irrespective of any comparative negligence.

 

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ASSAULT SECOND HAS A PERPETRATOR-VICTIM-AGE-DIFFERENCE” ELEMENT; THE PEOPLE FAILED TO PROVE DEFENDANT’S AGE WITH ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE; CONVICTION REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s attempted assault conviction, which has an “victim-perpetrator age-difference” element, determined the age of the defendant was not proven with admissible evidence:​

… [T]he second-degree assault conviction based on the victim and defendant’s respective ages was against the weight of the evidence because the People did not meet their burden to adduce adequate admissible evidence to establish defendant’s age (see Penal Law § 120.05[12] …). The only evidence offered by the People was the testimony of the arresting officer’s partner, who stated that while “assisting with the arrest,” he learned defendant’s date of birth without explaining whether he acquired the information from questioning defendant, from a fellow officer or from some document or report (see People v Justice, 99 AD3d 1213, 1214 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1012 [2013] [insufficient evidence of the defendant’s age where a police officer generally testified that he learned the defendant’s birthday “during the course of his investigation,” and the People failed to establish that the testimony was admissible under some exception to the hearsay rule]). People v McVay, 2026 NY Slip Op 03887, First Dept 6-18-26

Practice Point: Here the defendant’s age was an element of the crime and the People failed to prove it with admissible evidence. The conviction was therefore reversed.​

 

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DEFENDANT HAD SUFFICIENT CONTACTS WITH NEW YORK TO ALLOW THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION TO BE BROUGHT IN NEW YORK (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant, which issued preferred stock to plaintiff, had sufficient contacts with New York to bring the breach of contract action in New York:

Pursuant to the certificates of designation governing the preferred stock issued by defendant to plaintiff, defendant was required to provide dividends to a paying agent, which then provided the funds to a depository to pay the preferred stockholders. To facilitate dividend distributions, defendant designated entities located in New York as the paying agent and the depository. Further, defendant’s agreements with each of the depositories required the depository to maintain facilities in New York City. Defendant also contracted with multiple underwriters based in New York to sell the preferred stock. * * *

… [The] New York-based contacts are sufficiently related to plaintiff’s underlying breach of contract claim because “at least one element [of the cause of action] arises from the New York contacts” … . Defendant allegedly breached its duty under the certificates of designation not to sell stock to its affiliates “unless full cumulative dividends on the [preferred stock] . . . have been paid.” Defendant’s alleged breach consisted of not only its agreement to sell stock to one of its affiliates but also its failure to make full cumulative dividend payments to the preferred stockholders before completing the sale. … [D]efendant’s failure to make dividend payments, which necessarily would have been sent to its paying agent in New York, sufficiently connects defendant’s contacts with New York to the breach of contract cause of action … . Katz v Navios Mar. Holdings, Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 03731, First Dept 6-11-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into when a defendant’s contacts with New York are sufficient to support a breach of contract action.brought in New York.​

 

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