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A RARE SITUATION WHERE SUSPENSION OF THE NONCUSTODIAL PARENT’S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WAS WARRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gesmer, over an extensive dissent, affirmed Supreme Court’s denial of mother’s motion for pendente lite child support in the amount of $25,000/month and $10,000/month travel allowance. It was determined mother deliberately and actively alienated the child from the father:

Based on clear and convincing evidence presented at the 35-day custody trial, the court determined that the mother had deliberately and actively alienated the child from the father in “one of the most clear-cut and disturbing examples of parental alienation that this court has observed through thousands of custody cases over many years.” Accordingly, the court reasonably determined that this is one of the unfortunate and rare situations where suspension of the noncustodial parent’s child support obligation was warranted. Specifically, the court decided the pendente lite motion by directing the father to pay 90% of the child’s unreimbursed medical and mental health expenses and otherwise suspended the father’s child support obligation until the child’s visitation with the father was “meaningfully resumed” or “there is otherwise good cause to resume the support” … . * * *

As the motion court found, the child’s reasonable and appropriate needs are being met … . It is undisputed that the mother and child continue to reside in a 1,500 square foot luxury apartment with views of Central Park and that the father continues to pay all of the child’s expenses for private school, extracurricular activities and tutoring, in addition to 90% of her unreimbursed medical and mental health expenses. Rosenfeld v Rosenfeld, 2026 NY Slip Op 04048, First Dept 6-25-26

 

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PLAINTIFF’S STATEMENT THE LADDER MOVED SIDE TO SIDE CAUSING HIM TO FALL AND PLAINTIFF’S STATEMENT HE LOST HIS BALANCE ARE NOT INCONSISTENT; PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Suprem[e Court, determined plaintiff in this ladder-fall case was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff testified the ladder moved side to side. A medica report indicated plaintiff said he lost his balance. The two statements were not inconsistent:

Plaintiff, who fell from an eight-foot A-frame ladder while installing sheetrock, established his prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action through his testimony that the ladder moved from side to side and caused him to fall … .

… [Even] if plaintiff’s hearsay statement contained in his post-accident medical report and post-accident investigation report that he lost his balance may be considered, it is not inconsistent with his testimony that the ladder moved and caused him to fall … . Gomez v Brookfield Props. One WFC Co., LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 03921, First Dept 6-23-26

Practice Point: The statement that a ladder-fall resulted from movement of the ladder from side to sided and the statement that the ladder-fall resulted from plaintiff’s losing his balance are not inconsistent and do not create a question of fact.

 

PLAINTIFF SUED THE DEVELOPER OF PROPERTY ADJACENT TO PLAINTIFF’S BUILDING ALLEGING EXCAVATION WORK CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S BUILDING TO SETTLE AND LEAN; THE CITY ISSUED A STOP-WORK ORDER STEMMING FROM PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT; DEFENDANT-DEVELOPER THEN COUNTERCLAIMED ALLEGING PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT IN NOT MAINTAINING PLAINTIFF’S BUILDING SUCH THAT THE EXCAVATION WORK WOULD NOT DAMAGE IT, RESULTING IN THE STOP-WORK ORDER AND CAUSING THE DEVELOPER PURELY ECONOMIC LOSS OF AT LEAST $16 MILLION; SUPREME COURT LET THE COUNTERCLAIM STAND BUT THE FIRST DEPARTMENT DISMISSED IT; PLAINTIFF DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO THE DEVELOPER AND THE DEVELOPER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO PURELY ECONOMIC DAMAGES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Moulton, determined the defendant-developer’s counterclaim alleging plaintiff was negligent should have been dismissed. Plaintiff sued the developer alleging excavation and construction on the developer’s property, which is adjacent to plaintiff’s building, caused plaintiff’s building to settle and lean. Defendant-developer counterclaimed alleging plaintiff was negligent in not maintaining plaintiff’s building such that the excavation would would not damage it. The counterclaim alleged economic harm ($16 million) stemming from a stop-work order triggered by the plaintiff’s complaint:

The negligence counterclaim asserts that plaintiff “had a duty to construct and maintain the 1992 Building in compliance with the [Building] Code” and “a duty to maintain the 1992 Building in a reasonable and safe condition.” It contends that, as evidenced by three structural engineering reports, the building was “not constructed in compliance with the Code,” “remains in violation of the Code” and “was constructed and remains in an unsafe condition.” … The counterclaim further asserts that, on December 13, 2023, as a result of these conditions, “the DOB issued a partial Stop Work Order for the Project Site, forcing [the developer] to stop construction on its own property because of structural instability of the 1992 Building that was caused by the 1992 Building’s non-compliance with the Code and [plaintiff’s] failure to maintain the 1992 Building in a reasonable condition.” According to the developer, it was “harmed by the delay in construction . . . due to this stoppage” in an amount not less than $16 million. The developer does not allege that plaintiff’s negligent design, construction, and maintenance of its building caused any bodily injury or property damage.

This appeal raises two novel issues: 1) whether Supreme Court correctly held that plaintiff owes the developer a common-law duty as an adjacent landowner to protect the developer’s excavation/foundation work from construction delays arising out of the stop work order and, 2) assuming the existence of a duty based on plaintiff’s status as an adjacent landowner, whether the court correctly held that the developer could recover purely economic damages.

We now answer both questions in the negative and reverse. 1992 Third Realty LLC v Third Ave NY Realty LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 03871, First Dept 6-18-26

Practice Point: The owner of a building which is damaged by excavation work on an adjacent building by a developer, does not owe a duty to the developer to maintain his building such that the excavation work would not damage it.

 

IF THE FACTS FIT THE STATUTORY CRITERIA OF THE “HEIRS ACT” (RPAPL 993(2)), THE ACT MUST BE APPLIED TO A PARTITION ACTION RE: PROPERTY HELD BY TENANTS-IN-COMMON (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, remitting the matter, determined Supreme Court should have applied the Heirs Act to this partition action re: property held as tenants-in-common. The First Department noted that if the facts fit the requirements of RPAPL 993(2) (the Heirs Act), the Act must be applied:

The Heirs Act does not apply in all cases where real property is owned by tenants-in-common. Rather, “heirs property” is defined as real property that is held in tenancy in common and satisfies all of the following requirements: there is no agreement in a record binding all of the co-tenants which governs the partition of the property (RPAPL 993[2][e][i]); any of the co-tenants acquired title from a relative (RPAPL 993[2][e][i]); the property is used for residential or agricultural purposes (RPAPL 993[2][e][iii]); and any of the following applies: (a) 20% or more of the interests are held by co-tenants who are relatives; (b) 20% or more of the interests are held by an individual who acquired title from a relative, whether living or deceased; (c) 20% or more of the co-tenants are relatives of each other; or (d) any co-tenant who acquired title from a relative resides in the property (RPAPL 993[2][e][iv][A]-[D]).

Construing unambiguous language to give effect to its plain meaning, as we must …, we find that the Heirs Act is applicable in this action because all of the conditions noted in RPAPL 993(2)(e) were satisfied. There was no agreement in the record governing the partition of the property; both parties acquired their interest from their mother; the property was used as a residence; and all of the conditions set forth in RPAPL 9939(2)(e)(iv) were present. Thus, the statute unambiguously applies to the parties here and expressly takes precedence over the traditional partition proceedings under RPAPL 901(1) (RPAPL 993[3][c]). Accordingly, the matter should be remitted to Supreme Court to comply with the requirements of the Heirs Act. Williams v Williams, 2026 NY Slip Op 03902, First Dept 6-18-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for the circumstances under which the “Heirs Act” must be applied to a partition action re: property held by tenants-in-common.​

 

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EVIDENCE THAT THE A-FRAME LADDER FROM WHICH PLAINTIFF FELL WAS UNSECURED AND SHIFTED FOR NO APPARENT REASON WARRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION; EVIDENCE THAT THE LADDER WAS RESTING ON GARBAGE BAGS SPOKE TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, WHICH IS NOT A DEFENSE (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff should have been awarded summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action in this A-frame ladder-fall case. The evidence that the ladder was unsecured and shifted for no apparent reason was sufficient to support summary judgment. The allegation that the ladder was resting on garbage bags spoke only to comparative negligence which is not a defense to a Labor Law 240(1) violation:

Supreme Court should have granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability on his Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff established his entitlement to summary judgment through his testimony that while he was standing on the ladder, it shifted and fell for no apparent reason … . Plaintiff also established that he was provided with a safety device — namely, the ladder itself — but that the device proved to be inadequate … .

The testimony stating that the feet of the ladder were resting on garbage bags is insufficient to warrant denial of plaintiff’s motion, as there is no dispute that the ladder was unsecured … and at most, such evidence constitutes comparative negligence which is not a defense to a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). Rudzikewycz v 164 W. 79th St. Corp., 2026 NY Slip Op 03897, First Dept 6-18-26

Practice Point: If a ladder isn’t “secured” and it moves and plaintiff falls, plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on a Labor Law 240(1) cause of action, irrespective of any comparative negligence.

 

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ASSAULT SECOND HAS A PERPETRATOR-VICTIM-AGE-DIFFERENCE” ELEMENT; THE PEOPLE FAILED TO PROVE DEFENDANT’S AGE WITH ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE; CONVICTION REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s attempted assault conviction, which has an “victim-perpetrator age-difference” element, determined the age of the defendant was not proven with admissible evidence:​

… [T]he second-degree assault conviction based on the victim and defendant’s respective ages was against the weight of the evidence because the People did not meet their burden to adduce adequate admissible evidence to establish defendant’s age (see Penal Law § 120.05[12] …). The only evidence offered by the People was the testimony of the arresting officer’s partner, who stated that while “assisting with the arrest,” he learned defendant’s date of birth without explaining whether he acquired the information from questioning defendant, from a fellow officer or from some document or report (see People v Justice, 99 AD3d 1213, 1214 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1012 [2013] [insufficient evidence of the defendant’s age where a police officer generally testified that he learned the defendant’s birthday “during the course of his investigation,” and the People failed to establish that the testimony was admissible under some exception to the hearsay rule]). People v McVay, 2026 NY Slip Op 03887, First Dept 6-18-26

Practice Point: Here the defendant’s age was an element of the crime and the People failed to prove it with admissible evidence. The conviction was therefore reversed.​

 

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DEFENDANT HAD SUFFICIENT CONTACTS WITH NEW YORK TO ALLOW THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION TO BE BROUGHT IN NEW YORK (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant, which issued preferred stock to plaintiff, had sufficient contacts with New York to bring the breach of contract action in New York:

Pursuant to the certificates of designation governing the preferred stock issued by defendant to plaintiff, defendant was required to provide dividends to a paying agent, which then provided the funds to a depository to pay the preferred stockholders. To facilitate dividend distributions, defendant designated entities located in New York as the paying agent and the depository. Further, defendant’s agreements with each of the depositories required the depository to maintain facilities in New York City. Defendant also contracted with multiple underwriters based in New York to sell the preferred stock. * * *

… [The] New York-based contacts are sufficiently related to plaintiff’s underlying breach of contract claim because “at least one element [of the cause of action] arises from the New York contacts” … . Defendant allegedly breached its duty under the certificates of designation not to sell stock to its affiliates “unless full cumulative dividends on the [preferred stock] . . . have been paid.” Defendant’s alleged breach consisted of not only its agreement to sell stock to one of its affiliates but also its failure to make full cumulative dividend payments to the preferred stockholders before completing the sale. … [D]efendant’s failure to make dividend payments, which necessarily would have been sent to its paying agent in New York, sufficiently connects defendant’s contacts with New York to the breach of contract cause of action … . Katz v Navios Mar. Holdings, Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 03731, First Dept 6-11-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into when a defendant’s contacts with New York are sufficient to support a breach of contract action.brought in New York.​

 

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A PLAINTIFF CAN USE THE SIX-MONTH “SAVINGS CLAUSE” IN CPLR 205(A) MORE THAN ONCE; WHEN THERE HAS BEEN AN APPEAL OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT, THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD DOESN’T START TO RUN UNTIL 30 DAYS AFTER SERVICE OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION’S ORDER WITH NOTICE OF ENTRY (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department determined the dismissal of the complaint should have been “without prejudice” because plaintiff is entitled to use the six-month “savings clause” (CPLR 205(a)) more than once. The six-month period begins to run when when an appeal taken as of right is exhausted. Therefore the six-month period won’t start running until 30 days after the service of the First Department’s order with notice of entry:

The motion court properly determined that plaintiff did not have capacity to initiate this action because plaintiff has not yet obtained the necessary letters of administration. Dismissal of the action was therefore warranted. However, plaintiff is entitled to use the savings clause of CPLR 205(a) more than once … . Accordingly, we modify to make the dismissal without prejudice… .

Defendant’s contention that the grace period for plaintiff to bring a third action expired on December 3, 2025 (six months after the order appealed from was filed with notice of entry) is unavailing. “[A] prior action terminates for purposes of CPLR 205(a) when an appeal taken as of right is exhausted” … . Thus, “the six-month period for recommencing an action . . . begins to run once 30 days have elapsed following service of [our] order . . . with notice of entry” … . Lewis v TCPRNC, LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 03635, First Dept 6-9-26

Practice Point: The six-month “savings clause” in CPR 205(a) can be used more than once.

Practice Point: Where, as here, there has been an appeal of the initial dismissal of the complaint, the CPLR 205(a) six-month period does not start to run until 30 days after the service of the appellate division’s order with notice of entry.

 

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PLAINTIFF IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE DID NOT CALL HER TREATING PHYSICIAN AS A WITNESS AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE PHYSICIAN WAS UNAVAILABLE OR THAT HIS TESTIMONY WOULD BE CUMULATIVE; PLAINTIFF RELIED SOLELY ON THE TESTIMONY OF A PSYCHIATRIST WHO FIRST SAW PLAINTIFF SIX YEARS AFTER THE ACCIDENT; DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR A “MISSING WITNESS” JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; VERDICT SET ASIDE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, granting defendant’s motion to set aside the jury verdict and direct a new trial in this sidewalk slip and fall case, determined plaintiff’s failure to call her treating physician as a witness warranted the “missing witness” jury instruction. Plaintiff called only, Dr. Guy, a psychiatrist who saw plaintiff only a few times six years after the injury:

Plaintiff alleges that she was injured when she was walking on the sidewalk adjacent to defendant’s property when her foot became trapped in a hole, causing her to fall. At trial, plaintiff alleged that because of the accident, she suffered a cervical herniation that caused radiculopathy and required surgery. She further alleged that injuries to her knee and her lumbar spine would require future surgery.

The trial court should have given the jury a missing witness charge with regard to Dr. Jason Gallina, plaintiff’s treating physician and surgeon from the period beginning months after the accident until at least a year afterward. Dr. Gallina was the orthopedic surgeon who performed plaintiff’s cervical fusion surgery, and he was the doctor who allegedly recommended the lumbar surgery that plaintiff contended she would need in the future.

The law is well settled that a missing witness charge is warranted for the failure to call a treating physician as a witness at trial, unless the party opposing the inference shows that the witness is either unavailable or not under the party’s control, or that the witness’s testimony would be cumulative … . * * *

Although the burden was on plaintiff to show that Dr. Gallina was unavailable or not under her control, she made no such showing  … . … [T]he testimony from Dr. Gallina would not have been cumulative. Dr. Guy is a physiatrist, while Dr. Gallina is the orthopedic surgeon who performed plaintiff’s surgery. Encarnacion v St. Barnabas Hosp., 2026 NY Slip Op 03630, First Dept 6-9-26

Practice Point: The plaintiff in a personal injury action must call the treating physician as a witness or adequately explain the failure to do so. In the absence of an adequate explanation, the defendant is entitled to a “missing witness” jury instruction.​

 

ONLY A DEFECT APPARENT ON THE FACE OF THE NOTICE OF LIEN WARRANTS SUMMARY DISCHARGE OF A MECHANIC’S LIEN; ANY OTHER THEORY MUST AWAIT TRIAL OF THE FORECLOSURE ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner should not have been awarded summary discharge of a mechanic’s lien. Summary discharge is available only when a defect in the lien is apparent on the face of the notice of lien. Any other theory must await trial of the foreclosure action:

The court should not have granted the petition for summary discharge of the mechanic’s lien that respondent placed on petitioner’s property. As relevant here, summary discharge of a lien is available “[w]here it appears from the face of the notice of lien that the claimant has no valid lien by reason of the character of the labor or materials furnished and for which a lien is claimed” (Lien Law § 19[6]). “[A] lien may be summarily discharged only for defects appearing on its face” … , and “any dispute regarding the validity of the lien must await trial of the foreclosure action” (… Matter of Northside Tower Realty, LLC v Klin Constr. Group, Inc., 73 AD3d 1072, 1072 [2d Dept 2010] [“A court has no inherent power to vacate or discharge a notice of lien except as authorized by Lien Law § 19(6)”]).

Petitioner identifies no defect appearing on the face of the notice of lien, raising instead lack of consent and other issues related to the validity of the lien. Those issues cannot be resolved under Lien Law § 19(6) … . Lien Law § 38 does not provide alternative grounds to affirm the lien discharge, as no court has issued an order requiring respondent to provide an itemized statement … .  Matter of Broadway PT 1710 LLC v Kingdom Assoc., Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 03624, First Dept 6-9-26

Practice Point: Any defect warranting summary discharge of a mechanic’s lien must be apparent on the face of the notice of lien.

 

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