You are here: / / Plaintiff Cannot Proceed With Case Taking a Position Different from That...

Plaintiff Cannot Proceed With Case Taking a Position Different from That Taken in a Prior Action

The First Department determined plaintiff could not proceed with her discrimination action against an organization (ECEC) which had agreed to hire her because there had been a determination in another discrimination action that she was employed by the defendant (East Bronx Day Care) in that action.  The court explained the doctrine of judicial estoppel:

The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party who assumed a certain position in a prior proceeding and secured a ruling in his or her favor from advancing a contrary position in another action, simply because his or her interests have changed … . Also known as the “doctrine of estoppel against inconsistent positions” …, the doctrine “rests upon the principle that a litigant should not be permitted to lead a court to find a fact one way and then contend in another judicial proceeding that the same fact should be found otherwise” … . Applying this doctrine, we find that plaintiff has failed to show that she was “qualified” for the ECEC position, as required to make out a prima facie case of discrimination since plaintiff is judicially estopped from denying that, at the time she was allegedly discriminated against by defendants, she was actually employed with East Bronx Day Care, which would make it impossible for her to carry out her duties for defendants. Becerril v City of New York Dept of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2013 NY Slip Op 06783, 1st Dept 10-17-13

 

You might also like
COMMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY A JUROR DURING DELIBERATIONS EXPRESSING ETHNIC BIAS REQUIRED A HEARING AND FINDINGS WHETHER DEFENDANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, BOTH FEDERAL AND STATE, WERE VIOLATED (FIRST DEPT).
MATTER REMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION OF EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT WHICH ECUADORIAN STATUTE IS MOST CLOSELY ANALOGOUS TO NEW YORK’S FRAUDULENT-CONVEYANCE CRITERIA FOR PURPOSES OF NEW YORK’S BORROWING STATUTE; HERE THE ACTION ACCRUED IN ECUADOR; THE SHORTER OF THE APPLICABLE ECUADORIAN AND NEW YORK STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS WILL APPLY (FIRST DEPT).
DEFENDANT’S FLIGHT WHEN APPROACHED BY POLICE IN PLAINCLOTHES AND DRIVING AN UNMARKED CAR DID NOT JUSTIFY PURSUIT, MOTION TO SUPPRESS WEAPON DISCARDED BY THE DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
SPEED OF PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT RE HIS COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.
Unsworn Juror Properly Dismissed Based Upon the “Two-Hour-Trial-Delay” Rule
DEFENDANT’S PARTICIPATION IN A SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO SEEK DISMISSAL OF THE FORECLOSURE ACTION AS ABANDONED (FIRST DEPT).
THREE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR A FALSE ARREST CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER 42 USC 1983 BEGAN TO RUN UPON ARRAIGNMENT.
Exclusion from Coverage of Claims Brought By or On Behalf of a Governmental Entity Applied to a Qui Tam Case Brought by a Private Party Pursuant to the Federal and State False Claims Acts Re: Medicare and Medicaid Over-Billing—the Private Party (“Relator”) Is Bringing the Action On Behalf of the Government, Which Is the Real Party In Interest

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Issues to Be Determined in Inquest After Default in Contract Action Explained;... Insufficient Evidence to Warrant Jury Charge on Intoxication Defense