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Plaintiff Cannot Proceed With Case Taking a Position Different from That Taken in a Prior Action

The First Department determined plaintiff could not proceed with her discrimination action against an organization (ECEC) which had agreed to hire her because there had been a determination in another discrimination action that she was employed by the defendant (East Bronx Day Care) in that action.  The court explained the doctrine of judicial estoppel:

The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party who assumed a certain position in a prior proceeding and secured a ruling in his or her favor from advancing a contrary position in another action, simply because his or her interests have changed … . Also known as the “doctrine of estoppel against inconsistent positions” …, the doctrine “rests upon the principle that a litigant should not be permitted to lead a court to find a fact one way and then contend in another judicial proceeding that the same fact should be found otherwise” … . Applying this doctrine, we find that plaintiff has failed to show that she was “qualified” for the ECEC position, as required to make out a prima facie case of discrimination since plaintiff is judicially estopped from denying that, at the time she was allegedly discriminated against by defendants, she was actually employed with East Bronx Day Care, which would make it impossible for her to carry out her duties for defendants. Becerril v City of New York Dept of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2013 NY Slip Op 06783, 1st Dept 10-17-13

 

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