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Plaintiff Judgment-Creditor’s Action Under the Debtor Creditor Law to Recover Payment Made to a Limited Partner Time-Barred by Three-Year Statute of Limitations in the Revised Limited Partnership Act (RPLA)

In a detailed and fact-specified full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, in an action under the Debtor and Creditor Law (DCL), the First Department, determined plaintiff, a judgment creditor with an unpaid judgment against a partnership, could not reach a $425,000 payment made by the partnership to a limited partner. The court held the payment was not fraudulent, constituted a partnership distribution, and was subject to the three-year statute of limitations in the Revised Limited Partnership Act (RPLA), not the six-year statute of limitations in the Debtor and Creditor Law (DCL). Therefore, plaintiff’s action seeking the recover the payment was time-barred;

RLPA (Partnership Law) § 121-607 prohibits limited partnerships from making distributions “to a partner to the extent that, at the time of the distribution, after giving effect to the distribution, all liabilities of the limited partnership. . . exceed the fair market value of the assets of the limited partnership” (Partnership Law § 121-607[a]) … . A limited partner who knowingly receives a prohibited distribution is liable to the partnership in the amount of the distribution (§ 121-607[b]). However, “a limited partner who receives a wrongful distribution . . . shall have no liability under this article or other applicable law for the amount of the distribution after the expiration of three years from the date of the distribution” (§ 121-607[c]). … [T]he Limited Liability Company Law (LLCL) contains a similar limitation on distributions to members (LLCL §§ 102[i], 508[a]). Peckar & Abramson, P.C. v Lyford Holdings, Ltd., 2015 NY Slip Op 08363, 1st Dept 11-17-15

 

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