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THE RELATION BACK DOCTRINE ALLOWED PLAINTIFF TO SERVE A SUPPLEMENTAL SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT ON THE DRIVER’S EMPLOYER IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE PURSUANT TO THE RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR THEORY OF LIABILITY, AFTER THE ACTION WAS STARTED PLAINTIFF LEARNED THAT THE DRIVER OF THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS A PASSENGER WAS PAID BY THE EMPLOYER TO TRANSPORT THE OTHER EMPLOYEES IN THE CAR TO WORK (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the relation-back doctrine (CPLR 203(f)) allowed plaintiff, Polanco, to serve a supplemental summons and complaint against the employer of Elias-Tejada, the driver of the car in which plaintiff’s decedent was a passenger. The Elias-Tejada car stalled on a bridge and was struck from behind. Plaintiff (Polanco) did not learn until after the action was started that Elias-Tejada was paid by his employer, Fairway, to transport the other occupants of his car, all Fairway employees, to work. Plaintiff (Polanco) sought to add Fairway as a defendant under a respondeat superior theory and the First Department held he could do so:

The claims that Polanco seeks to assert against Fairway arise out of the same occurrence as alleged in the complaint against Elias-Tejada [and the other two defendant drivers]. … [W]e find that Polanco also satisfied the second condition, because under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer will be vicariously liable for the negligence of an employee committed while the employee is acting in the scope of his or her employment … . Based on Elias-Tejada’s employer/employee relationship with Fairway, they are united in interest because a judgment against one of them will similarly affect the other … . … [T]he Fairway defendants can, therefore, be charged as having notice of Polanco’s potential claims against them, based upon the claims asserted against Elias-Tejada in the original summons and complaint … . …

… Only later, after depositions were held, including those of a key Fairway employee and Elias-Tejada, did [plaintiff] learn that Fairway compensated Elias-Tejada for hosting the car pool and that this travel arrangement was condoned, if not actually implemented and encouraged, by Fairway’s human resources department because Fairway reimbursed him for tolls and mileage. Ramirez v Elias-Tejada, 2019 NY Slip Op 00021, First Dept  1-3-19

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS

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