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VILLAGE EMPLOYEE’S TERMINATION BECAUSE HE DID NOT HAVE A COMMERCIAL DRIVER’S LICENSE WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, JOB DESCRIPTION DID NOT EXPLICITLY REQUIRE A COMMERCIAL DRIVER’S LICENSE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined that the termination of a village employee (Jakubowicz) was arbitrary and capricious. The employee was fired because he did not have a commercial driver’s license. However, the Mechanic II position does not explicitly require a commercial driver’s license:

The Village, as limited by its brief, contends that a commercial driver’s license is a minimum qualification for Jakubowicz’s position as a Mechanic II in the Village and that his failure to maintain such minimum qualification required the termination of his employment. We reject that contention. The Mechanic II position in the Village requires, inter alia, “[p]ossession, at time of appointment and during service in this classification, of a valid NYS Motor Vehicle Operator’s license appropriate for the type of vehicles which the employee may from time to time operate.” ” [B]oth due process and fundamental fairness require that a qualification or requirement of employment be expressly stated in order for an employer to bypass the protections afforded by the Civil Service Law or a collective bargaining agreement and summarily terminate an employee’ ” … . Here, the requirement of a commercial driver’s license is not “expressly stated” … . Furthermore, while “an employee charged with failing to possess a minimum qualification of his or her position is only entitled to notice of the charge and the opportunity to contest it” … , the Village here offered Jakubowicz a hearing “to afford [him] the opportunity to present information to the Village why [he] should not be administratively terminated from employment.” There is no dispute that a hearing was never held. Matter of Jakubowicz v Village of Fredonia, 2018 NY Slip Op 02059, Fourth Dept 3-23-18

MUNICIPAL LAW (VILLAGE EMPLOYEE’S TERMINATION BECAUSE HE DID NOT HAVE A COMMERCIAL DRIVER’S LICENSE WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, JOB DESCRIPTION DID NOT EXPLICITLY REQUIRE A COMMERCIAL DRIVER’S LICENSE (FOURTH DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (MUNICIPAL LAW, VILLAGE EMPLOYEE’S TERMINATION BECAUSE HE DID NOT HAVE A COMMERCIAL DRIVER’S LICENSE WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, JOB DESCRIPTION DID NOT EXPLICITLY REQUIRE A COMMERCIAL DRIVER’S LICENSE (FOURTH DEPT))/CIVIL SERVICE LAW (VILLAGE EMPLOYEE’S TERMINATION BECAUSE HE DID NOT HAVE A COMMERCIAL DRIVER’S LICENSE WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, JOB DESCRIPTION DID NOT EXPLICITLY REQUIRE A COMMERCIAL DRIVER’S LICENSE (FOURTH DEPT))

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