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Tag Archive for: Fourth Department

Social Services Law

THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH’S DENIAL OF PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR A ROBOTIC ARM WAS ANNULLED; PETITIONER HAS CEREBRAL PALSY AND IS UNABLE TO GRASP OBJECTS; THE DOH’S DETERMINATION THAT THE ROBOTIC ARM WAS NOT MEDICALLY NECESSARY WAS AFFECTED BY ERRORS OF LAW (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, annulling the determination of the “… New York State Department of Health (DOH), made after a fair hearing, which upheld a determination of the New York State Office of People with Developmental Disabilities (OPWDD) denying [petitioner’s] application for adaptive technology under New York’s Home and Community Based Services (HCBS) Medicaid Waiver program …”. Petitioner has cerebral palsy and has very limited use of his limbs. Petitioner had applied for a robotic arm which can attach to his wheelchair and allow him to pick up objects:

… DOH’s determination that the robotic arm is not medically necessary was affected by an error of law because the agency did not consider the entire definition of medical necessity in affirming OPWDD’s determination. In its decision after the fair hearing, DOH held that the robotic arm was not medically necessary inasmuch as it would not be “preventing, diagnosing or curing” petitioner’s cerebral palsy. … [H]owever, medically necessary care also includes care that “correct[s]” a condition (Social Services Law § 365-a [2]; see 18 NYCRR 513.3 [a]). DOH thus erred in improperly narrowing the definition contained in the applicable statute and regulations … .

DOH’s determination that the robotic arm was not medically necessary was also affected by an error of law to the extent that DOH determined that the arm was not essential and could not perform tasks that an aide also could not perform. The definition of medically necessary does not require that the medical care, services, or supplies be essential (see 18 NYCRR 513.1 [c]), nor do the applicable statute and regulations require that the requested equipment be capable of performing services that cannot be performed by an aide. DOH thus erred to the extent that it applied a definition of medically necessary that conflicts with its own regulations … . Matter of Hamilton v Baer, 2026 NY Slip Op 06618, Fourth Dept 11-13-26

November 13, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-11-13 22:13:262026-11-21 10:39:45THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH’S DENIAL OF PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR A ROBOTIC ARM WAS ANNULLED; PETITIONER HAS CEREBRAL PALSY AND IS UNABLE TO GRASP OBJECTS; THE DOH’S DETERMINATION THAT THE ROBOTIC ARM WAS NOT MEDICALLY NECESSARY WAS AFFECTED BY ERRORS OF LAW (FOURTH DEPT). ​
Civil Rights Law, County Law, Municipal Law, Negligence

THE COUNTY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN HELD LIABLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (18 USC 1983) COMMITTED BY COUNTY EMPLOYEES WHICH LED TO THE DEATH OF AN ARRESTEE; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) the judgment, determined (among many other issues not summarized here) the 42 USC 1983 and state negligence claims against the county should have been dismissed. The lawsuit stemmed from the actions taken by county law enforcement and medical personnel in response to combative behavior by plaintiff’s decedent atter decedent’s arrest. Plaintiff’s decedent died because of the actions taken to subdue him. The Fourth Department explained that the county could not be held liable under 18 USC 1983 for the torts committed by county employees. In addition the state negligence claims against the county were dismissed because they were not alleged in the notice of claim:

… “Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort” … . As distinguished from the section 1983 claims asserted against the individual defendants, plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against the County required “an official policy or custom of the . . . government itself [that] caused the . . . violat[ion] of [decedent’s] constitutional rights,” which in turn may be “shown by proof that the municipality had a custom or practice that was both widespread and reflected a deliberate indifference to its citizens’ constitutional rights” … . In that way, it must be an act of the municipality itself, not merely an act of its employees, that generates the claim—”constitutional torts committed by [municipal] employees without official sanction or authority do not typically implicate the municipality in the deprivation of constitutional rights, and therefore the employer-employee relationship is in itself insufficient to establish the necessary causation … .

* * * … [T]here was no evidence that any County “policymaker was aware of a subordinate’s unconstitutional actions, and consciously chose to ignore them, effectively ratifying the actions” … , or of the County’s “deliberate indifference to constitutional deprivations caused by subordinates” … . Metcalf v County of Erie, 2026 NY Slip Op 06613, Fourth Dept 11-13-26

Practice Point: Here the county should not have been deemed liable for the civil rights (section 1983) violations committed by county employees. There was no proof the violations were the result of a county policy or deliberate indifference.

 

November 13, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-11-13 21:06:042026-11-20 22:12:39THE COUNTY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN HELD LIABLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (18 USC 1983) COMMITTED BY COUNTY EMPLOYEES WHICH LED TO THE DEATH OF AN ARRESTEE; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FOURTH DEPT).
Appeals, Family Law, Judges

IN THIS CUSTODY PROCEEDING, THE JUDGE DID NOT MAKE SUFFICIENT FINDINGS TO ALLOW APPELLATE REVIEW; MATTER REMITTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing the custody determination and remitting the matter for specific findings by the judge, determined the judge’s failure to make the required findings rendered an informed appellate ruling impossible:

In its bench decision and the order on appeal, Family Court failed to set forth on the record specific credibility determinations or factual findings regarding matters disputed during the custody hearing. “Effective appellate review, whatever the case but especially in child visitation, custody or neglect proceedings, requires that appropriate factual findings be made by the trial court—the court best able to measure the credibility of the witnesses” … .

Further, it is well established that “alteration of an established custody arrangement will be ordered only upon a showing of a change in circumstances which reflects a real need for change to ensure the best interest[s] of the child[ren]” … . Here, the court failed to satisfy its obligation to make an express finding whether the father, in support of his petition to modify the prior custody order, established the requisite change in circumstances before it analyzed whether an order granting custody to the father was in the children’s best interests. Given the court’s failure to make credibility and other factual findings, we decline to exercise our power ” ‘to independently review the record’ to ascertain whether the requisite change in circumstances existed” … .

Moreover, the court failed to set forth sufficient findings concerning the factors that must be considered in making a best interests determination … , and we conclude that the record is insufficient for us to make an independent determination in that regard … . Matter of Castro v Hawkins, 2026 NY Slip Op 06667, Fourth Dept 11-13-26

 

November 13, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-11-13 11:48:492026-11-21 12:01:49IN THIS CUSTODY PROCEEDING, THE JUDGE DID NOT MAKE SUFFICIENT FINDINGS TO ALLOW APPELLATE REVIEW; MATTER REMITTED (FOURTH DEPT).
Criminal Law, Judges

DEFENDANT ATTEMPTED TO LEAVE THE COURTROOM DURING THE SUPPRESSION HEARING AND WAS REMOVED FROM A PORTION OF THE HEARING; BEFORE REMOVING THE DEFENDANT, THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE WARNED THE DEFENDANT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF FURTHER MISBEHAVIOR AND/OR ASCERTAINED WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS WAIVING HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, ordering a new trial and a new suppression hearing, determined the defendant should not have been removed from the courtroom during the suppression hearing without first warning him he could be removed if he continued to misbehave:​

A defendant’s right to be present at material stages of trial is not absolute, and that right may be expressly or impliedly waived … , or it may be forfeited when the defendant “engag[es] in courtroom conduct so disruptive that the trial cannot proceed in their presence” … . Before a court may lawfully remove a defendant from the courtroom, however, the “defendant must be warned that their continued disruptive conduct will result in removal from the courtroom, unless such warning is impracticable under the circumstances” … . “It will be the rare case where waiting to provide such warning imperils the safety of those in the courtroom” … .

This is not one of those rare cases where it was “impracticable under the circumstances” to warn defendant that he would be removed if his conduct continued (id.). The record shows that defendant jumped out of his chair during the hearing and attempted to leave the courtroom. There is no indication that he attempted to hurt or verbally accost anyone, and he was immediately subdued by court deputies. We cannot conclude that defendant’s conduct “was violent in nature or that it create[d] an emergency necessitating his immediate removal” … . While defendant’s attempt to flee the courtroom may have reflected a willingness to waive his right to be present for the remainder of the suppression hearing, the court, before ordering his removal from the courtroom, did not ascertain whether he wished to expressly waive his right to be present and return to jail and failed to warn defendant that continued “disorderly and disruptive” conduct would result in his removal (CPL 260.20). That was error … . People v Velazquez, 2026 NY Slip Op 06666, Fourth Dept 11-13-26

Practice Point: Here removal of the defendant from a portion of the suppression hearing because he attempted to leave the courtroom warranted a new trial. The defendant should first have been warned that continued misbehavior would result in removal. Or the defendant should have been asked whether he was waiving his right to be present.

 

November 13, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-11-13 11:30:092026-11-21 11:48:42DEFENDANT ATTEMPTED TO LEAVE THE COURTROOM DURING THE SUPPRESSION HEARING AND WAS REMOVED FROM A PORTION OF THE HEARING; BEFORE REMOVING THE DEFENDANT, THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE WARNED THE DEFENDANT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF FURTHER MISBEHAVIOR AND/OR ASCERTAINED WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS WAIVING HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence

THE RECORD WAS NOT CLEAR ABOUT WHETHER AN AFFIDAVIT WAS ATTACHED TO THE SEARCH WARRANT; IF THE AFFIDAVIT WERE ATTACHED, THE SEARCH WOULD NOT HAVE EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE WARRANT; MATTER REMITTED FOR A HEARING (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department remitted the matter for reconsideration of whether the police exceeded the scope of the search warrant when they entered the attic where the handgun was found:

We … conclude that the court erred in denying the reconsideration motion without a hearing to the extent that defendant argued that the officers exceeded the scope of the search warrant. The record before the court presented an issue of fact whether the attic where the handgun was found was part of the rear apartment residence such that the executing officers did not exceed the stated scope of the warrant … . In denying the reconsideration motion without a hearing, the court found the description in an affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant, wherein the applying detective described the rear apartment as including defendant’s bedroom in the attic, to be dispositive of whether the executing officers exceeded the scope of the warrant. We disagree with the court on that point inasmuch as the search warrant itself merely mentions the existence of that affidavit, but does not expressly incorporate all or part of its contents and no evidence was presented that the supporting affidavit was physically attached to the search warrant at the time of its execution … . People v Myers, 2026 NY Slip Op 06633, Fourth Dept 11-13-26

Practice Point: Here, if an affidavit were attached to the search warrant, the search would not have exceeded the scope of the warrant. The matter was sent back for a hearing in the issue.

 

November 13, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-11-13 11:11:142026-11-21 11:30:01THE RECORD WAS NOT CLEAR ABOUT WHETHER AN AFFIDAVIT WAS ATTACHED TO THE SEARCH WARRANT; IF THE AFFIDAVIT WERE ATTACHED, THE SEARCH WOULD NOT HAVE EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE WARRANT; MATTER REMITTED FOR A HEARING (FOURTH DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Landlord-Tenant

THE LANDLORD’S RENT-NONPAYMENT PROCEEDING ACKNOWLEDGED THE EXISTENCE OF THE TENANCY, REQUIRING THE DISMISSAL OF THE HOLDOVER PROCEEDING (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court, determined the landlord’s nonpayment action action the tenant acknowledged the existence of the tenancy requiring dismissal of the holdover proceeding:

“Generally, if a landlord initiates a holdover proceeding and then commences a nonpayment proceeding, the nonpayment case operates as a waiver of the right to proceed with the holdover because it reaffirms the tenancy” … . Not only do “the affirmative acts involved in commencing the nonpayment summary proceeding . . . reaffirm[ the] tenancy, but the existence of the nonpayment petition itself . . . is documentary proof of the existence of [the] tenancy” … .

Here, “[o]nce [petitioner] obtained a final judgment for unpaid rent in the nonpayment proceeding, it was conclusively determined that a valid lease existed between the parties” and, under these circumstances, we conclude that “dismissal of the holdover proceeding [is] proper” … . Inasmuch as the nonpayment proceeding cannot be maintained in the absence of a landlord-tenant relationship, and the nonpayment proceeding was commenced after the issuance of the warrant of eviction in the earlier holdover proceeding, “[petitioner] waived its right to maintain the holdover proceeding” … . Matter of Pine View Circle, LLC v Atherton, 2026 NY Slip Op 06628, Fourth Dept 11-13-26

Practice Point: A rent-nonpayment proceeding acknowledges the existence of the tenancy, thereby requiring dismissal of a pending holdover proceeding.​

 

November 13, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-11-13 10:55:412026-11-21 11:11:07THE LANDLORD’S RENT-NONPAYMENT PROCEEDING ACKNOWLEDGED THE EXISTENCE OF THE TENANCY, REQUIRING THE DISMISSAL OF THE HOLDOVER PROCEEDING (FOURTH DEPT). ​
Evidence, Municipal Law, Negligence

THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE MUNICIPALITY CREATED THE ICY SIDEWALK CONDITION BY PILING SNOW ON THE EDGE OF THE SIDEWALK, THEREBY ELIMINATING THE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE REQUIREMENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff in this slip and fall case raised a question of fact whether the municipality created the icy sidewalk-condition, thereby eliminating the prior written-notice requirement:

“While the mere failure to remove all snow or ice from a sidewalk is an act of omission, rather than an affirmative act of negligence, a municipality’s act in piling snow as part of its snow removal efforts, which snow pile then melts and refreezes to create a dangerous icy condition, constitutes an affirmative act” … . Here, we conclude that, “when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and giving her the benefit of every reasonable inference” … , the deposition testimony submitted by plaintiff, combined with the opinion of plaintiff’s meteorological expert, is sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact whether the Town deliberately pushed snow onto the edge of the sidewalk and whether that snow then melted and refroze to create a dangerous icy condition … . Shearing v Town of Gates, 2026 NY Slip Op 06619, Fourth Dept 11-13-26

Practice Point: If the municipality creates the dangerous condition which causes plaintiff to slip and fall, the prior written notice requirement in not applicable.

 

November 13, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-11-13 10:39:562026-11-21 10:54:48THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE MUNICIPALITY CREATED THE ICY SIDEWALK CONDITION BY PILING SNOW ON THE EDGE OF THE SIDEWALK, THEREBY ELIMINATING THE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE REQUIREMENT (FOURTH DEPT).
Attorneys, Criminal Law, Family Law

THE PEOPLE’S AFFIRMATION IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO PREVENT REMOVAL OF THE 17-YEAR-OLD’S CASE TO FAMILY COURT WAS NOT BASED ON THE PROSECUTOR’S PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FAILED TO ALLEGE DEFENDANT’S SPECIFIC CONDUCT; THE MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court, determined the People’s motion to prevent removal of the 17-year-old defendant’s case to Family Court should have been denied:

The court was … required to order removal of the action to Family Court unless the People successfully moved to prevent removal by establishing “that extraordinary circumstances exist that should prevent the transfer” … . Such a motion must “contain allegations of sworn fact based upon personal knowledge of the affiant, and shall indicate if the district attorney is requesting a hearing” … . Whether extraordinary circumstances exist to preclude removal to Family Court is a discretionary determination to be made by a court after consideration of “the totality of the facts and circumstances” … . A court exercising that discretion, however, should give consideration to the legislative intent that retention should be the exception and not the rule, i.e., that only “extremely rare and exceptional cases” involving “highly unusual and heinous facts” and “strong proof that the young person is not amenable [to] or would not benefit in any way from the heightened services in the family court” should be precluded from removal … .

Here, the People’s supporting affirmation relied heavily on the nature of the charges against defendant. … [E]ach count on which defendant was indicted also named 17 codefendants with no factual allegations that would permit parsing out defendant’s specific conduct in, for example, possessing either a controlled substance or a weapon. Although defendant was also alleged to have committed conspiracy in the second degree, he was not alleged to have committed any overt act in furtherance of that conspiracy. The prosecutor also failed to state that the few factual allegations that were included in the People’s supporting affirmation were based on the prosecutor’s “personal knowledge” …  and that conclusion is not a reasonable inference from the affirmation as a whole … . Instead, there is no indication from what specific sources any information was obtained, no supporting documentation was included with the motion, and no request for a hearing was made … . Although the People also argued that defendant’s previous arrests on similar charges weighed against removal, we note that “reoffense in and of itself” is not “extraordinary” (id. at 666 [internal quotation marks omitted]). The mere fact of a prior charge or charges does not provide evidence of defendant’s actual prior conduct, i.e., the specific “illegal or immoral acts,” if any, that might have led to those charges … , or whether defendant’s conduct constituted “escalating criminal behavior” … . The People’s motion therefore failed to contain sufficient “allegations of sworn fact based upon personal knowledge of [an] affiant” … on which the court could have relied in considering defendant’s actual role in the charged offenses in relation to his numerous codefendants, many of whom were adults … . People v Quashawn C., 2026 NY Slip Op 05892, Fourth Dept 10-9-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a detailed discussion of what a prosecutor must demonstrate to prevent removal of a 17-year-old defendant’s case to Family Court.

 

October 9, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-09 22:33:082026-10-19 23:08:25THE PEOPLE’S AFFIRMATION IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO PREVENT REMOVAL OF THE 17-YEAR-OLD’S CASE TO FAMILY COURT WAS NOT BASED ON THE PROSECUTOR’S PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FAILED TO ALLEGE DEFENDANT’S SPECIFIC CONDUCT; THE MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
Attorneys, Criminal Law, Evidence

PRESENTING A VIDEOTAPED INTERVIEW OF THE 17-YEAR-OLD VICTIM TO THE GRAND JURY IN THE ABSENCE OF A COURT ORDER VIOLATED THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW AND IMPAIRED THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS; INDICTMENT DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, dismissing the indictment without prejudice, determined presenting a videotaped interview of the 17-year-old victim without a court order violated the Criminal Procedure Law and impaired the integrity of the proceedings:

Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of attempted rape in the first degree … . Defendant contends that County Court erred in denying that part of his omnibus motion seeking to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the grand jury proceeding failed “to conform to the requirements of [CPL] article [190] to such degree that the integrity thereof [was] impaired and prejudice to the defendant” resulted (CPL 210.35 [5]). We agree. The People correctly concede on appeal that the prosecutor improperly presented to the grand jury a videotaped interview of the approximately 17-year-old victim conducted by a social services caseworker in lieu of her live testimony without adhering to any of the requirements of CPL 190.32, including the obligation to seek a court order authorizing the videotaping of an examination of the victim as a “special witness” … . We agree with the parties that, under these circumstances, this error rendered the proceeding so irregular “that the integrity thereof [was] impaired and prejudice to . . . defendant may [have] result[ed]” (CPL 210.35 [5]; see CPL 210.20 [1] [c] …). People v Thompson, 2026 NY Slip Op 05874, Fourth Dept 10-9-26

Practice Point: Presenting a videotaped interview of a crime victim to a grand jury without a court order may impair the integrity of the proceedings requiring dismissal of the indictment.

 

October 9, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-09 22:06:582026-10-19 22:30:21PRESENTING A VIDEOTAPED INTERVIEW OF THE 17-YEAR-OLD VICTIM TO THE GRAND JURY IN THE ABSENCE OF A COURT ORDER VIOLATED THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW AND IMPAIRED THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS; INDICTMENT DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE (FOURTH DEPT).
Appeals, Criminal Law, Evidence

DEFENDANT’S WAIVER OF APPEAL WAS INVALID; DEFENDANT WAS SUBJECTED TO CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION WHICH WAS NOT PRECEDED BY THE MIRANDA WARNINGS; DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined (1) defendant’s waiver of appeal was invalid, and (2) defendant’s statements made in response to questioning not preceded by the Miranda warnings should have been suppressed:

… [D]efendant was a suspect in the burglary of the victim’s home after defendant’s fingerprint was found on a bedroom window. Investigators learned that defendant was scheduled to meet his parole officer. After defendant walked into his parole officer’s office, three police investigators entered the office to question him. At no point during the questioning of defendant did the officers give defendant his Miranda warnings or inform defendant that he was free to leave. Furthermore, the investigator who testified at the suppression hearing could not answer definitively whether defendant would have violated parole if he had refused to talk with the investigators and left the office. Defendant met with his parole officer only after the investigators concluded their interview. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would have thought that they were not free to leave during questioning … . Moreover, the questions by the investigators were accusatory in nature, rather than merely investigatory, and were designed to elicit an incriminating response … . We conclude that defendant was in custody and was subjected to interrogation. People v Clegg, 2026 NY Slip Op 05663, Fourth Dept 10-2-26

Practice Point: Here defendant was questioned by investigators when he showed up for a meeting with his parole officer. The investigators did not tell defendant he was free to leave and did not give him the Miranda warnings. The questioning was accusatory and designed to incriminate. Therefore defendant’s motion to suppress his statements to the investigators should have been granted.

 

October 2, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-02 11:23:012026-10-05 11:38:58DEFENDANT’S WAIVER OF APPEAL WAS INVALID; DEFENDANT WAS SUBJECTED TO CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION WHICH WAS NOT PRECEDED BY THE MIRANDA WARNINGS; DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (FOURTH DEPT).
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