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USING THE COURT’S OWN DEFINITION OF SURFACE WATER, THE COURT DETERMINED THE SURFACE WATER DAMAGE EXCLUSION IN THE PROPERTY INSURANCE POLICY DID NOT APPLY, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the insurer’s cross motion for summary judgment should not have been granted and the insured’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Plaintiffs’ home was damaged by water. The policy excluded damage from surface water and coverage was denied on that ground. Without describing the facts, the Fourth Department noted that the term “surface water” was not defined in the policy and, using the court’s own definition, held that the water which caused the damage was not surface water:

“An insurance agreement is subject to principles of contract interpretation” … , and “[a]ny . . . exclusions or exceptions from policy coverage must be specific and clear in order to be enforced. They are not to be extended by interpretation or implication, but are to be accorded a strict and narrow construction” … . Inasmuch as the term “surface water” is not defined in the policy, “we afford that term its plain and ordinary meaning’ ” … . We have previously defined surface water as ” the accumulation of natural precipitation on the land and its passage thereafter over the land until it either evaporates, is absorbed by the land or reaches stream channels’ ” … .We thus conclude that, under the clear and unambiguous terms of the policy, the water that entered the plaintiffs’ residence was not surface water, and defendant therefore erroneously denied coverage under that policy exclusion. Smith v Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 2018 NY Slip Op 02055, Fourth Dept 3-23-18

INSURANCE LAW (USING THE COURT’S OWN DEFINITION OF SURFACE WATER, THE COURT DETERMINED THE SURFACE WATER DAMAGE EXCLUSION IN THE PROPERTY INSURANCE POLICY DID NOT APPLY, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT))/SURFACE WATER (INSURANCE LAW, USING THE COURT’S OWN DEFINITION OF SURFACE WATER, THE COURT DETERMINED THE SURFACE WATER DAMAGE EXCLUSION IN THE PROPERTY INSURANCE POLICY DID NOT APPLY, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT))/WATER (SURFACE WATER, INSURANCE LAW, USING THE COURT’S OWN DEFINITION OF SURFACE WATER, THE COURT DETERMINED THE SURFACE WATER DAMAGE EXCLUSION IN THE PROPERTY INSURANCE POLICY DID NOT APPLY, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT))

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