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THE JURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO CONSIDER A THEORY OF DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER WHICH WAS NOT ALLEGED IN THE BILL OF PARTICULARS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s murder conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the jury instructions allowed the jury to consider a theory of prosecution that was not alleged in the bill of particulars. The defendant was charged with hitting and shaking the child victim, but the jury was allowed to consider defendant’s alleged inaction after the alleged assault:

“A defendant has a right to be tried only for the crimes charged in the indictment” … . ” ‘Where the prosecution is limited by the indictment or bill of particulars to a certain theory or theories, the court must hold the prosecution to such narrower theory or theories’ ” … . We agree with defendant that the People’s theory of depraved indifference, as outlined in the bill of particulars, was limited to defendant’s assaultive conduct, i.e., his infliction of head injuries by shaking or hitting the child, and that the court’s instruction allowed the jury to consider, in addition to the specifically delineated assaultive conduct, defendant’s “inaction” after the assault ended. … [D]efendant objected during the charge conference to a modification of the depraved indifference charge. The charge, as modified, allowed the jury to … consider “the defendant’s later inaction as a factor when considering the brutal, prolonged and ultimately fatal course of conduct,” and defendant objected on the ground that such proof was outside the scope of the bill of particulars. People v Faison, 2021 NY Slip Op 05184, Fourth Dept 10-1-21

 

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