You are here: / / REAR-MOST DRIVER IN A CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS...

REAR-MOST DRIVER IN A CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS IN THE LINE OF STOPPED CARS, REAR-MOST DRIVER NOT LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT INJURY WHEN HE WAS STRUCK BY ANOTHER DRIVER AFTER GETTING OUT OF HIS CAR (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment in his action against the rear-most driver (Lipome) which struck a stopped car (Foley’s car) causing chain-reaction collisions. Plaintiff was subsequently struck by another car (driven by Hourt) after he got out of his car to check on the other drivers. The rear-most driver who caused the chain-reaction accident (Lipome) was not liable for the subsequent accident (when plaintiff was on foot and struck by Hourt):

” [T]he rearmost driver in a chain-reaction collision bears a presumption of responsibility’ ” … , and “[i]t is well established that a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence with respect to the operator of the moving vehicle, and imposes a duty on the operator of the moving vehicle to come forward with an adequate, [nonnegligent] explanation for the accident”… . Here, plaintiff met his initial burden of demonstrating that Lipome was negligent in rear-ending Foley’s vehicle, which undisputedly caused the chain-reaction accident. Lipome has not provided any nonnegligent explanation for the collision and, indeed, it appears from the record that Lipome essentially admitted that she was at fault for rear-ending Foley’s vehicle. …

We agree with Lipome, however, that she is entitled to partial summary judgment dismissing the complaint against her insofar as it relates to the accident between plaintiff and Hourt, and we therefore further modify the order accordingly. Lipome’s negligence in the chain-reaction accident “did nothing more than to furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which [plaintiff’s] injury was made possible and which was brought about by the intervention of a new, independent and efficient cause” … , i.e., plaintiff’s conduct in walking back to the accident scene. Prior to plaintiff’s accident with Hourt, the situation resulting from the initial rear-end accident ” was a static, completed occurrence,’ . . . [and] [t]he risk undertaken by plaintiff’ [in walking back to the rear-end accident scene] was created by himself” … . Gustke v Nickerson, 2018 NY Slip Op 02087, Fourth Dept 3-23-18

NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, REAR-MOST DRIVER IN A CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS IN THE LINE OF STOPPED CARS, REAR-MOST DRIVER NOT LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT INJURY WHEN HE WAS STRUCK BY ANOTHER DRIVER AFTER GETTING OUT OF HIS CAR (FOURTH DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (REAR-MOST DRIVER IN A CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS IN THE LINE OF STOPPED CARS, REAR-MOST DRIVER NOT LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT INJURY WHEN HE WAS STRUCK BY ANOTHER DRIVER AFTER GETTING OUT OF HIS CAR (FOURTH DEPT))/REAR-END COLLISIONS  (REAR-MOST DRIVER IN A CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS IN THE LINE OF STOPPED CARS, REAR-MOST DRIVER NOT LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT INJURY WHEN HE WAS STRUCK BY ANOTHER DRIVER AFTER GETTING OUT OF HIS CAR (FOURTH DEPT))/CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENTS  (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, REAR-MOST DRIVER IN A CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS IN THE LINE OF STOPPED CARS, REAR-MOST DRIVER NOT LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT INJURY WHEN HE WAS STRUCK BY ANOTHER DRIVER AFTER GETTING OUT OF HIS CAR (FOURTH DEPT))/FURNISH CONDITION FOR ACCIDENT (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, REAR-MOST DRIVER IN A CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS IN THE LINE OF STOPPED CARS, REAR-MOST DRIVER NOT LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT INJURY WHEN HE WAS STRUCK BY ANOTHER DRIVER AFTER GETTING OUT OF HIS CAR (FOURTH DEPT))/PEDESTRIANS (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, REAR-MOST DRIVER IN A CHAIN-REACTION ACCIDENT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS IN THE LINE OF STOPPED CARS, REAR-MOST DRIVER NOT LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT INJURY WHEN HE WAS STRUCK BY ANOTHER DRIVER AFTER GETTING OUT OF HIS CAR (FOURTH DEPT))

You might also like
THE SHOOTER, WHO WAS NEVER FOUND OR IDENTIFIED, WAS A PASSENGER IN A CAR DRIVEN BY DEFENDANT WHEN THE SHOOTER SHOT AT AND MISSED A PERSON SITTING IN A PARKED CAR; THE ATTEMPTED MURDER AND ASSAULT CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).
STIPULATION WHICH WAS NOT MERGED INTO THE JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS UNENFORCEABLE (FOURTH DEPT).
Case Remitted for Determination Whether Defendant Should Be Adjudicated a Youthful Offender/Record Insufficient to Determine Whether Court Erred In Not Disclosing to the Defendant the Written Submissions of the Victims Which Were Reviewed by the Court–Case Remitted to Make an Adequate Record for Review
DEFENDANT DOG OWNER’S ACKNOWLEDGMENT SHE HAD HEARD THAT ONE OF HER DOGS NIPPED A BOY IN A PRIOR INCIDENT WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE FACTS OF THE INCIDENT; THEREFORE PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DOG BITE CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
GRANDMOTHER’S APPEAL OF THE DENIAL OF VISITATION HEARD DESPITE THE FACT THAT GRANDMOTHER HAD BEEN GRANTED VISITATION WHILE THE APPEAL WAS PENDING; DISSENT ARGUED THE EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED (FOURTH DEPT).
Defendant Failed to Meet Its Burden on Its Summary Judgment Motion—Not Enough to Point to Deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Proof
Where Proof Is Directed Exclusively to a Theory Not Charged in the Indictment, the Proof Is Insufficient to Support the Conviction—Such a Variance Need Not Be Preserved by Objection to Be Raised on Appeal/Conduct of Spectators (Mouthing Words When Victim Testified) Did Not Require that the Spectators Be Removed and Did Not Mandate the Declaration of a Mistrial
ALTHOUGH DOMINICA, THE EXECUTRIX OF JOSEPHINE’S ESTATE, WAS NEVER SUBSTITUTED FOR JOSEPHINE AFTER JOSEPHINE’S DEATH, DOMINICA APPEARED AND ACTIVELY LITIGATED A MOTION TO VACATE; THE FAILURE TO EFFECT SUBSTITUTION IN THAT CIRCUMSTANCE IS A MERE IRREGULARITY; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

VILLAGE EMPLOYEE’S TERMINATION BECAUSE HE DID NOT HAVE A COMMERCIAL DRIVER’S... SCHOOL COULD NOT HAVE FORESEEN ASSAULT ON PLAINTIFF BY A CLASSMATE IN GYM CLASS,...