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EVEN THOUGH THE PEDESTRIAN DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF WAY WHEN HE CROSSED THE STREET, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DRIVER COULD HAVE AVOIDED STRIKING HIM.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted in this pedestrian traffic accident. Plaintiff pedestrian conceded he did not have the right of way when he crossed in a crosswalk. There was a question of fact whether the driver could have seen the pedestrian and avoided the accident:

Plaintiff pedestrian testified that he was struck by defendant’s vehicle while crossing the street within the crosswalk, but conceded that he did not have the right of way when he entered the street (… Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1112;…). Nevertheless, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, triable issues of fact exist as to the relative positions of plaintiff and defendant at the time of the accident, and whether defendant could have seen plaintiff before the accident and failed to exercise due care to avoid the accident … . Sylvester v Velez, 2017 NY Slip Op 00390, 1st Dept 1-19-17

NEGLIGENCE (EVEN THOUGH THE PEDESTRIAN DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF WAY WHEN HE CROSSED THE STREET, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DRIVER COULD HAVE AVOIDED STRIKING HIM)/PEDESTRIANS (EVEN THOUGH THE PEDESTRIAN DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF WAY WHEN HE CROSSED THE STREET, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DRIVER COULD HAVE AVOIDED STRIKING HIM)/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (EVEN THOUGH THE PEDESTRIAN DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF WAY WHEN HE CROSSED THE STREET, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DRIVER COULD HAVE AVOIDED STRIKING HIM)

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LEASE WAS NOT AN ATTEMPT TO THWART (NYC) RENT CONTROL AND WAS THEREFORE VALID... HEARING NECESSARY TO ASSESS ATTORNEY’S FEES, CRITERIA EXPLAINED.