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Broker’s Complaint Stated Causes of Action for Breach of Implied Contract and Unjust Enrichment—Complaint Alleged Broker Was Entitled to a Commission Where Defendant Buyers Abandoned the Potential Purchase in which Broker Was Involved and 18 Months Later Purchased Nearly Identical Property from the Same Seller

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, determined a real estate broker (SPRE) had sufficiently stated causes of action for breach of implied contract and unjust enrichment.  The complaint alleged that the broker introduced the defendants to the developer of condominium units (397 West) and found an architect.  The defendants subsequently informed the broker they were no longer looking to buy.  18 months later the defendants purchased different but nearly identical condominium units from the same developer:

In this appeal, we must determine whether plaintiff broker has alleged facts sufficient to establish its entitlement to a commission on the sale of real estate, where it expended significant effort locating an apartment for buyers who abandoned the transaction and purchased another apartment in the same building 18 months later. In addition, we take this opportunity to clarify the standard by which a broker may be found to have been the “procuring cause” of a real estate transaction. We find that the complaint sufficiently alleges that plaintiff was a direct and proximate link between the introduction of defendant buyers and the seller and the consummation of the transaction to withstand defendants’ motion to dismiss. * * *

“[I];n the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a real estate broker will be deemed to have earned his commission when he [or she]; produces a buyer who is ready, willing and able to purchase at the terms set by the seller” … . A broker does not earn a commission merely by calling the property to the attention of the buyer … . But this does not mean that the broker “must have been the dominant force in the conduct of the ensuing negotiations or in the completion of the sale” (id. at 206). Rather, the broker must be the “procuring cause” of the transaction, meaning that “there must be a direct and proximate link, as distinguished from one that is indirect and remote,” between the introduction by the broker and the consummation of the transaction … . * * *

In the present case, … under the … “direct and proximate link” standard, we find that the allegations in the complaint sufficiently state that SPRE was the procuring cause of defendants’ purchase of the second duplex at 397 West. SPRE brought defendants to the building on several occasions; introduced defendants to the developer and attended several meetings between the developer and defendants; reviewed floor plans with defendants; negotiated favorable terms for defendants on the original units; prepared a deal sheet with defendants’ preliminary offer terms on the first duplex for the developer’s consideration; drafted a contract of sale; and connected defendants with a reputable architect whom SPRE specially selected to implement defendants’ design plans. Affording these allegations a liberal construction, we find that they establish that SPRE’s actions and efforts may have been a direct and proximate link between the introduction of defendants to the developer and defendants’ purchase of the second duplex at 397 West. Whether SPRE was the procuring cause “is a question of fact to be decided on the evidence” … . SPRE Realty Ltd v Dienst, 2014 NY Slip Op 03642, 1st Dept 5-20-14

 

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