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DEFENSE COUNSEL ALLOWED EVIDENCE PRECLUDED BY A SANDOVAL RULING TO COME IN, AND DID NOT OBJECT TO HEARSAY WHICH REFUTED DEFENDANT’S ALIBI; DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined defense counsel was ineffective for allowing the introduction of evidence which violated a Sandoval ruling. The court ruled the People could not introduce evidence of defendant’s rape conviction. But the People elicited testimony from defendant’s parole officer (Kellett) indicating defendant was a sex offender. In addition, hearsay testimony which refuted an alibi defendant did not attempt to present at trial was allowed in without objection by defense counsel:

Kellett’s testimony effectively circumvented the court’s earlier Sandoval ruling precluding the introduction of defendant’s past rape conviction by allowing her to testify that defendant was a sex offender … . The People had already affirmed on the record that they would not seek to introduce the basis for defendant’s parole supervision, and defendant had consented to this so long as the testimony be restricted and a limiting instruction provided. The details offered by Kellett were not necessary to establish defendant’s status as a parolee, as she could have merely testified that defendant was under parole supervision without elaborating upon his status as a sex offender. Despite the crimes charged not being of a sexual nature, the testimony in question introduced highly prejudicial information that “ha[d] no purpose other than to show that . . . defendant is of a criminal bent or character and thus likely to have committed the crime[s] charged” … . However, trial counsel made no objection to this testimony or, in the alternative, no request for a curative instruction. Thus, the prejudice resulting from this testimony was not dissipated “by promptly and clearly advising the jury that the comments were improper and should be completely disregarded” … . * * *

Although we find this error on the part of trial counsel to have, by itself, deprived defendant of a fair trial … , we would be remiss not to briefly address trial counsel’s failure to object to law enforcement testimony describing interviews with individuals who refuted defendant’s previously claimed alibi. This testimony presented arguably inadmissible evidence of a hearsay nature, which defendant claims presented a Crawford violation … . However, trial counsel lodged no objection, essentially allowing defendant to be impeached regarding an alibi he did not attempt to present at trial. People v Franklin, 2025 NY Slip Op 01975, Third Dept 4-3-25

Practice Point: Here a Sandoval ruling excluded evidence defendant had been convicted of rape but the People, through defendant’s parole officer, introduced evidence defendant was a sex offender. Defense counsel did not object. The failure to object was deemed ineffective assistance requiring a new trial.

 

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