You are here: / Third Department

Posts

BECAUSE THE GRAND JURY MINUTES WERE NOT PART OF THE MOTION TO AMEND THE INDICTMENT OR THE RECORD ON APPEAL, IT COULD NOT BE DETERMINED WHETHER THE DEFENDANT WAS ACTUALLY INDICTED ON THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE AMENDED INDICTMENT; PLEA VACATED AND AMENDED INDICTMENT DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea and dismissing the amended indictment, held that, because the grand jury minutes did not accompany the motion to amend the indictment and were not available to the appellate court, it could not be determined whether defendant was indicted on the charged offense, a jurisdictional defect. The People argued that the grand jury voted on the offense charged in the amended indictment but the wrong subdivision of the statute was set forth in the original indictment:

“The right to indictment by a [g]rand [j]ury has . . . been recognized as not merely a personal privilege of the defendant but a public fundamental right, which is the basis of jurisdiction to try and punish an individual”… . “[S]ince an infringement of defendant’s right to be prosecuted only by indictment implicates the jurisdiction of the court,” this claim is not waived by a guilty plea and may be raised for the first time on appeal … .  Thus, “[b]efore a person may be publicly accused of a felony, and required to defend against such charges, the [s]tate must a [g]rand [j]ury that sufficient legal reasons exist to believe the person guilty” … . To that end, an indictment ensures that “the crime for which the defendant is brought to trial is in fact one for which he [or she] was indicted by the [g]rand [j]ury, rather than some alternative seized upon by the prosecution” … , providing a safeguard against prosecutorial authority by requiring the grand jury to “assess[] the sufficiency of the prosecutor’s case” … .

The record before us only establishes that a grand jury indicted defendant for violating subdivision (7) of Penal Law § 120.05, not subdivision (3) of that statute. In their motion to amend, the People stated that “the grand jury was instructed on the correct section of the statute” — presumably subdivision (3) of Penal Law § 120.05 … — and that the amendment therefore did not change the theory of their case “as reflected in the instructions and the evidence before the [g]rand [j]ury,” asserting that the charge in the original indictment (under subdivision [7]) was an “inadvertent misstatement.” It is unclear if the People were representing that the grand jury actually indicted defendant under subdivision (3). People v Mathis, 2020 NY Slip Op 03696, Third Dept 7-2-20

 

/0 Comments/by
,

ANY CHALLENGE BASED ON A DEFECT IN THE SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION AND WAIVER OF APPEAL FOR FAILURE TO SET FORTH THE DATE AND TIME OF THE OFFENSE WAIVED BY THE GUILTY PLEA; THE PLEA WAS INVALID BECAUSE OF THE INCOMPLETE COLLOQUY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined the plea colloquy did not demonstrate defendant fully understood and voluntarily waived his right to trial. The court noted that the failure to set forth the date and time of the offense in the superior court information (SCI) and the waiver of indictment was not a jurisdictional defect and any related error was not preserved for appeal and was forfeited by the guilty plea:

Notwithstanding the omission of the date and approximate time of the offense, the waiver of indictment and the SCI, together with the underlying accusatory instruments prepared in connection with the incident, gave defendant reasonable notice of the felony sex crime with which he was being charged. In light of this, as well as the absence of any indication that defendant raised an objection before County Court to the sufficiency of the waiver of indictment or the SCI, or requested a bill of particulars, defendant’s challenge to the waiver of indictment and the SCI was forfeited by his guilty plea … . …

Preliminarily, we note that defendant’s challenge to the voluntariness of the plea is not precluded by his appeal waiver … and was preserved by his unsuccessful postallocution motion to withdraw his plea … . During the plea proceedings, County Court advised defendant that he was giving up a number of important rights by pleading guilty, including the right “to take the case to trial,” the “right to cross-examine people who testified against you,” and “the right to testify yourself or call your own witnesses.” The court further explained that he could not be convicted at trial unless the People proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the crime. The court, however, failed to mention the privilege against self-incrimination or ascertain whether defendant conferred with counsel regarding the trial-related rights that he was waiving and the constitutional consequences of entering a guilty plea … . Absent an affirmative showing that defendant fully understood and voluntarily waived his trial-related constitutional rights, the plea was invalid and must be vacated … . People v Oliver, 2020 NY Slip Op 03697, Third Dept 7-2-20

 

/0 Comments/by
, , ,

ARBITRATOR’S DECISION FINDING CLAIMANT WAS PROPERLY DISCHARGED FOR MISCONDUCT ENTITLED TO COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROCEEDING (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, determined the arbitration decision pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement should have been given collateral estoppel effect by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in the unemployment insurance proceeding. The arbitrator found that the claimant engaged in misconduct warranting discharge. The arbitrator’s decision was issued prior to the ALJ’s decision. The ALJ found claimant did not engage in misconduct and was entitled to unemployment insurance benefits:

Although “the Board is not bound by arbitration decisions regarding [a] claimant’s discharge issued subsequent to the time the Board rendered its decision”… , the Board was informed of the arbitration decision prior to its decision. As such, the factual findings of the arbitrator should have been accorded collateral estoppel effect in relation to the final unemployment insurance decision, so long as the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the misconduct issue at the arbitration hearing … . The fact that the arbitration decision was issued after the conclusion of the unemployment insurance hearing does not preclude its consideration for collateral estoppel purposes, as “the final factfinder in the administrative process is the Board, not the ALJ” … . As the Board indicated that the arbitrator’s decision was not part of the record before it — despite that decision being the focus of, and a copy of it annexed to, the employer’s administrative appeal — the matter must be remitted in order for the employer to submit the arbitration decision into the record and to provide an opportunity for claimant and the employer to provide additional evidence and testimony regarding the nature of the arbitration hearing … . Matter of Bruce (Town of N. Hempstead–Commissioner of Labor), 2020 NY Slip Op 03705, Third Dept 7-2-20

 

/0 Comments/by

ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO SCHEDULE LOSS OF USE (SLU) AWARD FOR THE PRIOR (2003) INJURY, THE AMOUNT OF THE AWARD FOR THE CURRENT (2015) INJURY MUST BE REDUCED BY THE LOSS OF USE ATTRIBUTED TO THE PRIOR INJURY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined the schedule loss of use (SLU) award should have been apportioned between the effects of a prior (2003( injury for which claimant was not compensated and the current (2015) injury to the same body member. The prior injury would have been compensable but for the finding the injury was caused by an injury at work:

In August 2015, claimant sustained another injury to his right shoulder while at work, and his ensuing claim was established for injury to the right shoulder. Ultimately, a WCLJ found that claimant had a 50% SLU of the right arm that was causally related to the 2015 accident. The WCLJ [Workers’ Compensation Law Judge] rejected the carrier’s assertion that there should be apportionment between the 2015 claim and the 2003 noncompensable injury, stating that the carrier had successfully argued at the time of the 2003 claim that one of claimant’s consultants was not credible and that there was no SLU for the 2003 injury and that it would be contradictory to now reduce claimant’s award based on that consultant’s prior SLU opinion. …

It is standard practice to apportion an SLU award involving two compensable injuries to the same body member and thus hold each carrier responsible for only that portion of the overall loss of use attributable to the injury covered by them ). That same principle is applicable to an SLU case involving a prior, noncompensable injury when the prior injury was disabling “in a compensation sense” before the occurrence of the subsequent injury. Because an SLU award “is not given for an injury sustained, but[, rather,] for the residual permanent physical and functional impairments” to the subject body member … , the question is whether there is documented prior “loss of use, function or range of motion of the body member in question” … . In other words, “apportionment may be applicable in an SLU case if the medical evidence establishes that the claimant’s prior injury [to the same body member] — had it been compensable — would have resulted in an SLU finding” … . Matter of St. Aubin v Office of Children & Family Servs., 2020 NY Slip Op 03706, Third Dept 7-2-20

 

/0 Comments/by
, , , ,

THE REGULATION REQUIRING NEW YORK HEALTH INSURANCE POLICIES TO COVER MEDICALLY NECESSARY ABORTION SERVICES, WHICH INCLUDES AN EXEMPTION FOR ‘RELIGIOUS EMPLOYERS,’ IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND WAS PROPERLY PROMULGATED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Colangelo, affirming Supreme Court, determined the regulation requiring health insurance policies in New York to provide coverage for medically necessary abortion services, which includes an exemption for “religious employers,” was properly promulgated and was constitutional. The Court of Appeals decision upholding a similar regulation for prescription contraceptives,  Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v Serio (7 NY3d 510 [2006] …), was deemed the controlling precedent:

At issue in Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany was the validity of a provision of the Women’s Health and Wellness Act (…[hereinafter WHWA]) that requires health insurance policies that provide coverage for prescription drugs to include coverage for prescription contraceptives … . The WHWA also provided an exemption from coverage for “religious employers” (Insurance Law § 3221 [l] [16] [E]), which exemption contains the identical criteria as the exemption applicable here … . … As the constitutional arguments raised by plaintiffs here are the same as those raised and rejected in Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany, Supreme Court properly concluded that they must meet the same fate by operation of the doctrine of stare decisis. “Stare decisis is the doctrine which holds that common-law decisions should stand as precedents for guidance in cases arising in the future and that a rule of law once decided by a court will generally be followed in subsequent cases presenting the same legal problem” … .

We agree with Supreme Court that an analysis of the Boreali factors [Boreali v Axelrod, 71 NY2d 1] weighs in favor of rejecting plaintiffs’ challenge that the Superintendent exceeded regulatory authority in promulgating the regulation at issue here. Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany v Vullo, 2020 NY Slip Op 03707, Third Dept 7-2-20

 

/0 Comments/by
, ,

ATTEMPTS TO DE-ACCELERATE THE DEBT, INCLUDING VOLUNTARY DISCONTINUANCES AFTER THE DEATH OF THE DEFENDANT, WERE INEFFECTUAL, THE FORECLOSURE ACTION IS TIME-BARRED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a two-justice concurrence, determined the statute of limitations began to run in 2009 when the mortgage debt was accelerated in this foreclosure action and the attempts to subsequently de-accelerate the debt after the death of the defendant, including voluntary discontinuances, were ineffectual. Therefore the action was time-barred:

With respect to the notices of discontinuance in the 2009 and 2013 actions, we note that we, as well as other Appellate Divisions, have held that the voluntary discontinuance of an action, without more, will not generally constitute an affirmative act that revokes a lender’s election to accelerate a debt … . * * *

In the 2009 action, plaintiff filed its notice of voluntary discontinuance roughly 13 months after decedent had passed away, without having sought substitution of a legal representative to act on behalf of decedent’s estate (see CPLR 1021; see also SCPA 1002, 1401, 1402 [1] [b]). Thus, as the action was stayed and there was no substitution of a proper defendant, the notice of voluntary discontinuance filed in the 2009 action was without effect. …  As for the notice of discontinuance filed in the 2013 action, plaintiff commenced that action against decedent, despite the fact that she had died more than two years earlier. As a result, the 2013 action was a nullity from its inception and the subsequent notice of voluntary discontinuance was void … .

We similarly find that, under the circumstances of this case, the July 2015 and September 2015 notices did not constitute affirmative acts that would notify decedent’s legal representative that the prior debt acceleration was revoked, that the debt was de-accelerated and that the loan was reinstated to installment payments. Irrespective of the content and substance of the July 2015 and September 2015 notices, plaintiff addressed the notices to decedent, who had been deceased for more than four years, and mailed them to the mortgaged property. The record reflects that the September 2015 letter, which was sent by both regular mail and certified mail, was returned as undeliverable. Beneficial Homeowner Serv. Corp. v Heirs at Large of Ramona E. Thwaits, 2020 NY Slip Op 03709, Third Dept 7-2-20

 

/0 Comments/by

CLAIMANT ENTITLED TO A SCHEDULE LOSS OF USE (SLU) AWARD DESPITE RETURNING TO WORK AT PREINJURY WAGES (SECOND DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined claimant was entitled to a schedule loss of use (SLU) award even though claimant returned to work at preinjury wages:

For the reasons set forth in Matter of Arias v City of New York (182 AD3d 170 [2020]), we find that the Board’s disregard of Matter of Taher v Yiota Taxi, Inc. (162 AD3d 1288 [2018] …) was in error and, therefore, reverse. As this Court has recently held, “where a claimant who has sustained both schedule and nonschedule permanent injuries in the same work-related accident has returned to work at preinjury wages and, thus, receives no award based on his or her nonschedule permanent partial disability classification, he or she is entitled to an SLU award” … . As there was a finding of permanency as to claimant’s neck injury and he has returned to work at preinjury wages, he is entitled to an SLU award for the remaining injuries … . Matter of Cruz v Suffolk County Police Dept., 2020 NY Slip Op 03713, Second Dept 7-2-20

Similar issues and result: Matter of Cosides v Town of Oyster Bay Sanitation, 2020 NY Slip Op 03710, Third Dept 7-2-20

 

/0 Comments/by
,

THE 3RD DEPARTMENT REFUSED TO AMEND THE NOTICE OF APPEAL TO INSERT AN ORDER FROM WHICH NO APPEAL HAD BEEN TAKEN; APPEAL DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, dismissing respondent mother’s appeal, determined mother failed to timely appeal the order terminating her parental rights, Mother submitted a notice of appeal after she was served with the April 2018 permanency hearing order, not within 35 days of her being service with the November 2016 order terminating her parental rights:

Respondent contends that the affidavit submitted with her notice of appeal demonstrates that she intended to appeal the November 2016 order terminating her parental rights, rather than the April 5, 2018 permanency hearing order. Accordingly, respondent asks this Court to “construe [her appeal] as such, and deem it timely filed.” Despite this request, the order terminating respondent’s parental rights was entered and mailed to respondent in November 2016, 18 months before her May 2018 notice of appeal. Thus, even if we were to construe it as respondent requests, because the notice of appeal was not filed and served “within 35 days after the order was mailed” to respondent, it was untimely and we lack jurisdiction to hear the appeal … . Further, despite respondent’s contention that her affidavit accompanying the notice of appeal demonstrates her intent to appeal the order terminating her parental rights, this affidavit explicitly and repeatedly references the permanency hearing order. Although this Court “may treat a notice of appeal which contains an inaccurate description of the judgment or order appealed from as valid,” it may not, as respondent requests, “amend a notice of appeal so as to insert therein an order from which no appeal has in fact ever been taken” … . Matter of Alan VV. (Amanda RR.), 2020 NY Slip Op 03574, Third Dept 6-26-20

 

/0 Comments/by
, ,

DESPITE EVIDENCE THAT BOTH DRIVERS WERE FAMILIAR WITH THE INTERSECTION WHERE THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT OCCURRED, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PROPER SIGNAGE COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE ACCIDENT; THE TOWN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs’ expert raised a question of fact whether proper signage at the intersection where the traffic accident occurred could have prevented the collision. The fact that both drivers were familiar with the intersection did not require that the town’s motion for summary judgment be granted (as Supreme Court had found):

“As a general rule, the question of proximate cause is to be decided by the finder of fact,” but it may be decided as a matter of law “where only one conclusion may be drawn from the established facts” … . Here, in support of its motion for summary judgment, the Town submitted evidence revealing that the drivers had some familiarity with the intersection, together with expert proof that the existing markings and traffic control devices were appropriate and consistent with applicable design standards. However, plaintiffs countered the Town’s showing with evidence that additional devices, such as a stop sign and painted stop bar, as well as pavement markings indicating the proper turning radius, were required for the subject intersection by applicable design standards; plaintiffs’ expert opined that the absence of such markings and devices was a substantial contributing factor to this collision. Notably, “a disagreement . . . between experts merely creates a question of credibility to be resolved by the finder of fact” … . Upon review, we do not find the opinions expressed by plaintiffs’ expert in this matter to be lacking in either substance or foundation … . O’Keefe v Wohl, 2020 NY Slip Op 03579, Third Dept 6-25-20

 

/0 Comments/by
, ,

PERSONAL INJURY ACTION BY MOTHER OF A 14-YEAR-OLD KILLED WHEN WORKING ILLEGALLY ON DEFENDANT FARM PROPERLY DISMISSED; THE RECOVERY UNDER THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW WAS THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY BECAUSE THE INTENTIONAL-TORT EXCEPTION DID NOT APPLY; THE ACTION WAS PRECLUDED BY THE RES JUDICATA DOCTRINE; IN ADDITION THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE DEFENDANTS ACTED WILLFULLY OR INTENTIONALLY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the personal injury action brought by decedent’s mother was properly dismissed because the recovery pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Law was the exclusive remedy. Plaintiff’s decedent, 14-years-old, was killed operating a skid steer while illegally employed by defendant’s (Park’s) farm. Although plaintiffs recovered Workers’ Compensation benefits, plaintiffs argued an exception to the exclusive-remedy restriction for intentional torts applied. The Third Department held the exclusive-remedy restriction applied and there was no evidence of willful or intentional conduct on the part of the defendants:

Inasmuch as the [Workers’ Compensation] Board had already “determined that [decedent’s] injuries were suffered accidentally and in the course of employment” for the Farm, the claim that the Farm or its employees are liable “for an intentional tort based on the same event is barred by the exclusive remedy and finality provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law, and by principles of res judicata” … . Even if the Board’s decision did not have preclusive effect, however, Supreme Court properly rejected the contention that Park engaged in “deliberate acts . . . to injure [decedent] or to have him injured” so as to bring this case within an exception to the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law … . The record reflects that decedent used the skid steer without anyone’s knowledge and that, following the investigation into decedent’s death, Park pleaded guilty to willful failure to pay unemployment insurance contributions (see Labor Law § 633), endangering the welfare of a child (see Penal Law § 260.10) and prohibited employment of a minor (see Labor Law § 133). It could be inferred from those facts that Park was negligent in failing to supervise decedent, or even reckless in exposing decedent to dangerous work that his age left him unsuited for, but not that Park acted out of a “willful intent to harm” decedent, as required … . Smith v Park, 2020 NY Slip Op 03583, Third Dept 6-25-20

 

/0 Comments/by

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

Copyright © 2020 New York Appellate Digest, LLC
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy