You are here: / / JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED DEFENDANT TO PLEAD TO A LESSER OFFENSE WITHOUT...
,

JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED DEFENDANT TO PLEAD TO A LESSER OFFENSE WITHOUT THE PROSECUTOR’S PERMISSION, HOWEVER NEITHER A WRIT OF PROHIBITION NOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS WAS WARRANTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the writ of prohibition against a judge for accepting a plea to a lesser offense without the prosecutor’s permission was not warranted because the judge (the respondent) acknowledged the mistake. The court further determined it did not have the authority to grant the writ of mandamus, seeking vacation of the plea and reinstatement of the more serious charge, because the plea had already been entered and the conditional discharge sentence had been commenced:

​

Under CPL 220.10 (3), “the defendant may, with both the permission of the court and the consent of the people, enter a plea of guilty of a lesser included offense.” “Where the record shows that the prosecutor’s consent to a plea is premised on a negotiated sentence and a lesser sentence is later deemed more appropriate, the People should be given the opportunity to withdraw their consent” … . Respondent concedes in his brief that he committed a legal error in accepting Hernandez’s plea to a reduced charge without petitioner’s consent. The question therefore distills to whether a writ of prohibition or writ of mandamus is warranted given that Hernandez’s guilty plea has already been accepted, she was already sentenced by respondent to, among other things, a one-year conditional discharge period and such period expired in November 2017.

“[T]he extraordinary remedy of prohibition is only available where a body or officer proceeded, is proceeding or is about to proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction and there is a clear legal right to such relief” … . Petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition to prohibit respondent from accepting guilty pleas to reduced charges in the future without his consent. Respondent, however, noted at the sentencing hearing that this was the first time that he had ever reduced a charge without petitioner’s consent and that he did so “under the circumstances of [the] case.” Given that the record does not indicate that respondent has undertaken such similar action in the past or has expressed an intention to do so in the future, and taking into account respondent’s concession that his actions were erroneous, petitioner is not entitled to a writ of prohibition … . Matter of Carnright v Williams, 2018 NY Slip Op 00206, Third Dept 1-11-18

/by
You might also like
Teacher at a Community College Entitled to Unemployment Insurance Benefits—Teacher Was Offered Employment in the Next School Year But the Hours Were Drastically Reduced—Therefore the Teacher Did Not Receive “Reasonable Assurance of Continued Employment” within the Meaning of Labor Law 590(10)
NO RECORD OF JUDGE’S DISCUSSION OF A JURY NOTE WITH COUNSEL, MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED; DEFENDANT AUTHORIZED HIS AGENT TO SHOW HIS LETTER TO HIS ATTORNEY TO A THIRD PARTY, NO ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE; SENTENCES CANNOT BE CONSECUTIVE FOR CRIMES WITH THE SAME ACTUS REUS (THIRD DEPT).
SHORTLY BEFORE TRIAL, THE PEOPLE WERE PROPERLY ALLOWED TO AMEND THE REFERENCE TO A DATE IN THE INDICTMENT (THIRD DEPT).
In a Slip and Fall Case, Plaintiff Was Unable to Raise a Question of Fact About Whether a Defect in a Concrete Slab Was More than “Trivial”—Criteria Explained
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE DEFENDANT PARTICIPATED IN THE MUGGING, INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THE VICTIM SUFFERED PHYSICAL INJURY, AND INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE DEFENDANT CONSTRUCTIVELY POSSESSED THE VICTIM’S WALLET AND CELL PHONE (THIRD DEPT).
Employer’s Claim for Reimbursement from the Special Disability Fund for Death Benefits Paid Re: an Employee Who Died from Dust Disease Time-Barred—Even Though the Injury to the Employee Predated the Last Date for Such Claims, the Death Occurred After the Statutory Cut-Off Date
PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES AS THE PREVAILING PARTY IN THIS FOIL PROCEEDING; RESPONDENT HAD AGREED TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO VIEW THE ELECTRONIC FILES USING ITS VIEWING PROGRAM, BUT HAD DENIED, FOR NO GOOD REASON, PETITIONER’S REQUEST TO TRANSFER THE FILES TO A FLASH DRIVE (THIRD DEPT).
NO AGREEMENT TO INCREASE INSURANCE COVERAGE OF HOME DESTROYED BY FIRE AFTER RENOVATIONS, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INSURANCE BROKERS AND THE INSUREDS (THIRD DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

Copyright © 2023 New York Appellate Digest, LLC
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

FURTIVE MOVEMENTS JUSTIFIED POLICE OFFICER’S LIMITED SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S... APPEAL OF SORA RISK ASSESSMENT NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE APPELLATE DIVISION, COUNTY...