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ABSENT AMBIGUITY A COURT CAN NOT CONSIDER EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO INTERPRET A CONTRACT; HERE PLAINTIFF HAD BROUGHT TWO ACTIONS AGAINST THE CITY CHALLENGING TWO SEPARATE ARRESTS; THERE WAS NO INDICATION THE RELEASE ONLY APPLIED TO THE ACTION DESCRIBED IN THE CAPTION OF THE RELEASE; THE SPACE FOR DESCRIBING ANY ACTION TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE RELEASE WAS LEFT BLANK; THEREFORE THE RELEASE APPLIED TO BOTH ACTIONS; THERE WAS A DISSENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a dissent, determined the release signed by plaintiff applied to both actions plaintiff had brought against the city, not just the action identified in the caption of the release. Plaintiff brought two separate actions challenging two arrests occurring 14 days apart. The release identified the action stemming from the second arrest and left a blank space to describe anything to be excluded from the release. That space was left blank. Supreme Court and the dissent determined that the plaintiff intended to exclude the first action from the release but plaintiff’s attorney inadvertently left the space for the exclusion blank:

Like any contract, a release must be “read as a whole to determine its purpose and intent,” and extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent may be considered only if the agreement is ambiguous … . “A contract is unambiguous if the language it uses has a definite and precise meaning, unattended by danger of misconception in the purport of the [agreement] itself, and concerning which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion” … . “More to the point, an ambiguity never arises out of what is not written at all, but only out of what was written so blindly and imperfectly that its meaning is doubtful” … .

Here, there was nothing surreptitious about the City sensibly filling in plaintiff’s name as the releasor, the case name and the index number referrable to Action 2, in the general release to identify the specific matter being settled. What followed are standard, boiler-plate operative terms of this general release, namely, a broadly worded waiver provision and a claim exclusion clause, both of which are clear and unambiguous. Thus, there was no legal basis for the motion court to use any extrinsic evidence, discern an unfounded ambiguity therefrom and ultimately surmise the parties’ intent to limit the scope of the general release to Action 2 … . Smith v City of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 01198, First Dept 3-4-25

Practice Point: Here Supreme Court considered extrinsic evidence indicating that the release was meant to apply to only one of two actions plaintiff brought against the city. The First Department held that, because the release was not ambiguous, the court cannot consider extrinsic evidence. Therefore the release, by its terms, applied to both actions.

 

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