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DEFENSE COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO REQUEST THAT THE JURY BE INSTRUCTED ON THE HEIGHTENED DEFINITION OF IMPAIRMENT DID NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE; AT THE TIME OF THE TRIAL THERE WAS NO APPELLATE AUTHORITY FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE HEIGHTENED DEFINITION OF IMPAIRMENT IN ANY CONTEXT OTHER THAN VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, affirming defendant’s conviction, over a dissent, determined that the heightened definition of “impaired” which has been applied to a vehicular manslaughter charge need not be applied to driving while ability impaired by drugs or a combination thereof, the charges against defendant here. Therefore the failure to request that the jury be instructed to apply the heightened definition of impaired did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel:

At the time of defendant’s trial, there was no appellate authority which warranted a jury instruction concerning the heightened intoxication standard relative to the crimes that were pending against defendant. In Caden N. [189 AD3d 84], this Court, by its own express language, limited its holding to the crime of vehicular manslaughter, which of course is not present here. That is, this Court was careful to state that it was defining impairment “in the context of assessing whether a person has committed the crime of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree” (People v Caden N., 189 AD3d at 90). In the event that this Court had also wished to apply the new definition of impairment to the underlying crimes of driving while ability impaired by drugs or by a combination thereof, it surely would have explicitly stated as much. * * *

In the absence of any such authority, defense counsel properly acquiesced to the jury being charged in accordance with the definition of impairment that was provided in the Criminal Jury Instructions as of that time. Thus, under these circumstances, it cannot be said that any reasonable defense counsel would have requested the intoxication instruction in place of the impairment instruction, and counsel was not ineffective for failing to do so. People v Ambrosio, 2025 NY Slip Op 01133, Third Dept 2-27-25

Practice Point: The Third Department has applied a heightened definition of impairment for vehicular manslaughter cases. The Fourth Department refused to follow suit. The law in this area is in flux.

 

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